f 


dforagn  &tattfmnt 


KICHELIEU 


KICHELIEU 


BY 


RICHARD  LODGE,  M.A. 

PROFESSOR  OF   HISTORY   IN   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF  GLASGOW,    FORMERLY 
FELLOW   AND   TUTOR   OF   BRASENOSE   COLLEGE,    OXFORD 


MACMILLAN   AND   CO.,  LIMITED 
ST.   MARTIN'S   STREET,  LONDON 

1908 


First  Edition  1896 
Reprinted  1908 


CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION 

Rise  of  the  French  monarchy — The  new  appanaged  nobles  and  tho 
Hundred  Years'  War — Charles  VII.  expels  the  English — The 
standing  army  and  the  permanent  taille — Louis  XL  humili- 
ates the  nobles — Strength  of  the  monarchy  under  Francis  I. — 
Evil  results  of  the  sale  of  offices — The  wars  of  religion — De- 
cline of  the  royal  power — Successes  of  Henry  IV. — Victory  of 
the  crown  only  partial  —  Independence  of  the  nobles,  the 
Huguenots  and  the  sovereign  courts — The  minority  of  Louis 
XIII.  —  Greatness  of  Richelieu's  work  —  Difficulty  of  his 
biography Page  1 


CHAPTER   I 

HICHELIEU'S    EARLY    LIFE 
1585-1614 

The  family  of  du  Plessis — The  du  Plessis  do  Richelieu — Career  of 
Fran9ois  du  Plessis  —  Birth  of  Armand  Jean  —  His  life  at 
Richelieu — He  enters  the  College  of  Navarre — Transferred  to 
the  Academy — The  bishopric  of  Lu9on — Armand  returns  to 
the  University — Consecrated  bishop  at  Rome — He  quits  Paris 
for  Lu9on  —  Motives  for  this  step — Letters  to  Madame  de 
Bourges — His  conduct  as  bishop — His  religious  attitude — 
Early  relations  with  Jansenism — Connection  with  Berulle  and 


vi  RICHELIEU 

Father  Joseph — Death  of  Henry  IV. — Richelieu  in  Paris- 
Acquaintance  with  Barbin  and  Concini  —  Returns  to  his 
diocese  —  His  attitude  towards  parties  at  court — Letter  to 
Concini — Election  to  the  States-General — Personal  appearance 
— Feeble  health — Character  and  aims  .  .  .  Page  8 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    STATES-GENERAL RICHELIEU'S    FIRST    MINISTRY 

1614-1617 

Questions  before  the  States-General — The  paulette  —  Quarrels  of 
clergy  and  third  estate — Richelieu  orator  of  the  clergy — Concini 
and  the  ministers — Conde  and  the  Huguenots  oppose  Mary 
de  Medici — Treaty  of  Loudun — Fall  of  the  old  ministers — 
Richelieu  rises  to  prominence — Conspiracy  of  the  nobles— 
Arrest  of  Cond6  and  flight  of  his  associates — Richelieu  receives 
office  —  His  difficulties  —  Measures  against  the  nobles  — 
Assassination  of  Concini — Fall  of  the  ministers — Richelieu  at 
the  Louvre — He  quits  the  court 26 


CHAPTER   III 

RICHELIEU    AND    THE    QUEEN-MOTHER 
1617-1624 

Government  in  the  hands  of  Luynes — Hostility  to  the  Huguenots 
— Edict  to  restore  church  lands  in  Beam — Richelieu  exiled  to 
his  diocese — His  answer  to  the  four  ministers  of  Charenton — 
Exile  in  Avignon  —  Writes  the  Instruction  du  Clir&ien  — 
Unpopularity  of  Luynes — The  nobles  join  the  queen-mother — 
Her  escape  from  Blois — Richelieu  sent  to  join  Mary  de  Medici 
at  Angouleme  —  His  policy  at  this  period  —  The  treaty  of 
Angouleme — Henri  de  Richelieu  killed  in  a  duel — Continued 
hostility  between  Mary  de  Medici  and  Luynes — The  nobles 


CONTENTS  vil 

again  rally  round  the  queen-mother — Civil  war — The  rout  of 
Pont-de-Ce" — Richelieu  negotiates  a  treaty — -His  relations  with 
Luynes — Enforcement  of  royal  edict  in  B6arn — Huguenot  dis- 
content and  organisation — Campaign  of  1621 — Luynes  con- 
stable— His  death — Mary  de  Medici  still  opposed  by  Conde 
and  the  ministers — Campaign  of  1622 — Treaty  of  Montpellier 
—  Conde  leaves  France  in  disgust  —  Richelieu  receives  the 
cardinal's  hat — The  government  of  the  Brularts  (Sillery  and 
Puisieux) — La  Vieuville  procures  the  dismissal  of  the  ministers 
— Richelieu  admitted  to  the  council  .  .  .  Page  39 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE    VALTELLINE    AND    LA    EOCHELLE 
1624-1628 

Richelieu's  schemes  of  domestic  reform — Compelled  to  abandon 
them  for  foreign  politics — Threatening  progress  of  the  house  of 
Hapsburg — Difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  ministers — Renewed 
alliance  with  the  Dutch  —  Negotiations  about  the  English 
marriage — Fall  of  la  Vieuville — Richelieu  first  minister — His 
policy  in  the  English  negotiations — Question  of  the  Valtelline 
— The  forts  in  the  hands  of  the  pope — De  Cceuvres  seizes  the 
Valtelline — Revolt  of  the  Huguenots — Ships  obtained  from 
England  and  Holland  —  Naval  victory  over  the  rebels  — 
Negotiations  with  the  Huguenots — Indignation  of  the  Ultra- 
montane party  against  Richelieu  —  Treaty  of  Monzon  with 
Spain — Treaty  with  the  Huguenots — Conspiracy  of  Ornano 
and  Madame  de  Chevreuse — Collapse  of  the  conspiracy — Fato 
of  Chalais — Richelieu  appointed  superintendent  of  navigation 
and  commerce — His  maritime  schemes — Quarrel  between  France 
and  England  —  Buckingham's  expedition  to  Rhe  — •  Critical 
position  of  France — Energy  displayed  by  Richelieu — Relief  of 
the  fort  of  St.  Martin — Buckingham  compelled  to  abandon 
Rhe — Siege  of  La  Rochelle — Plan  of  blocking  the  harbour — 
Period  of  the  king's  absence  —  Richelieu  directs  the  siege — 
Failure  of  the  English  attempts  to  relieve  La  Rochelle — 
Surrender  of  the  city — Its  treatment  ....  55 


viii  RICHELIEU 

CHAPTEE  V 

THE    MANTUAN    SUCCESSION    AND    THE    DAY    OF    DUPES 
1628-1631 

The  question  of  the  Mantuan  succession — Siege  of  Casale — Louis 
XIII.  and  Richelieu  cross  the  Alps  for  its  relief — Treaty  of 
Susa — Peace  with  England — Treaty  between  Spain  and  Rohan 
— Campaign  in  Languedoc — Submission  of  the  Huguenots — 
They  retain  religious  toleration  but  lose  their  political  privileges 
— Discontent  of  Gaston  of  Orleans  —  He  goes  to  Lorraine  — 
Enmity  of  Mary  de  Medici  against  Richelieu — Its  motives — 
Relations  of  Richelieu  and  Louis  XIII. — Gaston  returns  to 
France — Imperialist  troops  sent  to  Mantua — Richelieu's  second 
expedition  to  Italy — Attitude  of  Charles  Emmanuel  of  Savoy — 
The  French  take  Pinerolo — Conquest  of  Savoy — Fall  of  Mantua 
— Siege  of  Casale — Truce  of  Rivalta — Relations  of  France  with 
Gustavus  Adolphus — The  emperor  and  the  Catholic  League — 
Diet  of  Ratisbon — Treaty  of  Ratisbon — Richelieu  refuses  to 
confirm  it — Illness  of  Louis  XIII. — Relief  of  Casale — Open 
quarrel  of  Mary  de  Medici  with  Richelieu — The  Day  of  Dupes — 
Gaston  goes  to  Orleans  —  Mary  de  Medici  at  Compiegne — 
Gaston  goes  to  Lorraine — The  queen-mother  escapes  to  Brussels 
— Settlement  of  the  Mantuan  succession  by  treaties  of  Cherasco 
— France  keeps  Pinerolo — Successes  of  Richelieu  .  Page  81 

CHAPTER  VI 

FRANCE    INVOLVED    IN    THE    EUROPEAN    WAR 
1631-1635 

Richelieu  made  duke  and  peer — Threatened  coalition  in  favour  of 
Gaston — Lorraine — Treaty  of  Vic  —  Gaston's  marriage  and 
retreat  to  Brussels — Gustavus  Adolphus  in  Germany — Services 
which  he  renders  to  France — Louis  XIII.  and  Richelieu  in 
Lorraine — Treaty  of  Liverdun — Gaston  in  France— Montmor- 
ency — Battle  of  Castelnaudari — Execution  of  Montmorency — 
Gaston  retires  to  Brussels — Death  of  Gustavus  Adolphus — 
Illness  and  recovery  of  Richelieu — Fall  and  imprisonment  of 


CONTENTS  ix 

Chlteauneuf — Richelieu  and  his  colleagues — League  of  Heil- 
bronn — Renewed  invasion  of  Lorraine — Surrender  of  Nancy — 
Abdication  of  Charles  IV. — Complete  occupation  of  Lorraine — 
Gaston's  marriage  with  Margaret  annulled — Return  of  Gaston 
and  Puylaurens — Imprisonment  and  death  of  Puylaurens — 
Wallenstein's  policy — His  death — Battle  of  Nordlingen — Break 
up  of  the  Protestant  League  in  Germany — Treaty  of  Prague — 
Dangers  to  France  if  the  war  came  to  an  end — Seizure  of  the 
elector  of  Trier  by  the  Spaniards — France  declares  war  against 
Spain Page  110 

CHAPTER  VII 

REVERSES    AND    TRIUMPHS 
1635-1640 

French  alliances — Military  preparations — Disasters  of  1635  in  the 
Netherlands,  Germany,  Italy,  and  at  sea — Causes  of  failure — 
Campaign  of  1636  —  Invasion  of  Picardy — Panic  in  Paris — 
Richelieu's  courage — Repulse  of  the  Spaniards — Conspiracy  of 
Orleans  and  Soissons — Risings  in  Normandy  and  Guienne — 
Episode  of  Louise  de  la  Fayette — Campaign  of  1637 — More 
French  reverses — Loss  of  the  Valtelline — The  French  fleet 
recovers  the  Lerins — Series  of  triumphs  begin  in  1638 — Bern- 
hard  of  Saxe-  Weimar  takes  Breisach — His  death — France 
becomes  his  heir — The  Spaniards  in  Piedmont — Battle  and 
capture  of  Turin — Naval  victories — Destruction  of  Spanish 
fleet  in  the  Downs — Relations  with  England — Revolt  of  Cata- 
lonia and  Portugal — Capture  of  Arras — Extent  of  Richelieu's 
triumphs — Birth  of  the  dauphin — Death  of  Father  Joseph  133 

CHAPTER  VIII 

DOMESTIC    GOVERNMENT 

Richelieu's  influence  almost  as  great  in  France  as  abroad — The  aims 
of  his  domestic  policy — Treatment  of  the  Huguenots — Measures 
against  the  nobles :  the  destruction  of  fortresses ;  edict  against 
duelling  ;  appointment  of  intendants  —  Relations  with  the 
Parliament  of  Paris — Hostility  to  the  provincial  estates — 


RICHELIEU 

Organisation  of  the  Conseil  du  Roy  —  The  Conseil  d'e'tat — 
Centralisation  inevitable — Merits  of  Richelieu's  government : 
military  and  naval  organisation  ;  patronage  of  commerce  and 
colonisation  —  Defects :  neglect  of  manufactures  and  agri- 
culture ;  financial  maladministration — Attempts  to  conciliate 
public  opinion — Meetings  of  notables — Patronage  of  literature 
and  foundation  of  the  Academy — Origin  of  the  Gazette  de  la 
France Page  157 


CHAPTEE   IX 

RICHELIEU    AND    THE    CHURCH 

Condition  of  the  French  Church  during  the  religious  wars — 
Religious  revival  in  the  seventeenth  century  —  Charitable 
orders — Advance  of  clerical  and  secular  education — Monastic 
reform — Richelieu's  relations  with  the  papacy — Relations  of 
Church  and  State  —  Clerical  taxation  —  Richelieu  and  St. 
Cyran — Richelieu's  opportunism  in  ecclesiastical  matters — 
His  superstition — Case  of  Urbain  Grandier  .  .  .  184 

CHAPTER  X 

RICHELIEU'S  LAST  TEARS 
1641,  1642 

Military  events  of  1641  and  1642 — Rising  of  Soissons — His  death — 
Conspiracy  of  Cinq-Mars — Richelieu's  illness  at  Nar  bonne — 
His  will — Detection  of  the  plot — Execution  of  Cinq-Mars  and 
de  Thou — Completeness  of  Richelieu's  success — His  death — 
Continuance  of  his  policy — Gradual  relaxation  of  severity — 
Death  of  Louis  XIII. — Permanence  of  Richelieu's  influence — 
Richelieu's  character — His  ill-health — His  isolation — The  in- 
security of  his  position — His  relations  with  Louis  XIII. — His 
vindictiveness — His  unpopularity  .  .  .  ...  207 

APPENDIX  A. — The  Genealogy  of  the  Richelieu  family  .  .  231 
APPENDIX  B. — The  chief  books  on  the  period  .  .  .  232 
APPENDIX  C. — The  Testament  Politique  ....  234 


INTRODUCTION 

Rise  of  the  French  monarchy — The  new  appanaged  nobles  and  the 
Hundred  Years'  War — Charles  VII.  expels  the  English — The 
standing  army  and  the  permanent  taille — Louis  XL  humiliates 
the  nobles — Strength  of  the  monarchy  under  Francis  I. — Evil 
results  of  the  sale  of  offices — The  wars  of  religion — Decline  of 
the  royal  power — Successes  of  Henry  IV. — Victory  of  the  crown 
only  partial — Independence  of  the  nobles,  the  Huguenots,  and 
the  sovereign  courts — The  minority  of  Louis  XIII. — Greatness 
of  Richelieu's  work — Difficulty  of  his  biography. 

THE  history  of  France  from  the  tenth  to  the  close  of 
the  eighteenth  century  is  bound  up  with  the  history  of 
the  French  monarchy.  Under  the  early  Capets  France 
was  a  mere  geographical  expression  ;  its  kings  were 
little  more  than  the  titular  chiefs  among  a  number  of 
feudal  nobles,  and  their  practical  authority  was  limited 
to  the  He  de  France.  From  this  powerless  condition 
the  monarchy  was  gradually  raised  by  the  energy  of 
Louis  VI.,  the  prudence  of  Philip  Augustus,  and  the 
legislative  ability  and  high  personal  character  of  Louis 
IX.  But  the  real  founder  of  absolute  monarchy  in 
France  was  Philip  IV.,  who  created  that  administrative 
system  which  gradually  extended  itself  over  the  whole 
kingdom,  and  undermined  the  independent  local  institu- 
tions of  feudalism.  Successful  war  and  the  extinction 


2  RICHELIEU 

of  the  old  mediaeval  families  enabled  the  crown  to 
bring  most  of  the  provinces  under  its  direct  rule.  But 
a  new  danger  arose  from  the  practice  of  granting  these 
provinces  out  as  appanages  to  members  of  the  royal 
family,  who  formed  a  new  nobility  as  eager  for  inde- 
pendence as  the  feudal  magnates  whose  place  they  had 
taken.  At  the  same  time 'the  disasters  of  the  wars 
with  Edward  III.  and  Henry  V.  seriously  weakened  the 
monarchy,  which  sunk  again  into  impotence  under  John 
II.  and  Charles  VI.  But  the  falling  structure  was 
successfully  rebuilt  under  Charles  VII.  and  Louis  XL 
In  the  former  reign  the  English  were  expelled,  a  stand- 
ing army  established,  and  a  revenue  secured  by  the 
imposition  of  the  permanent  taille.  Louis  XI.  broke  up 
the  formidable  League  of  the  Public  Weal,  and  the 
decline  of  the  great  Burgundian  power  on  the  death  of 
Charles  the  Bold  freed  the  French  crown  from  its  most 
dangerous  rival.  The  marriage  of  the  heiress  of  Brittany 
to  two  successive  kings  extinguished  the  independence 
of  the  last  of  the  feudal  provinces.  The  victory  of  the 
monarchy  seemed  to  be  assured,  when  Francis  I.,  at  the 
head  of  a  compact  and  well-organised  kingdom,  success- 
fully resisted  the  enormous  but  ill-compacted  power  of 
Charles  V. 

But  a  subtle  evil  was  already  undermining  the 
foundations  of  this  imposing  edifice,  and  was  destined 
in  the  end  to  overthrow  it.  This  was  financial  mal- 
administration. The  chronic  deficit,  which  was  the 
chief  immediate  cause  of  the  Eevolution  of  1789,  was 
already  in  existence  in  the  sixteenth  century.  It  is 
not  a  little  curious  that  France,  the  home  of  financial 
theories,  has  only  produced  in  its  long  history  three 


INTRODUCTION  8 

great   financial    administrators — Jacques    Coeur,   Sully, 

^*^""*'*^^SHBP"pta*  •     ^M^^M 

and  Colbert;  and  their  efforts  only  succeeded  in  post- 
poning the  inevitable  crash.  Among  the  ruinous 
expedients  to  which  the  crown  was  impelled  by  an 
empty  treasury,  the  most  fatal  was  the  sale  of  offices. 
This  practice,  which  originated  in  the  fifteenth  century, 
was  raised  into  a  system  by  Louis  XII.,  who  is  said  to 
have  copied  the  usages  of  the  Roman  court.  In  order 
to  make  these  offices  valuable  their  holders  must  be 
irremovable.  Thus  the  crown,  of  its  own  accord, 
surrendered  the  control  over  its  own  officials.  The 
administrative  institutions,  such  as  the  parliament  of 
Paris,  which  had  been  the  most  efficient  agents  in 
extending  the  royal  power,  became  in  the  seventeenth 
century  the  most  serious  opponents  of  royalty. 

The  period  following  the  death  of  Henry  II.  (1560) 
is  the  most  critical  in  the  history  of  France.  A  country 
on  which  geography  had  imposed  the  necessity  of  unity, 
and  which  had  risen  to  greatness  in  Europe  by  attaining 
that  unity  under  a  strong  monarchy,  was  suddenly 
divided  by  the  most  powerful  of  forces — religion.  Not 
only  was  the  practical  authority  of  the  crown  almost 
annihilated  during  the  long  struggle  between  Catholics 
and  Huguenots,  but  its  theoretical  foundations  were 
torn  up  and  examined  by  polemical  writers  on  both 
sides.  While  the  Huguenots  endeavoured  to  conciliate 
support  by  vindicating  the  independence  of  nobles  and 
municipalities,  the  Jesuits  taught  that  the  voice  of  the 
people  was  the  voice  of  God,  and  that  circumstances 
might  arise  in  which  tyrannicide  was  not  only  a  right 
but  a  duty.  At  the  same  time  military  necessities 
forced  the  kings  to  intrust  the  government  of  the  great 


4  RICHELIEU 

provinces  to  powerful  nobles,  who  used  their  delegated 
authority  in  their  own  interests,  and  threatened  to 
revive  a  military  feudalism  which  recalled  the  anarchy 
of  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries. 

The  struggle  ended  at  last  in  the  defeat  of  both  the 
extreme  parties ;  and  their  defeat  was  due  to  their 
collision  with  that  passionate  desire  for  unity  which  has 
been  the  dominant  force  in  French  history  from  that  day 
to  this.  The  Huguenots,  the  prototypes  of  the  later 
Girondins,  aimed  at  establishing  a  system  of  local  isola- 
tion, which  must  have  effaced  France  from  among  the 
great  states  of  Europe.  The  success  of  the  League  would 
have  subjected  the  Gallican  Church  to  Eome,  and  would 
have  made  France  a  vassal  and  tool  of  the  Spanish  Haps- 
burgs.  The  victory  of  Henry  IV.  and  the  middle  party, 
which  represented  national  interests  and  instincts,  was 
secured  by  Henry's  acceptance  of  Roman  Catholicism,  and 
by  his  grant  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  to  the  Huguenots. 

Henry  IV.  is  a  great  as  well  as  an  attractive  figure 
in  history,  and  he  deserves  much  of  the  idolatry  with 
which  the  French  have  always  regarded  him.  He 
restored  order  after  the  chaos  of  the  religious  wars. 
He  founded  the  Bourbon  monarchy,  which  was  to 
preside  for  the  next  two  centuries  over  the  history  of 
France,  and  was  to  guide  that  country  to  an  ascendency 
in  Europe,  to  which  it  still  looks  back  with  boastful 
regret.  With  the  aid  of  Sully  he  restored  the  balance 
between  income  and  expenditure,  and  encouraged  the 
development  of  the  internal  resources  of  France.  He 
humbled  the  power  of  Philip  II.,  and  inaugurated  the 
foreign  policy  which  was  followed  with  such  success  by 
Richelieu,  Mazarin,  and  Louis  XIV. 


INTRODUCTION  5 

But  the  work  of  Henry  IV.  was  still  incomplete, 
when  he  was  removed  by  the  dagger  of  Ravaillac. 
Neither  he  nor  Sully  had  the  genius  or  the  foresight  to 
found  a  new  system  of  government,  which  was  necessary 
for  the  triumph  of  the  new  dynasty.  Even  in  the  task 
of  destroying  abuses,  both  king  and  minister  were  tram- 
melled by  their  past  lives,  and  by  the  circumstances 
under  which  Henry  had  come  to  the  throne.  In  some 
matters  a  policy  of  compromise  was  all  that  was  possible 
for  them.  Under  their  rule  the  forces  of  disorder  were 
checked  rather  than  annihilated.  Again,  the  provincial 
governorships  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  great 
nobles,  though  their  authority  was  limited  by  the  ap- 
pointment of  lieutenant-generals,  who  were  to  act  as 
the  agents  of  the  crown,  and  by  the  policy  of 'intrusting 
the  chief  towns  in  a  province  to  persons  independent  of 
the  governor.  And  the  supplementary  clauses  of  the 
Edict  of  Nantes  conferred  upon  the  Huguenots,  not  only 
religious  toleration,  but  also  a  political  independence 
which  enabled  them  to  stir  up  disorder  whenever  it 
suited  their  interests.  Above  all,  the  sale  of  offices, 
instead  of  being  abolished,  was  systematised  by  the  in- 
stitution of  the  paulette.  Members  of  the  parliament 
and  of  the  other  central  courts,  by  paying  an  annual  tax 
to  the  crown,  became  the  absolute  proprietors  of  their 
offices,  which  they  could  transmit  to  their  heirs  or  dis- 
pose of  by  sale  to  whom  they  pleased.  Thus  the  office- 
holders in  France  came  to  form  a  vast  hereditary  cor- 
poration, with  corporate  interests  to  defend,  and  virtually 
independent  of  the  crown.  The  nobles,  the  Huguenots, 
and  the  sovereign  courts,  were  left  by  Henry  IV.  to  be 
the  great  obstacles  in  the  way  of  his  successors. 


6  RICHELIEU 

The  insecurity  of  the  monarchy  under  these  condi- 
tions was  clearly  manifested  during  the  regency  of  Mary 
de  Medici.  There  are  few  more  depressing  and  weari- 
some periods  of  history  than  the  first  thirteen  years  of 
the  reign  of  Louis  XIII.  The  incessant  intrigues  of  the 
great  princes  against  the  crown  and  against  each  other, 
the  complete  subordination  of  national  to  personal 
interests,  the  petty  rivalries  of  the  Huguenot  leaders, 
Bouillon  and  Rohan,  the  coalitions  against  the  queen's 
favourite,  Concini,  and  against  the  king's  favourite, 
Luynes,  have  been  described  in  contemporary  memoirs 
with  a  fulness  which  they  only  merit  as  an  effective 
contrast  to  the  state  of  things  which  preceded  and  which 
followed  them.  The  regent  and  her  ministers  purchased 
a  few  years'  peace  by  lavish  bribes  to  the  nobles  at  the 
expense  of  the  monarchy,  while  she  sought  to  strengthen 
herself  against  domestic  opposition  by  abandoning  the 
foreign  policy  of  her  husband,  and  concluding  a  close 
alliance  with  Spain.  The  revival  of  the  Hapsburg  sup- 
remacy, threatened  in  the  first  period  of  the  Thirty 
Years'  War,  was  allowed  to  progress  without  hindrance 
from  France. 

From  these  disorders  and  dangers  France  was  saved 
by  the  greatest  political  genius  she  has  ever  produced. 
No  man  was  ever  more  completely  a  politician  than 
Richelieu,  and  no  figure  is  more  indispensable  in  a 
series  which  professes  to  form  a  gallery  of  "  Foreign 
Statesmen."  His  own  memoirs  treat  of  nothing  but 
politics.  The  character  of  the  man  himself  must  be 
looked  for  in  the  accounts  of  contemporaries,  few  of 
whom  were  able  to  estimate  his  greatness  or  to  ap- 
preciate, his  aims.  The  details  of  his  private  life  have 


INTRODUCTION  7 

to  be  gleaned  from  scattered  sources,  but  chiefly  from 
the  letters  and  papers  which  have  been  edited  in  so 
masterly  a  manner  by  M.  d'Avenel. 

In  writing  the  life  of  Richelieu  one  must  narrate  the 
history  of  France  and,  to  a  great  extent,  of  Europe 
during  an  eventful  period  of  nearly  twenty  years. 
Perhaps  this  consideration  helps  to  explain  why  no  first- 
rate  biography  of  him  has  been  produced,  even  in 
France.  In  spite  of  the  innumerable  books  that  have 
been  written  on  this  period,  the  work  of  Aubery,  although 
an  avowed  panegyric,  and  published  as  long  ago  as  1661, 
has  never  been  completely  superseded.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  M.  Hanotaux  may  yet  find  sufficient  leisure  amid  the 
distractions  of  political  life  to  continue  the  great  work 
which  he  has  begun,  and  that  this  will  fill  what  is  an 
undoubted  lacuna  in  historical  literature.  In  the  mean- 
time this  little  volume  can  only  attempt  a  brief  estimate 
of  the  work  which  Richelieu  achieved — and  achieved 
with  such  success  that  he  must  be  regarded  as  the  chief 
founder,  not  only  of  France  before  the  Revolution,  but 
of  much  that  is  most  characteristic  of  France  at  the 
present  day. 


CHAPTER  I 

RICHELIEU'S  EARLY  LIFE 

1585-1614 

The  family  of  du  Plessis — The  du  Plessis  de  Richelieu — Career 
of  Frai^ois  du  Plessis — Birth  of  Armand  Jean — His  life  at 
Richelieu — He  enters  the  College  of  Navarre — Transferred  to 
the  Academy — The  bishopric  of  Lujon — Armand  returns  to  the 
University — Consecrated  bishop  at  Rome — He  quits  Paris  for 
Lucon — Motives  for  this  step — Letters  to  Madame  de  Bourges 
— His  conduct  as  bishop — His  religious  attitude — Early  rela- 
tions with  Jansenism — Connection  with  Berulle  and  Father 
Joseph — Death  of  Henry  IV. — Richelieu  in  Paris — Acquaint- 
ance  with  Barbin  and  Concini — Returns  to  his  diocese — His 
attitude  towards  parties  at  court — Letter  to  Concini — Election 
to  the  States-General — Personal  appearance — Feeble  health — 
Character  and  aims. 

THE  family  of  du  Plessis  has  no  history.  For  genera- 
tions it  had  lived  in  provincial  obscurity  on  the  borders 
of  Poitou.  In  the  fifteenth  century  Fra^ois  du  Plessis, 
a  younger  member  of  the  family,  inherited  the  estate  of 
Richelieu  from  his  maternal  uncle,  Louis  de  Cle"rembault. 
His  descendants  were  the  du  Plessis  de  Richelieu,  and 
their  chief  residence  was  the  castle  of  that  name,  situated 
on  the  Mable,  near  the  frontier  of  Poitou  and  Touraine. 
The  first  member  of  the  family  who  played  any  not- 
able part  in  history  was  Francois  du  Plessis,  great- 


CHAP.  I  RICHELIEU'S  EARLY  LIFE  9 

grandson  of  the  inheritor  of  Richelieu.  He  rendered 
valuable  services  to  Henry  of  Anjou  during  his  brief 
tenure  of  the  crown  of  Poland,  and  retained  his  favour 
when  he  returned  to  France  as  Henry  III.  Raised  to 
the  dignity  of  grand  provost  of  France,  Fra^ois  du 
Plessis  became  one  of  the  most  prominent  and  loyal 
servants  of  the  last  of  the  Valois.  When  his  master 
died  under  the  dagger  of  Jacques  Clement,  it  was  he 
who  arrested  the  assassin  and  took  down  the  depositions 
of  the  eye-witnesses. 

The  death  of  Henry  III.  left  his  Catholic  followers 
in  a  difficult  position.  The  traditions  of  his  family 
seemed  to  impel  Francois  du  Plessis  to  join  the  League. 
But  he  showed  on  this  occasion  a  practical  foresight 
worthy  of  his  great  son,  and  at  once  espoused  the  cause 
of  Henry  of  Navarre.  He  had  already  gained  the  con- 
fidence of  the  new  king  by  his  bravery  at  Arques  and  at 
Ivry,  and  had  just  been  appointed  captain  of  the  guard, 
when  he  was  carried  off  by  a  fever  during  the  siege  of 
Paris  on  July  10,  1590. 

Francois  du  Plessis  was  married  to  Suzanne  de  la 
Porte,  daughter  of  the  celebrated  avocat,  Francois  de  la 
Porte,  and  herself  possessed  of  the  practical  ability  which 
characterised  her  family.  They  had  three  sons  and  two 
daughters,  and  the  youngest  child,  Annand^jgan^  was 
born  at  Paris  in  the  rue  du  Boulay,  on  jleptember  9, 
1585.  The  child  was  so  feeble  and  sickly  that  it  was 
not  thought  safe  to  have  him  baptized  till  May  5,  1586. 
His  god-parents  were  Marshal  Biron,  Marshal  d'Aumont, 
and  his  paternal  grandmother,  Fran9oise  de  la  Roche- 
chouart. 

Armand  Jean  was  only  five  years  old  when  his  father 


10  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

died,  and  his  mother  carried  her  children  from  the  capital 
to  the  seclusion  of  Richelieu.  There,  amid  the  disturb- 
ances of  the  civil  war  between  Henry  IV.  and  the  League, 
the  boy's  education  was  carried  on  for  the  next  seven 
years.  We  have  no  evidence  that  he  showed  any 
youthful  precocity  or  gave  any  signs  of  future  greatness. 
Aube>y,  who  wrote  under  the  auspices  of  Richelieu's 
relatives,  and  who  would  certainly  have  preserved  any 
family  traditions  about  his  hero,  tells  us  nothing  of  this 
period  of  his  life,  so  that  we  may  conclude  that  there 
was  nothing  to  tell. 

A  distant  province  like  Poitou  offered  few  educa- 
tional advantages  in  the  sixteenth  century,  and  at  the 
age  of  twelve  Armand  was  sent  to  Paris,  and  was 
admitted  to  the  College  of  Navarre.  There  he  went 
through  the  ordinary  courses  of  grammar  and  philosophy, 
and  an  anecdote  of  his  later  years  proves  that  he  retained 
a  grateful  recollection  of  this  period  of  his  education. 
In  1597  Jean  Yon,  one  of  the  philosophical  teachers  of 
the  College  of  Navarre,  held  for  the  third  time  the  office 
of  Rector  of  the  University,  and  the  young  scholar,  robed 
as  a  chorister,  accompanied  him  on  a  solemn  procession 
to  the  tomb  of  St.  Denis.  In  later  days,  whenever  the 
University  wished  to  prefer  a  petition  to  the  all-powerful 
cardinal,  the  venerable  Yon  was  always  included  in  the 
deputation.  Richelieu  confessed  that  he  never  saw  his 
old  teacher  without  a  sentiment  of  respectful  fear,  and 
the  deputation,  even  if  its  request  were  not  granted, 
was  certain  of  a  gracious  answer  from  the  minister. 

At  this  time  Richelieu  was  destined  for  a  military 
career,  and  he  had  only  received  the  usual  rudimentary 
education  when  he  was  transferred  from  the  College  of 


I  RICHELIEU'S  EARLY  LIFE  11 

Navarre  to  the  Acaddmie,  an  institution  founded  by 
Antoine  de  Pluvinel  to  train  the  sons  of  noble  families 
in  the  exercises  and  accomplishments  which  were  to  fit 
them  for  a  soldier's  life.  It  was  here  that  Armand 
acquired  the  military  tastes  which  never  deserted  him. 
He  was  at  all  times  ready  to  exchange  his  cassock 
for  a  knight's  armour,  and  equally  willing  to  give  his 
advice  as  to  the  handling  of  an  army  or  the  construction 
of  a  fortress. 

The  young  marquis  de  Chillon,  as  he  called  himself 
at  the  Academy,  was  only  seventeen  years  old  when  an 
event  occurred  which  suddenly  altered  all  his  aspirations. 
In  1584  Henry  III.,  in  accordance  with  a  practice  not 
uncommon  in  those  days,  had  granted  to  Francois  du 
Plessis  the  disposal  of  the  bishopric  of  Lu9on.  His 
widow,  left  in  somewhat  straitened  circumstances,  had 
found  the  revenues  of  the  bishopric  one  of  her  chief 
resources.  The  episcopal  functions  were  exercised  in 
the  meantime  by  one  Fra^ois  Yver,  who  was  avowedly 
only  a  "  warming-pan  "  until  one  of  the  sons  could  take 
his  place.  But  the  chapter  of  the  diocese  resented  the 
diversion  of  the  episcopal  revenue  to  secular  and  per- 
sonal uses,  and  threatened  to  go  to  law  with  M.  Yver, 
whose  position  was  indefensible.  In  these  circumstances 
Madame  de  Richelieu  determined  to  procure  the  appoint- 
ment of  her  second  son,  Alphonse  Louis,  to  the  bishopric. 
From  1595  he  is  occasionally  spoken  of  as  bishop  of 
Lu9on,  though  he  never  really  held  the  office.  Suddenly, 
about  1602,  he  absolutely  refused  to  seek  consecration, 
became  a  monk,  and  entered  the  Grande  Chartreuse. 
In  the  next  year  M.  Yver,  on  the  suit  of  the  chapter, 
was  ordered  by  the  parliament  to  devote  a  third  of  the 


12  RICHELIEU  CHAP 

revenue  of  the  bishopric  to  the  repairs  of  the  cathedral 
and  of  the  episcopal  palace. 

These  events  were  a  great  blow  to  Madame  de 
Richelieu,  but  she  had  still  one  expedient  left.  By  a 
petition  she  delayed  the  enforcement  of  the  decree  of 
parliament,  and  in  the  meantime  her  third  son  was  to 
assume  the  position  which  his  brother  refused.  Armand 
seems  to  have  made  no  opposition  to  his  mother's  will. 
In  1603  he  quitted  the  Academy,  and  resumed  his 
studies  at  the  University.  His  eldest  brother,  Henri, 
was  now  at  court,  where  Henry  IV.  had  received  him 
with  favour  as  his  father's  son,  and  where  he  was  able 
to  defend  the  interests  of  his  family.  In  1606  the  king 
_  wrote  to  the  French  envoy  at  Kome,  urging  him  to 
obtain  from  the  pope  the  appointment  of  Armand  Jean 
du  Plessis  to  the  bishopric  of  Lu9on,  although  he  had 
not  yet  reached  the  canonical  age. 

Meanwhile  Richelieu,  who  had  taken  deacon's  orders 
and  completed  his  theological  course  in  this  year,  became 
impatient  of  the  delays  of  the  papal  court,  and  hurried 
to  Rome  to  look  after  his  own  interests.  He  succeeded 
in  obtaining  favour  with  the  pope,  and  was  consecrated 
by  the  cardinal  de  Givry  on  April  17,  1607.  There  is 
no  foundation  whatever  for  the  story  told  in  later  years 
by  Richelieu's  detractors  that  he  deceived  the  pope  as 
to  his  age  by  producing  a  false  certificate  of  birth,  and 
that  when  he  afterwards  confessed  the  fraud  Paul  V. 
declared  that  "  that  young  man  will  be  a  great  rogue." 
Equally  unfounded  is  the  counterbalancing  story  that 
the  pope  was  so  impressed  with  Richelieu's  stores  of 
theological  learning  that  he  exclaimed,  jEquum  est  ut 
gui  supra  cetatem  sapis  infra  xtaiem  ordineris  (It  is  only 


I  RICHELIEU'S  EARLY  LIFE  13 

fair  that  one  whose  knowledge  is  above  his  age  should  be 
ordained  under  age). 

On  his  return  he  resumed  his  studies  at  the  Uni- 
versity until,  on  October  24,  1607,  he  was  admitted  a 
member  of  the  Sorbonne  or  theological  faculty.  For  the 
next  year  he  remained  in  Paris,  acquiring  a  certain 
reputation  as  a  preacher,  cultivating  the  acquaintance  of 
all  who  might  be  of  use  to  him,  and  retaining  the  favour 
of  the  king,  who  frequently  spoke  of  him  as  "my  bishop." 
From  the  first,  his  ambition  was  for  political  distinction ; 
his  avowed  model  was  the  cardinal  du  Perron,  who  had 
acquired  a  great  but  fleeting  reputation  as  the  champion  of 
the  orthodox  creed  against  the  Huguenots.  Everything 
seemed  to  attract  the  young  prelate  to  remain  in  Paris  : 
in  days  when  ecclesiastical  duties  sat  lightly  on  church  dig- 
nitaries, it  appeared  preposterous  to  expect  him  to  reside 
in  a  petty,  unattractive  provincial  town  like  Lu<jon,  far 
removed  from  the  capital,  without  society,  with  dull  and 
depressing  surroundings,  and  close  to  the  chief  strong- 
hold of  the  heretics.  Yet  in  1608  Eichelieu  suddenly 
determined  to  bury  himself  for  a  time  in  what  he  him- 
self termed  "the  most  villainous,  filthy,  and  disagree- 
able diocese  in  the  world." 

His  motives  for  this  step  are  wrapped  in  complete 
obscurity.  It  is  certain  that  Henry  IV.,  though  no 
strict  champion  of  discipline,  approved  of  prelates  resid- 
ing in  their  sees.  He  may  have  hinted  to  the  young 
bishop  that  his  newly -acquired  position  carried  some 
duties  with  it.  But  it  is  more  probable  that  the  decision 
was  due  to  Eichelieu  himself.  He  was  always  keenly 
alive  to  practical  considerations.  He  may  well  have 
felt  that  to  obtain  distinction  he  must  do  something  to 


14  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

deserve  it.  His  powers  were  immature,  and  he  had  no 
experience  in  the  conduct  of  affairs.  The  bishopric  of 
Lugon  was  not  a  great  stage  to  appear  on,  but  it  offered 
opportunities  for  practical  work,  and  its  very  neighbour- 
hood to  La  Kochelle  made  it  the  more  important  at  a 
time  when  the  position  of  the  Huguenots  might  at  any 
moment  become  the  most  pressing  question  of  the  day. 
It  is  possible  that  poverty  may  have  been  another 
motive.  The  family  estates  were  fairly  extensive,  but 
they  brought  in  a  small  revenue,  and  Richelieu  was  the 
youngest  child.  Even  his  elder  brother,  who  enjoyed 
a  considerable  pension  from  the  king,  was  always  com- 
plaining of  want  of  funds.  Eichelieu  was  throughout 
his  life  extremely  sensitive  to  public  opinion.  He  could 
make  a  respectable  figure  as  a  resident  bishop  on  an 
income  which  was  lamentably  meagre  for  an  aspiring 
politician  in  Paris. 

His  first  care  was  to  provide  himself  with  a  residence. 
His  palace  was  in  ruins,  and  in  those  days  furnishing 
was  a  matter  of  great  expense  and  difficulty.  His 
letters  to  Madame  de  Bourges,  who  acted  as  a  sort  of 
maternal  adviser  and  purchaser  for  him  in  Paris,  are 
among  the  most  interesting  specimens  of  his  correspond- 
ence, and  illustrate  that  careful  attention  to  details 
which  always  characterised  him.  The  following  was 
written  in  the  spring  of  1609,  when  he  had  already 
been  some  months  at  Lugon. 

"  I  shall  not  want  for  occupation  here,  I  can  assure  you, 
for  everything  is  so  completely  in  ruins  that  it  needs  much 
exertion  to  restore  them.  I  am  extremely  ill  lodged,  for 
I  have  no  place  where  I  can  make  a  fire  on  account  of 
the  smoke.  You  can  imagine  that  I  don't  desire  bitter 


I  RICHELIEU'S  EARLY  LIFE  15 

weather,  but  there  is  no  remedy  but  patience.  .  .  . 
There  is  no  place  to  walk  about  in,  no  garden  or  alley 
of  any  sort,  so  that  my  house  is  my  prison.  I  quit  this 
subject  to  tell  you  that  we  have  not  found  in  the  parcel 
a  tunic  and  dalmatic  of  white  taffety,  which  belonged  to 
the  ornaments  of  white  damask  which  you  have  pro- 
cured for  me :  this  makes  me  think  that  they  must  have 
been  forgotten.  ...  I  must  tell  you  that  I  have  bought 
the  bed  with  velvet  hangings  from  Madame  de  Marcon- 
net,  which  I  am  having  done  up,  so  that  it  will  be 
worth  500  francs.  I  am  also  getting  several  other 
pieces  of  furniture,  but  I  shall  want  a  tapestry.  If  it  were 
possible  to  exchange  the  valance  of  silk  and  gold  from  the 
bed  of  the  late  bishop  of  Lu<jon  for  a  Bergamasque 
canopy,  like  that  which  you  have  already  bought  me, 
it  would  suit  me  very  well.  There  are  still  at  Eichelieu 
several  portions  of  the  said  bed,  such  as  the  laths  of  the 
framework,  etc.,  which  I  could  send  to  you.  You  see 
that  I  write  to  you  about  my  establishment,  which  is 
not  yet  well  supplied  :  but  time  will  do  everything.  I 
have  secured  a  mattre  d'hdtel  who  serves  me  very  well, 
and  in  a  way  that  would  please  you  :  without  him  I  was 
very  badly  off,  but  now  I  have  nothing  to  do  but  to 
look  after  my  accounts,  for  whatever  visitors  come  to 
see  me,  he  knows  exactly  what  to  do.  He  is  the  young 
la  Brosse,  who  was  formerly  in  the  service  of  M.  de 
Montpensier." 

In  another  letter  of  slightly  later  date  he  shows  a 
desire  to  impress  his  guests  by  his  magnificence  :  "  Please 
let  me  know  what  would  be  the  cost  of  two  dozen 
silver  plates  of  the  best  size  that  are  made.  I  should 
like  to  have  them,  if  possible,  for  10,000  crowns,  for 


16  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

my  funds  are  not  large ;  but  I  know  that  for  a  matter 
of  another  hundred  crowns  you  would  not  let  me 
have  anything  paltry.  I  am  a  beggar,  as  you  know, 
so  that  I  cannot  play  the  wealthy  prelate ;  but  still,  if 
I  only  had  silver  plates,  my  nobility  would  be  much 
enhanced." 

But  Eichelieu  was  not  only  occupied  with  the 
splendour  of  his  table  and  the  hangings  of  his  bed. 
That  he  was,  by  the  standard  of  those  days,  an  excellent 
bishop,  there  can  be  no  doubt.  In  his  diocese  he  first 
found  an  opportunity  to  display  those  administrative 
talents  which  he  was  afterwards  to  employ  in  the  service 
of  his  country.  His  correspondence  shows  that  he  took 
the  widest  view  of  his  episcopal  functions.  Not  content 
with  admonishing  his  clergy,  and  seeking  energetic 
recruits  from  all  quarters,  he  also  attended  to  the  secular 
interests  of  his  flock.  In  the  hope  of  obtaining  relief 
for  their  financial  necessities,  he  writes  urgent  letters  to 
the  assessors  of  taxes,  and  even  to  the  great  duke  of 
Sully.  To  his  delight  his  merits  begin  to  be  appre- 
ciated. He  hears  that  the  cardinal  du  Perron  speaks  of 
him  as  a  model  for  other  bishops  to  copy. 

Of  Bichelieu's  attitude  towards  religion  it  is  not  easy 
to  speak  with  precision.  It  was  never  the  guiding  force 
of  his  life  ;  at  all  times  he  subordinated  religious  interests 
to  considerations  of  policy.  No  doubt  has  ever  been 
cast  upon  the  sincerity  of  his  belief.  Scepticism  was  in 
those  days  the  luxury  of  a  few  leisurely  and  self-indul- 
gent critics.  Richelieu's  essentially  practical  mind  was 
averse  to  the  speculative  subtleties  which  lead  to  un- 
belief. Numerous  passages  in  his  memoirs  show  that 
he  was  more  inclined  to  accept  the  current  superstitions 


I  RICHELIEU'S  EARLY  LIFE  17 

of  his  time  than  too  curiously  to  inspect  the  evidence 
for  them. 

Still  more  difficult  is  it  to  lay  down  any  formula 
about  his  relations  with  ecclesiastical  parties.  At  the 
beginning  of  his  career  the  chief  divisions  in  France  were 
the  Ultramontanes,  the  Gallicans,  and  the  Huguenots. 
To  these  were  added  before  his  death  the  Jansenists,  a 
sort  of  advanced  guard  of  Gallicanism.  To  the  Huguenots 
Richelieu  had  no  leaning,  and  he  was  ever  ready  to 
enter  the  lists  of  controversy  against  them ;  but  he  was 
always  personally  tolerant  towards  them,  both  as  bishop 
and  as  minister.  In  a  letter  of  1611  he  speaks  of 
Chamier,  one  of  their  most  vehement  and  outspoken 
champions,  in  terms  of  studied  moderation :  "  He  deserves 
to  be  esteemed  as  one  of  the  most  amiable  of  those  who  are 
imbued  with  these  new  errors,  and  if  he  may  be  blamed 
for  anything  besides  his  creed,  it  seems  to  be  a  certain 
too  ardent  zeal,  which  others  might  perhaps  term  in- 
discreet." With  the  sects  of  his  own  Church  Richelieu's 
relations  changed  at  different  periods,  and  each  had  at 
times  occasion  to  charge  him  with  treachery  or  desertion. 
So  far  as  their  differences  were  doctrinal  rather  than 
political,  he  had  no  particular  bias.  He  was  a  sufficient 
master  of  the  scholastic  theology  for  controversial 
purposes,  as  was  proved  by  the  works  published  during 
his  lifetime.  But  the  real  object  of  these  writings  was 
to  further  his  own  advancement  rather  than  to  secure 
the  acceptance  of  his  particular  views.  He  had  none 
of  the  self  -  sacrificing  enthusiasm  and  none  of  the 
deeply -rooted  conviction  of  the  religious  prophet  or 
martyr. 

At  one  time  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  he  was 
G 


18  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

powerfully  impelled  towards  Gallican,  if  not  Jansenist, 
opinions.  One  of  the  neighbours  of  whom  he  saw  most 
was  Chasteignier  de  la  Rochepozay,  the  fighting  bishop 
of  Poitiers,  whose  father  had  been  the  friend  and  com- 
panion-in-arms of  Fra^ois  du  Plessis.  The  bishop  of 
Poitiers  had  appointed  as  his  grand-vicar,  Duvergier  de 
Hauranne,  afterwards  abb6  of  St.  Cyran,  and  famous  as 
the  apostle  of  Jansenism  in  France.  Another  link  in 
the  chain  was  Sebastien  Bouthillier,  afterwards  dean  of 
Lu9on,  whose  father  had  been  the  confidential  clerk  and 
had  succeeded  to  the  practice  of  Francois  de  la  Porte, 
Richelieu's  maternal  grandfather.  Sebastien  with  his 
three  brothers  formed  a  small  bodyguard  of  devoted  ad- 
herents to  Richelieu,  and  at  every  crisis  of  his  early 
career  we  find  a  Bouthillier  at  his  side.  The  dean  of 
Lucon  was  an  intimate  friend  .of  St.  Cyran,  and  it 
was  he  who  introduced  him  to  another  founder  of  the 
Jansenist  sect,  Arnauld  d'Andilly.  These  four  young 
men,  Richelieu,  the  bishop  of  Poitiers,  d'Hauranne,  and 
Sebastien  Bouthillier,  formed  a  small  association  for 
the  prosecution  of  theological  study.  Sometimes  they 
met  together  at  Poitiers,  but  when  this  was  impossible 
they  kept  up  a  constant  correspondence  with  each 
other. 

But  intimate  as  his  connection  was  with  these 
associates,  Richelieu  was  careful  not  to  commit  himself 
to  their  opinions.  His  published  letters  prove  that  his 
aim  at  this  time  was  to  conciliate  friends  on  all  sides, 
and  to  quarrel  with  no  one  who  could  render  him  any 
service.  He  cultivated  the  acquaintance  of  Be"rulle, 
the  founder  of  the  Oratoire,  who  established  at  Lu9on 
the  second  house  which  his  association  possessed  in 


I  RICHELIEU'S  EARLY  LIFE  19 

the  kingdom.  But  the  most  important  friendship  which 
he  formed  during  his  residence  at  Lu9on  was  with 
Fran9ois  du  Tremblay,  already  known  as  a  stern 
monastic  reformer,  and  afterwards  famous  as  Father 
Joseph,  "the  gray  cardinal."  Du  Tremblay,  who  be- 
longed  to  a  noble  family  of  Anjou,  was  eight  years 
older  than  Richelieu.  Like  him,  he  had  been  destined 
for  a  military  career,  but  at  the  age  of  twenty-two  he 
yielded  to  an  irresistible  religious  impulse  and  dis- 
gusted his  family  by  becoming  a  Capuchin  monk.  He 
became  an  active  agent  in  the  movement  of  ecclesias- 
tical reform  which  characterised  the  first  half  of  the 
seventeenth  century.  Among  the  institutions  which 
were  subject  to  his  care  was  the  famous  abbey  of 
Fontevrault,  near  to  which  was  the  priory  of  Les 
Roches,  where  Richelieu  occasionally  resided.  In  1611 
the  abbess  died,  and  Father  Joseph  wrote  to  the  court 
to  secure  the  succession  of  Antoinette  d'Orleans,  who 
had  aided  him  in  introducing  much-needed  reforms  into 
the  abbey.  Richelieu  received  instructions  to  supervise 
the  election,  and  it  was  this  affair  which  brought 
together  the  two  men  who  were  destined  to  be  so 
closely  connected  in  the  future. 

Before  this  the  death  of  Henry  IV.  had  to  some 
extent  modified  Richelieu's  plans  of  life.  He  realised 
that  the  regency  of  Mary  de  Medici  inaugurated  a  new 
period  in  France,  that  retired  merit  would  be  of  no 
further  use  to  him,  and  that  in  some  way  or  other  he 
must  thrust  himself  forward.  He  drew  up  a  formal 
oath  of  fealty,  in  which  he  and  the  chapter  of  Lugon 
expressed  their  devoted  loyalty  to  the  king  and  regent. 
This  document  was  sent  up  to  his  eldest  brother  to  be 


20  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

presented  to  the  queen-mother.  But  Henri  de  Richelieu, 
who  was  a  great  person  at  court,  and  one  of  the  mystic 
"  seventeen  seigneurs "  who  aspired  to  set  the  fashions 
of  the  day,  rather  scoffed  at  this  exuberant  profession 
of  fidelity,  and  suppressed  the  document,  on  the  ground 
that  no  one  else  had  done  anything  of  the  kind.  This 
was  not  enough  to  discourage  the  aspiring  bishop,  who 
determined  in  the  future  to  make  frequent  visits  to 
Paris.  He  writes  to  Madame  de  Bourges  to  ask  her  to 
find  a  private  lodging  for  him.  A  furnished  room,  he 
admits,  would  be  more  suitable  to  his  purse ;  but  he 
would  be  uncomfortable,  and  moreover  he  wishes  to 
make  a  figure  in  the  world.  "  Being,  like  you,  of  a 
somewhat  boastful  humour,  I  should  like  to  be  at  my 
ease,  and  to  appear  still  more  so ;  and  this  I  could  do 
more  easily  if  I  had  a  lodging  to  myself.  Poverty  is  a 
poor  accompaniment  for  noble  birth,  but  a  good  heart 
is  the  only  remedy  against  fortune." 

Richelieu  spent  six  months  in  Paris  in  1610,  and 
though  he  did  not  obtain  any  employment,  his  time  was 
not  wholly  wasted.  At  the  house  of  the  Bouthillier  he 
made  the  acquaintance  of  Barbin,  who  held  an  influential 
post  in  the  queen's  household.  Barbin  introduced  him 
to  Concini,  and  thus  established  a  connection  with  the 
favourite,  which  enabled  him  five  years  later  to  enter 
upon  a  political  life.  But  at  this  time  Concini,  though 
high  in  his  mistress's  favour,  had  not  aspired  to  influence 
the  government,  which  was  entirely  in  the  hands  of 
Villeroy,  Sillery,  and  Jeannin,  the  veteran  ministers  of 
Henry  IV. 

Richelieu  soon  saw  that  his  opportunity  had  not  yet 
come,  and  he  again  quitted  Paris  for  his  diocese.  But 


i  RICHELIEU'S  EARLY  LIFE  21 

from  this  time  he  watched  the  development  of  events 
with  ever-increasing  interest,  and  he  had  made  up  his 
mind  which  side  to  take  in  the  inevitable  contest.  The 
queen-mother  had  exhausted  the  treasures  which  Sully 
had  amassed  in  bribes  to  the  princes — she  had  given 
them  offices,  governorships,  all  that  they  demanded. 
By  these  means,  and  by  dexterously  playing  off  the 
Guises  against  the  prince  of  Conde,  she  endeavoured 
to  maintain  at  least  the  semblance  of  peace  until  the 
king  should  reach  his  majority,  at  the  age  of  thirteen. 
But  her  concessions  failed  to  conciliate  the  nobles,  whose 
requests  became  the  more  insatiable  the  more  they  were 
granted.  The  ruling  sentiment  of  Richelieu's  career 
was  his  hatred  of  disunion  and  of  princely  independence. 
All  his  sympathies  in  the  approaching  struggle  were 
with  the  court,  with  which  he  tried  to  draw  closer  the 
connection  established  in  1610.  When  the  Huguenots 
in  1612  showed  their  discontent  at  the  double  marriage 
with  Spain,  and  their  leader,  Rohan,  made  himself 
master  of  St.  Jean  d'Angely,  Richelieu  used  his  in- 
fluence with  the  veteran  Huguenot,  du  Plessis  Mornay, 
to  maintain  order  in  his  province,  and  wrote  to  the 
secretary  of  state,  Pontchartrain,  to  assure  him  of  his 
active  co-operation. 

His  foresight  had  already  perceived  the  means  by 
which  he  was  first  to  rise  to  power.  He  had  no  par- 
ticular respect  for  Concini,  who  played  a  very  vacillating 
part  in  the  relations  between  the  regent  and  the  princes. 
But  Concini's  wife  had  that  secure  influence  over  Mary 
de  Medici  which  comes  from  the  habits  of  a  lifetime, 
and  the  favourite  might  be  a  useful  step  in  the  ladder 
of  promotion.  At  the  beginning  of  1614  the  storm 


22  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

seemed  at  last  about  to  burst.  Conde  and  all  the  chief 
nobles,  except  the  Guise  party,  had  withdrawn  from 
court  and  were  collecting  forces.  Concini  himself,  now 
known  as  the  marshal  d'Ancre,  who  had  intrigued  with 
Conde"  against  the  ministers,  was  in  disgrace  at  Amiens. 
Richelieu  seized  the  opportunity  to  write  to  him  the 
following  letter,  dated  February  12,  1614  : — 

"Always  honouring  those  to  whom  I  have  once 
promised  service,  I  write  you  this  letter  to  renew  my 
assurance,  and  to  know  if  I  can  be  of  any  use  to  you ; 
for  I  prefer  to  testify  the  truth  of  my  affection  on  im- 
portant occasions,  rather  than  to  offer  you  the  mere 
appearance  of  it  when  there  is  no  need  :  so  I  will  use 
no  more  words  on  this  subject.  I  will  only  beg  you  to 
believe  that  my  promises  will  always  be  followed  by 
fulfilment,  and  that,  as  long  as  you  do  me  the  honour  to 
love  me,  I  shall  always  serve  you  worthily." 

On  this  occasion  civil  war  was  averted  by  negotiations, 
and  the  treaty  of  St.  Menehould  was  signed  on  May  15. 
Once  more  the  queen  granted  all  that  was  asked  of  her. 
Every  confederate  received  something  for  himself,  either 
office,  promotion,  or  money.  But  among  their  demands 
was  one  which  was  intended  to  express  their  devotion 
to  the  public  welfare — the  summons  of  the  States- 
General.  This  was  also  conceded,  and  the  assembly 
was  finally  summoned  to  meet  at  Paris  in  October. 
The  nobles  had  intended  to  use  it  as  a  means  of 
advancing  their  own  interests,  but  they  were  dis- 
appointed. The  court  succeeded  in  managing  the 
elections,  and  the  vast  majority  of  delegates  were 
devotedly  royalist.  Eichelieu  was  active  in  the  cause ; 
and  the  exertions  of  his  three  friends,  the  bishop  of 


i  RICHELIEU'S  EARLY  LIFE  23 

Poitiers,  Duvergier  de  Hauranne,  and  Sebastien  Bout- 
hillier,  secured  his  own  return  as  deputy  for  the  clergy 
of  the  province  of  Poitou.  As  soon  as  the  cahier  of  his 
order  had  been  drawn  up  he  carried  it  to  Paris  in 
October. 

He  was  now  on  the  threshold  of  his  public  career, 
and  we  may  pause  for  a  moment  to  consider  the  man 
himself,  before  attempting  to  follow  him  through  the 
maze  of  intrigues  in  which  he  was  so  soon  to  be  in- 
volved. His  figure  was  tall  and  slight,  but  had  not 
yet  contracted  the  stoop  in  the  shoulders  which 
diminished  his  height  in  later  years.  His  face  was 
long  and  pale,  with  a  prominent  and  well-formed  nose, 
and  surmounted  by  masses  of  long  black  hair.  His  lips 
were  thin  and  tightly  drawn,  at  times  relaxing  in 
a  winning  smile,  but  more  often  expressing  stern 
resolution.  Perhaps  his  most  striking  characteristic 
was  a  pair  of  bright  penetrating  eyes,  under  eye- 
brows which  were  naturally  arched  as  if  to  express 
surprise.  Clad  in  his  purple  bishop's  robe,  as  he 
appeared  at  the  meeting  of  the  States,  he  was  the  model 
of  an  imposing  ecclesiastic. 

His  great  misfortune  was  his  ill-health.  During  his 
residence  in  the  low,  marshy  district  of  Luijon  he  had 
become  liable  to  aguish  fevers,  which  frequently 
reduced  him  to  absolute  impotence  of  thought  and 
action.  The  energy  with  which  he  had  thrown  himself 
into  his  theological  studies  and  the  administrative  work 
of  his  diocese  had  prematurely  exhausted  a  frame  which 
had  been  feeble  from  infancy.  He  was  subject  to 
excruciating  headaches,  which  frequently  lasted  for  days 
at  a  time.  On  one  of  these  occasions  he  registered  a 


24  RICHELIEU  CHAP 

vow,  which  has  come  down  to  us,  and  which  shows  the 
vein  of  superstition  running  through  his  imperious  nature. 
If  the  Deity  will  cure  his  head  within  eight  days,  he 
promises  to  endow  a  chaplain  with  thirty  livres  a  year 
to  celebrate  a  mass  every  Sunday  in  the  castle  of 
Richelieu. 

He  was  capable,  as  we  have  already  seen,  of  inspiring 
warm  feelings  of  friendship  and  devotion ;  but  his  own 
nature  was  cold  and  reserved.  His  letters  of  condolence, 
even  when  he  writes  to  his  sister  on  the  death  of  one 
of  her  children,  are  as  measured  and  formal  as  a 
diplomatic  epistle.  Few  human  beings,  except  his 
favourite  niece,  could  boast  a  secure  hold  upon  his 
affection.  Throughout  his  life  he  held  himself  aloof 
from  ties  that  might  bind  and  impede  him.  Political 
interests  severed  him  from  many  of  the  friends  of  his 
early  manhood,  as,  for  instance,  from  St.  Cyran,  and  he 
had  no  hesitation  in  sacrificing  them  for  the  success  of 
his  designs.  He  could  appreciate  devotion,  but  he 
could  not  return  it. 

Richelieu  set  out  for  Paris  in  1614  with  a  resolute 
determination  to  carve  out  a  career  for  himself.  In  his 
bishopric  he  had  learned  to  exercise  his  powers,  and  had 
acquired  confidence  in  them.  He  was  no  longer  troubled 
with  the  self-distrust  which  had  led  to  his  retirement  in 
1608.  He  had  spared  no  trouble  to  form  connections 
wherever  opportunity  offered,  but  he  had  been  careful 
to  avoid  entangling  pledges.  That  he  had  at  all  made 
up  his  mind  to  carry  through  the  vast  schemes  of  his 
later  life  it  would  be  preposterous  to  suppose.  His 
ability  was  practical  rather  than  theoretical.  His  policy 
was  always  to  make  use  of  circumstances,  rather  than  to 


i  RICHELIEU'S  EARLY  LIFE  25 

attempt  to  wrest  them  to  his  wishes.  His  one  firm 
intention  was  to  raise  himself  to  political  power  ;  and  he 
had  the  sublime  confidence  of  every  truly  great  man 
that  his  own  rule  would  be  for  the  advantage  of  his 
country. 


II  p  M 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    STATES-GENERAL — RICHELIEU'S    FIRST   MINISTRY 
1614-1617 

Questions  before  the  States  -  General— The  paulette — Quarrels  of 
clergy  and  third  estate — Richelieu  orator  of  the  clergy — Concini 
and  the  ministers — Conde  and  the  Huguenots  oppose  Mary 
de  Medici — Treaty  of  Loudun — Fall  of  the  old  ministers — 
Richelieu  rises  to  prominence — Conspiracy  of  the  nobles — 
Arrest  of  Conde  and  flight  of  his  associates — Richelieu  receives 
office  —  His  difficulties  —  Measures  against  the  nobles — 
Assassination  of  Concini — Fall  of  the  ministers — Richelieu  at 
the  Louvre — He  quits  the  court. 

THE  States-General,  which  met  on  October  27,  1614, 
are  interesting  as  the  last  assembly  held  before  the 
famous  meeting  of  1789.  In  itself,  however,  it  was 
of  very  slight  importance.  The  essential  weakness  of 
these  assemblies  lay  in  the  deeply-rooted  class  divisions 
which  ruined  all  prospect  of  constitutional  government 
in  France,  in  the  want  of  any  practical  check  upon  the 
executive,  such  as  is  given  in  England  by  the  control  of 
supply  and  expenditure,  and  in  the  tradition  that  their 
only  function  was  to  formulate  grievances.  The  great 
questions  raised  at  this  meeting  were  the  paulette  and 
the  sale  of  offices,  and  the  relations  of  the  spiritual  and 
temporal  powers.  The  nobles  and  clergy  agreed  to 


CHAP,  ii  THE  STATES-GENERAL  27 

demand  the  abolition  of  the  paulette.  The  deputies  of 
the  third  estate,  most  of  whom  belonged  to  the  official 
class,  were  by  no  means  eager  for  a  change  which 
would  have  deprived  them  of  a  valuable  property.  The 
instructions  of  their  constituents,  however,  were  too 
distinct  for  them  to  refuse  their  co-operation  to  the 
other  estates,  but  they  insisted  upon  complicating  the 
question  by  demanding  at  the  same  time  a  diminution 
of  the  faille  and  a  reduction  of  the  lavish  pensions 
granted  by  the  crown.  This  last  request  was  a  direct 
attack  upon  the  nobles,  and  a  quarrel  was  imminent 
between  the  two  estates,  when  attention  was  diverted 
to  a  new  question. 

The  third  estate  demanded  the  recognition  as  a 
fundamental  law  that  the  king  holds  his  crown  from 
God  alone,  and  that  no  power,  whether  spiritual  or 
temporal,  has  the  right  to  dispense  subjects  from  their 
oath  of  allegiance.  This  at  once  raised  all  the  thorny 
questions  about  the  power  of  the  papacy,  which  had  been 
discussed  with  such  vehemence  in  France  for  the  last 
sixty  years.  The  clergy  hastened  to  resent  the  intro- 
duction of  such  a  subject  by  a  body  of  laymen,  and  to 
point  out  that  the  acceptance  of  the  resolution  would 
produce  a  schism  in  the  Church.  The  support  of  the 
court  secured  them  a  complete  victory.  Mary  de  Medici 
had  committed  herself  entirely  to  an  ultramontane 
policy  which  was  involved  in  the  alliance  with  Spain. 
She  had,  moreover,  a  personal  interest  in  the  matter. 
An  attack  upon  the  supremacy  of  the  pope  would  cast 
a  slur  upon  the  legitimacy  of  her  own  marriage,  which 
rested  upon  a  papal  dispensation,  and  consequently  upon 
the  right  of  her  son  to  wear  the  crown.  The  king 


28  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

evoked  the  matter  to  his  own  consideration,  and  the 
proposition  was  ultimately  erased  from  the  cahier  of  the 
third  estate. 

Emboldened  by  this  victory,  the  clergy  proceeded  to 
demand  the  acceptance  in  France  of  the  decrees  of  the 
Council  of  Trent,  reserving  the  liberties  of  the  Gallican 
Church.  The  nobles,  irritated  by  the  attitude  of  the 
third  estate  on  the  subject  of  royal  pensions,  hastened 
to  support  them.  But  the  obstinacy  of  the  third  estate, 
more  royalist  than  the  court,  succeeded  in  preventing 
the  carrying  through  of  a  measure  which  France  had 
persistently  avoided  for  sixty  years. 

At  last  the  cahiers  of  the  three  orders  were  com- 
pleted, and  were  presented  to  the  king  in  a  formal 
session  on  February  23,  1615.  We  have,  unfortunately, 
no  record  of  the  part  played  by  Eichelieu  in  the  pre- 
ceding debates,  but  that  it  must  have  been  a  distinguished 
one  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  he  was  chosen  on  this 
occasion  as  the  orator  of  his  order.  His  harangue, 
which  lasted  more  than  an  hour,  is  said  to  have 
attracted  great  attention.  That  it  expressed  his  own 
personal  views  is  improbable ;  many  of  its  sentiments 
are  in  opposition  to  the  whole  tenor  of  his  subsequent 
career.  He  seems  to  have  conceived  that  his  duty  or 
his  interest  compelled  him  to  act  as  the  mere  mouth- 
piece of  the  dominant  majority,  and  to  express  opinions 
which  he  knew  would  be  favourably  received  by  the 
court.  His  whole  argument  is  based  upon  the  premises 
of  ultramontanism.  He  condemns  the  practice  of  lay 
investiture,  the  attempt  to  levy  taxes  upon  the  clergy, 
whose  only  contributions  ought  to  be  their  prayers,  the 
interference  with  clerical  jurisdiction,  and  the  non- 


H  THE  STATES-GENERAL  29 

recognition  of  the  Council  of  Trent.  Only  two  passages 
seem  to  express  the  personal  convictions  of  the  orator — 
his  vigorous  denunciation  of  the  exclusion  of  ecclesiastics 
from  the  control  of  affairs,  and  his  lavish  praises  of  the 
government  of  the  regent. 

From  this  time  Eichelieu  was  a  man  of  mark ;  both 
Mary  de  Medici  and  Concini  realised  the  value  of  the 
services  which  he  might  render  to  them,  and  his 
admission  to  political  employment  was  assured.  Hence- 
forth his  residence  in  Paris  becomes  more  continuous, 
and  his  diocese  occupies  less  and  less  of  his  attention. 
For  a  long  time  Concini  had  been  kept  in  the  back- 
ground by  the  close  union  among  the  ministers  of  the 
late  king,  whom  the  regent  had  never  ventured  to 
dismiss.  But  this  union  had  lately  been  weakened  by 
a  growing  jealousy  between  Villeroy  and  the  chancellor 
Sillery ;  and  the  chief  link  between  them  was  broken  in 
November  1613,  by  the  death  of  Villeroy 's  grand- 
daughter, who  had  married  Sillery's  son,  de  Puisieux. 
The  discord  among  the  ministers  was  Concini's  oppor- 
tunity, and  he  determined  to  make  use  of  it  to  get  rid 
first  of  one  section  and  then  of  the  other.  His  rise  to 
power  was  accompanied  by  that  of  Richelieu. 

In  the  autumn  of  1615  it  was  decided  that  the 
court  should  travel  to  the  Spanish  frontier  to  complete 
the  double  marriage  which  had  been  formally  agreed 
to  three  years  before.  Conde1  and  the  other  malcontent 
princes  had  given  their  approval  to  the  marriages,  but 
they  now  refused  to  accompany  the  court,  and  set  to 
work  to  raise  troops  in  their  respective  provinces. 
Regardless  of  the  danger,  Mary  de  Medici  insisted 
upon  continuing  her  'journey  to  Bayonne.  Her  eldest 


80  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

daughter  was  sent  to  Spain  to  become  the  wife  of  the 
future  Philip  IV.,  and  Louis  XIII.  was  formally  married 
to  the  infanta,  Anne  of  Austria.  Meanwhile  Conde"  had 
collected  an  army,  had  evaded  the  royal  troops  under 
marshal  Bois-Dauphin,  and  had  crossed  the  Loire  into 
Poitou.  At  Parthenay  he  was  met  by  deputies  of  the 
extreme  party  of  the  Huguenots,  who  had  already 
defied  the  royal  authority,  and  the  advice  of  their  more 
moderate  leaders,  by  transferring  their  assembly  from 
Grenoble  to  Nimes.  They  now  concluded  a  close 
alliance  with  the  oligarchical  party,  which  pledged  itself 
to  prevent  the  recognition  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  to 
oppose  the  probable  results  of  the  Spanish  alliance,  and 
to  maintain  the  Edict  of  Nantes.  Thus  the  monarchy 
was  once  more  face  to  face  with  the  forces  of  dis- 
union. 

Neither  Concini  nor  Eichelieu  had  accompanied  the 
court,  and  Mary  de  Medici  was  still  surrounded  by  her 
old  advisers.  After  some  discussion  in  the  council  it 
was  decided  to  adhere  to  the  well-worn  policy  of 
negotiation  and  concession.  The  office  of  mediator  was 
undertaken  by  the  duke  of  Nevers  and  the  English 
ambassador,  and  their  exertions  resulted  in  the  treaty 
of  Loudun,  which  was  concluded  in  the  spring  of  1616. 
The  treaty  marks  a  complete  momentary  victory  for 
the  aristocratic  party  over  the  alliance  between  the 
crown  and  the  clergy,  which  had  signalised  the  close  of 
the  States -General.  The  king  promised  to  give  a 
favourable  consideration  to  the  demands  of  the  third 
estate,  to  reject  the  decrees  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  to 
maintain  the  freedom  of  the  Gallican  Church,  to  respect 
the  privileges  of  the  parliaments  and  other  sovereign 


II  RICHELIEU'S  FIRST  MINISTRY  31 

courts,  to  uphold  the  existing  alliance  of  France,  many 
of  which  were  opposed  to  Spanish  interests,  and  finally 
to  continue  to  the  Huguenots  all  the  concessions  which 
had  been  granted  to  them  by  his  predecessors.  Secret 
articles  stipulated  for  concessions  to  the  individual 
princes,  and  the  peace  is  said  to  have  cost  the  king 
more  than  six  million  livres.  Cond^,  who  exchanged 
the  government  of  Guienne  for  the  more  central 
province  of  Berri,  was  to  be  chief  of  the  council,  and 
was  to  sign  all  royal  edicts. 

The  treaty  of  Loudun  was  followed  by  the  fall  of 
Sillery.  As  the  chancellorship  was,  like  so  many  other 
offices,  a  property  for  life,  it  was  impossible  to  deprive 
him  of  it.  All  that  could  be  done  was  to  exile  him 
from  the  court,  and  to  intrust  the  seals  to  a  keeper, 
du  Vair,  who  had  acquired  a  reputation  as  president  of 
the  parliament  of  Provence.  But  this  first  ministerial 
change  was  not  enough  to  satisfy  Mary  de  Medici  or 
Concini.  Before  long  Jeannin  was  deprived  of  the 
control  of  the  finances,  which  was  entrusted  to  Barbin. 
Villeroy  was  not  absolutely  dismissed,  but  he  lost  all 
influence.  His  colleague  in  the  secretaryship  of  state, 
de  Puisieux,  shared  the  disgrace  of  his  father,  and  his 
office  was  now  given  to  Mangot,  an  ally  of  Barbin. 
Concini  was  prudent  enough  not  to  attempt  to  secure 
office  for  himself,  but  the  ministers  were  in  the  habit  of 
visiting  him  in  his  own  apartments,  and  his  vanity  led 
him  to  magnify  the  extent  of  his  influence  over  affairs. 

The  queen-mother  had  succeeded  in  freeing  herself 
from  the  tutelage  in  which  she  had  hitherto  been  kept 
by  the  veteran  ministers  of  her  husband,  but  her 
position  was  by  no  means  secure  nor  satisfactory.  Since 


82  RICHELIEU  OHAP. 

the  majority  of  her  son  she  had  been  far  more  eager  for 
power  than  she  had  been  during  the  regency.  One  of 
her  most  darling  schemes,  the  Spanish  marriages,  had 
been  successfully  completed.  But  she  was  confronted 
by  a  powerful  coalition  of  the  chief  princes,  the  third 
estate,  and  the  Huguenots,  and  she  had  been  forced  to 
concede  their  demands  at  Loudun.  When  Cond6  came 
to  Paris  he  was  apparently  all  powerful.  His  palace 
was  crowded,  while  the  Louvre  was  deserted.  Mary 
was  naturally  anxious  to  turn  the  tables  upon  her 
conquerors,  and  eagerly  welcomed  any  assistance  which 
promised  to  contribute  to  her  success.  These  circum- 
stances gave  Richelieu  the  opportunity  for  which  he  was 
waiting.  Whatever  his  personal  opinions  may  have 
been,  he  appeared  before  the  world  as  the  devoted 
adherent  of  Mary  de  Medici  and  Concini,  as  the  close 
friend  and  ally  of  Barbin  and  Mangot.  He  succeeded 
in  obtaining  the  reward  for  which  he  was  labouring. 
Early  in  1616  he  was  appointed  almoner  to  the  young 
queen,  Anne  of  Austria,  and  about  the  same  time  he 
was  admitted  a  member  of  the  council  of  State.  He 
was  employed  on  embassies  to  the  prince  of  Conde"  and 
to  the  duke  of  Nevers.  In  August  a  royal  edict  granted 
to  him  an  annual  sum  of  6000  livres  "in  considera- 
tion of  the  good  and  praiseworthy  services  which 
he  has  rendered,  and  which  he  continues  to  render 
every  day."  At  this  time  it  was  intended  to  send  him 
as  ambassador  to  Spain  to  settle  a  dispute  which  had 
arisen  in  Italy  with  the  duke  of  Savoy.  But  affairs  at 
home  soon  became  too  critical  for  him  to  be  spared,  and 
the  Spanish  embassy  was  entrusted  to  somebody  else. 
The  princes  were  unwilling  to  lose  without  a 


ii  RICHELIEU  S  FIRST  MINISTRY  33 

struggle  the  advantages  which  they  had  secured  at 
Loudun.  They  were  especially  irritated  by  the  influence 
of  Concini,  a  Florentine  adventurer  who  had  crept  into 
power  by  the  favour  of  his  wife.  The  court  tried  to 
separate  them  by  stimulating  their  ill-feeling  against 
Cond6  for  having  kept  the  lion's  share  of  the  spoil  for 
himself.  But  hatred  of  the  foreigner  was  stronger  than 
their  mutual  jealousies,  and  in  the  autumn  a  general 
conspiracy  was  formed  against  the  favourite.  Its  most 
active  leader  was  the  duke  of  Bouillon,  the  "  demon  of 
rebellions,"  as  Richelieu  calls  him,  and  with  him  were 
combined  Conde,  the  dukes  of  Mayenne,  Guise,  and 
Nevers.  It  was  the  first  time  that  the  Guises  and  Conde 
had  been  on  the  same  side. 

The  coalition  was  extremely  formidable,  especially  as 
its  hostility  could  not  be  limited  to  Concini.  The  con- 
spirators felt,  though  Cond6  alone  ventured  to  express 
the  general  sentiment,  that  the  overthrow  of  the 
favourite  would  excite  the  bitter  enmity  of  the  queen- 
mother,  and  that  they  would  never  be  safe  from  her 
vengeance  unless  they  could  succeed  in  separating  her 
from  the  king.  But  Mary  de  Medici,  thus  personally 
threatened,  was  surrounded  by  very  different  advisers 
to  those  who  had  counselled  the  shameful  surrenders 
of  St.  Menehould  and  Loudun.  It  was  resolved  to 
paralyse  the  opposition  by  a  bold  measure,  nothing  less 
than  the  arrest  of  Conde  and  as  many  as  possible  of  his 
allies.  The  scheme  was  carefully  prepared,  and  the 
secret  was  wonderfully  kept,  considering  the  number  of 
those  to  whom  it  was  entrusted.  Unfortunately,  the 
queen-mother's  irresolution  allowed  the  day  to  pass 
which  had  been  originally  fixed,  when  most  of  the  princes 

D 


84  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

were  at  the  Louvre.  Meanwhile,  some  suspicions  were 
excited  among  the  princes,  but  Cond6  was  so  confident 
in  his  power  that  he  refused  to  entertain  them.  On 
September  1  he  was  arrested  as  he  was  leaving  the 
council,  and  was  at  once  imprisoned  in  a  chamber  of  the 
Louvre. 

The  news  struck  consternation  among  the  other 
nobles,  who  hastened  to  secure  their  personal  safety  by 
flight  from  Paris.  As  soon  as  they  had  recovered  from 
their  first  fright,  they  held  a  conference  at  Soissons, 
where  they  agreed  to  raise  troops  in  their  respective 
provinces,  to  meet  in  twelve  days  at  Noyon,  and  thence 
to  advance  upon  Paris.  Meanwhile,  the  prompt 
measures  taken  by  the  ministers  had  succeeded  in  pre- 
venting any  serious  outbreak  in  the  capital,  where 
Conde"  was  extremely  popular,  and  they  set  to  work  to 
sow  dissension  among  their  opponents.  The  Guises 
were  soon  detached  from  the  coalition,  and  even  the 
duke  of  Longueville  was  drawn  over  to  the  court  by 
the  influence  of  Mangot.  Nevers  and  Bouillon,  how- 
ever, continued  to  hold  out,  and  to  prepare  for  civil  war. 

It  is  extremely  probable,  though  there  is  no  direct 
evidence,  that  Richelieu,  as  a  member  of  the  council, 
took  part  in  the  discussions  which  preceded  the  arrest 
of  Conde".  A  vigorous  policy  was  quite  to  his  taste, 
and  he  had  long  been  the  intimate  associate  of  Barbin, 
to  whom,  in  his  Memoirs,  he  attributes  the  chief  part  in 
these  events.  But  one  of  the  ministers,  du  Vair,  was 
entirely  out  of  sympathy  with  his  colleagues.  He  had 
already  proposed  the  release  of  Conde\  and  he  now 
suggested  calling  in  the  parliament  to  settle  the  dissen- 
sions between  the  crown  and  the  nobles.  Such  feeble- 


II  RICHELIEU'S  FIRST  MINISTRY  35 

ness  was  intolerable.  On  November  25  the  seals  were 
taken  from  du  Vair  and  given  to  Man  got.  At  the 
same  time  the  secretaryship  of  state,  held  by  the  latter, 
was  given  to  Eichelieu,  who,  five  days  later,  received  a 
formal  grant  of  precedence  over  the  other  secretaries. 
This  completed  the  fall  of  Villeroy,  who  showed  his 
resentment  at  being  placed  below  his  youthful  colleague 
by  ceasing  to  attend  the  council  altogether. 

Richelieu's  first  tenure  of  office  only  lasted  for  five 
months  ;  but  during  that  period  he  succeeded  in  impart- 
ing to  the  actions  of  the  government  a  firmness  and 
consistency  such  as  had  not  been  witnessed  since  the 
death  of  Henry  IV.  He  had  many  difficulties  to 
contend  with.  The  departments  with  which  he  was 
especially  concerned  were  those  of  war  and  foreign 
affairs,  and  both  were  left  to  him  in  the  greatest 
disorder.  The  regiments  were  below  their  proper 
numbers,  the  commissariat  was  wholly  neglected,  and 
the  habits  of  discipline  seemed  to  have  been  lost. 
Money  was  wanting  for  the  soldiers'  pay,  and  on  this, 
as  on  several  later  occasions,  Richelieu  found  it 
necessary  to  make  large  advances  from  his  own  funds. 
As  for  the  foreign  office,  the  most  recent  and  im- 
portant documents  were  missing.  He  had  actually  to 
write  to  the  existing  ambassadors  for  copies  of  the  in- 
structions that  had  been  given  to  them.  But  perhaps 
the  greatest  difficulty  of  all  was  interposed  by  Concini 
himself,  to  whose  favour  he  owed  his  appointment. 
The  favourite's  head  had  been  turned  by  his  rapid  rise 
to  power,  and  it  was  doubtful  whether  his  insolence  or 
his  incapacity  were  the  more  conspicuous.  Richelieu 
has  preserved  the  fragment  of  a  letter  to  Bar  bin,  which 


36  RICHELIEU  CHA.P. 

illustrates  the  way  in  which  he  treated  the  ministers 
whom  he  regarded  as  his  tools.  "  By  God,  sir,  I  com- 
plain of  you  that  your  treatment  of  me  is  too  bad ;  you 
negotiate  for  peace  without  consulting  me ;  you  have 
induced  the  queen  to  urge  me  to  abandon  the  suit 
which  I  have  commenced  against  M.  de  Montbazon  to 
make  him  pay  what  he  owes  me.  By  all  the  devils, 
what  do  you  and  the  queen  expect  me  to  do  ?  Rage 
gnaws  me  to  the  very  bones."  France  was  weary  of  the 
caprices  of  a  foreigner  who  had  used  his  influence  to 
amass  riches  and  offices  in  his  own  hands.  The 
ministers  had  reason  to  suspect  that  he  was  plotting  to 
secure  their  dismissal,  and  Eichelieu  and  Barbin  actually 
offered  their  resignations  to  the  queen-mother. 

In  spite  of  these  obstacles,  Richelieu  and  his 
colleagues  succeeded  in  dealing  the  princes  more 
severe  blows  than  they  had  experienced  at  any  pre- 
vious period  of  the  reign.  Envoys  were  despatched 
to  England,  Holland,  and  Germany  to  remove  any 
suspicions  that  might  have  been  excited  by  the  Spanish 
marriages,  and  to  prevent  any  assistance  being  given 
by  these  powers  to  the  rebels.  The  instructions  to 
Schomberg,  the  ambassador  to  Germany,  were  drawn 
up  by  Richelieu  himself,  and  contain  the  clearest  ex- 
position of  the  position  and  policy  of  the  court.  At 
the  same  time  three  armies  were  set  on  foot  to  act 
simultaneously  in  the  Ile-de-France,  Champagne,  and 
the  Nivernais.  Everywhere  the  royal  troops  carried  all 
before  them.  The  eyes  of  Europe  were  fixed  upon  the 
siege  of  Soissons,  where  the  duke  of  Mayenne  was 
blockaded  by  the  army  under  the  count  of  Auvergne. 

Suddenly  the  whole  aspect  of  affairs  was  altered  by 


II  RICHELIEU'S  FIRST  MINISTRY  37 

au  incident  which  was  entirely  unforeseen.  Concini's 
unpopularity  was  a  serious  source  of  weakness  to  the 
ministers  ;  but  the  fatal  blow  was  struck  from  a  quarter 
from  which  it  was  least  expected.  Hitherto  Louis 
XIII.,  who  was  only  fifteen  years  old,  had  been  regarded 
as  a  mere  cipher  in  the  administration.  But  the  king 
had  his  favourites  as  well  as  the  queen  -  mother. 
Prominent  among  these  was  a  young  man  of  obscure 
origin,  Luynes,  whose  chief  recommendation  was  his 
skill  in  falconry.  Mary  de  Medici  and  Concini  had 
taken  him  under  their  patronage,  and  had  thought  to 
secure  his  allegiance  by  giving  him  the  government  of 
Amboise.  But  Luynes  had  ambitious  designs  of  his 
own  which  were  by  no  means  satisfied  by  the  position 
of  personal  favourite.  He  persuaded  Louis  that 
Concini  purposely  excluded  him  from  affairs,  that  the 
princes  were  perfectly  loyal  and  were  only  alienated  by 
the  omnipotence  of  the  Florentine,  and  that  the  queen- 
mother  was  influenced  by  a  blind  preference  for  his 
younger  brother,  Gaston.  It  was  not  difficult  to  per- 
suade Louis  to  free  himself  from  the  galling  yoke  of  his 
mother's  omnipotence  by  striking  a  blow  against  a  man 
whom  he  personally  detested.  The  plot  against  Concini 
was  arranged  as  secretly  and  successfully  as  that 
against  Conde".  No  suspicions  had  been  aroused  in  the 
mind  of  the  favourite  when  on  April  24  he  was  arrested 
on  the  bridge  leading  to  the  Louvre.  He  had  only 
time  to  ejaculate,  "la  prisoner !  "  when  he  was  killed 
by  three  pistol  bullets.  His  captors  excused  their 
precipitancy  on  the  ground  that  he  had  offered 
resistance.  All  precautions  had  been  taken.  The 
queen-mother's  guard  was  disarmed,  and  she  found 


38  RICHELIEU  CHAP,  u 

herself  a  prisoner  in  her  own  apartments.  Concini's 
wife  was  arrested,  brought  to  trial,  and  executed.  The 
body  of  the  murdered  man  was  disinterred  by  the  mob, 
hanged  by  the  feet  on  the  Pont  Neuf,  dragged  in 
hideous  triumph  through  the  streets,  and  finally  burnt. 
The  news  of  Concini's  death  fell  like  a  thunderbolt 
upon  the  ministers,  who  were  expecting  to  hear  every 
day  of  the  fall  of  Soissons.  Mangot  was  arrested, 
compelled  to  resign  the  seals,  and  then  released  as  of 
small  importance.  Barbin,  who  was  regarded  as  the 
chief  agent  in  the  late  government,  was  strictly  im- 
prisoned. Richelieu  alone  was  treated  with  some 
favour  by  the  triumphant  faction.  He  went  boldly  to 
the  Louvre,  where  people  who  had  courted  him  two 
hours  before  refused  to  recognise  him.  He  found  the 
young  king  raised  upon  a  billiard  table  .that  he  might 
be  better  seen  by  the  crowd,  and  was  assured  both  by 
him  and  by  Luynes  that  they  did  not  regard  him 
as  belonging  to  the  faction  of  Concini.  He  was  even 
granted  admission  to  the  council,  where  he  found  all 
the  old  ministers,  Villeroy,  Sillery,  Jeannin,  and  du 
Vair  in  consultation.  They  received  him  with  great 
coolness,  and  demanded  in  what  capacity  he  appeared. 
On  the  answer  that  he  came  by  special  order  of  the 
king,  they  acquiesced  in  his  presence,  but  he  abstained 
from  taking  any  part  in  the  discussions,  and  soon  after- 
wards retired.  The  change,  however,  was  too  complete 
and  too  sudden  for  him  to  retain  his  position,  and  he 
found  himself  compelled  by  necessity,  if  not  by  his  own 
sense  of  gratitude,  to  follow  the  fortunes  of  the  queen- 
mother. 


CHAPTER   III 

RICHELIEU   AND   THE   QUEEN-MOTHER 
1617-1624 

Government  in  the  hands  of  Luynes — Hostility  to  the  Huguenots 
— Edict  to  restore  church  lands  in  Beam — Richelieu  exiled  to 
his  diocese — His  answer  to  the  four  ministers  of  Charenton — 
Exile  in  Avignon  —  Writes  the  Instruction  du  Chretien — 
Unpopularity  of  Luynes — The  nobles  join  the  queen-mother — 
Her  escape  from  Blois — Richelieu  sent  to  join  Mary  de  Medici 
at  Angouleme —  His  policy  at  this  period — The  treaty  of 
Angouleme — Henri  de  Richelieu  killed  in  a  duel — Continued 
hostility  between  Mary  de  Medici  and  Luynes — The  nobles 
again  rally  round  the  queen-mother — Civil  war — The  rout  of 
Pont-de-Ce — Richelieu  negotiates  a  treaty — His  relations  with 
Lnynes — Enforcement  of  royal  edict  in  Beam — Huguenot  dis- 
content and  organisation — Campaign  of  1621 — Luyues  con- 
stable— His  death — Mary  de  Medici  still  opposed  by  Conde 
and  the  ministers — Campaign  of  1622 — Treaty  of  Montpellier 
— Conde  leaves  France  in  disgust — Richelieu  receives  the 
cardinal's  hat — The  government  of  the  Brularts  (Sillery  and 
Puisieux) — La  Vieuville  procures  the  dismissal  of  the  ministers 
— Richelieu  admitted  to  the  council. 

THE  death  of  Concini  and  the  fall  of  Mary  de  Medici 
seemed  at  first  to  effect  a  complete  revolution.  The 
rebellion  of  the  nobles  was  at  an  end;  in  fact,  they 
were  received  at  court  as  if  they  had  been  fighting  the 
king's  battles  against  his  enemies.  But  they  soon 


40  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

discovered  that  the  change  of  policy  was  not  so  com- 
plete as  it  appeared  at  first.  They  were  jealously 
excluded  from  the  royal  council.  Conde,  on  whose 
release  they  had  confidently  reckoned,  was  removed 
from  the  Bastille  to  Vincennes,  but  his  prison  doors 
were  as  securely  guarded  as  ever.  The  nobles  realised 
that  the  ascendency  of  the  king's  favourite  was  as 
intolerable  as  that  of  Concini.  Nothing  had  happened 
to  reconcile  the  hostile  interests  of  the  monarchy  and 
the  aristocracy. 

The  new  government,  though  it  had  lost  the  oppor- 
tunity of  annihilating  the  power  of  the  princes,  was  in 
other  respects  not  wanting  in  energy  and  decision. 
Luynes,  who  took  the  chief  conduct  of  affairs  into  his 
own  hands,  was  a  far  abler  man  than  Concini.  He 
was  determined  to  avoid  the  reproach  of  subservience 
to  Spain  which  had  been  cast  upon  the  rule  of  the 
queen -mother.  French  assistance  was  sent  to  the 
duke  of  Savoy,  which  compelled  the  Spaniards  to 
withdraw  their  troops  from  Piedmont  and  to  conclude 
the  treaty  of  Pavia.  But  at  the  same  time  a  resolute 
attitude  was  adopted  towards  the  Huguenots.  An 
anomalous  state  of  things  existed  in  Beam,  which  was 
ruled  by  the  French  king  without  being  united  with 
France.  Henry  IV.,  after  his  conversion,  had  restored 
Roman  Catholicism  in  his  little  Protestant  kingdom  ; 
but  he  had  left  the  church  lands  in  the  hands  of  the 
Huguenots,  while  the  Catholic  clergy  received  their 
stipends  from  the  royal  revenue.  The  French  clergy 
had  never  ceased  to  demand  that  the  Church  of  Beam 
should  be  restored  to  its  lawful  possessions,  and  in 
June  1617  a  royal  edict  was  issued  to  gratify  this 


HI  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  QUEEN- MOTHER  41 

demand.  The  Huguenots  met  at  Orthez  to  protest, 
and  the  Parliament  of  Pau  refused  to  register  the  edict. 
The  struggle  about  its  enforcement  marks  the  beginning 
of  the  civil  war,  which  ended  in  the  loss  by  the 
Huguenots  of  their  political  independence. 

Meanwhile  Richelieu,  with  the  permission  of  the 
king,  had  followed  Mary  de  Medici  into  exile  at  Blois, 
where  he  was  appointed  president  of  her  council.  But 
he  had  many  enemies  at  court,  who  persuaded  the 
king  that  it  was  dangerous  to  allow  him  to  remain  in 
his  mother's  service.  On  June  15  he  received  a  royal 
letter  ordering  him  to  reside  within  his  diocese.  He 
employed  his  compulsory  solitude  at  the  Priory  of 
Coussay  in  composing  a  controversial  work  against  the 
Huguenots.  This  took  the  form  of  an  answer  to  four 
ministers  of  Charenton,  Avho  had  replied  to  a  hostile 
sermon  preached  before  the  king  by  Father  Arnoux. 
The  book  itself  is  of  slight  merit,  and  its  chief  object 
was  to  keep  the  author  prominently  before  men's  eyes. 
It  contains  more  vehement  denunciations  than  argu- 
ments, and  its  intolerant  tone  is  in  marked  contrast  to 
Richelieu's  own  actions  during  his  ministry. 

The  active  defence  of  the  orthodox  creed  did  not 
suffice  to  secure  Richelieu  from  the  suspicions  excited 
by  his  continued  correspondence  with  the  queen-mother. 
Coussay  was  considered  too  near  to  Blois,  and  early  in 
1618  he  was  exiled  to  Avignon,  where  he  resided  for  a 
year.  He  was  followed  thither  by  his  brother,  Henri 
de  Richelieu,  and  by  the  husband  of  his  elder  sister, 
de  Pont-Courlay.  So  rigorous  was  the  attitude  of  the 
court  towards  the  family  that  Henri  de  Richelieu  was 
not  even  allowed  to  pay  a  short  visit  to  his  home  on 


42  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

the  death  of  his  wife.  Richelieu,  as  before,  solaced 
himself  with  the  labours  of  composition.  His  new 
book,  the  Instruction  du  Chrttien,  had  a  great  vogue  in 
his  own  lifetime,  when  it  passed  through  more  than 
thirty  editions,  but  has  since  fallen  into  well-deserved 
neglect.  French  prose  was  not  then  the  polished  instru- 
ment that  it  became  in  the  hands  of  Pascal  and  Fe"nelon, 
and  Richelieu,  in  spite  of  his  interest  in  literature,  had 
little  literary  sense  or  capacity.  The  only  occasions 
on  which  he  wrote  really  well  and  pointedly  were  when 
his  pen  was  inspired  by  scornful  indignation.  A  letter 
which  he  sent  about  the  end  of  1610  to  the  grand 
vicars  of  Lugon  is  in  its  way  quite  a  model. 

During  Richelieu's  absence  from  court  the  ill-feeling 
against  the  administration  of  Luynes,  in  spite  of  the 
success  of  his  anti-Spanish  policy  in  Italy,  was  steadily 
increasing.  He  tried  to  conciliate  popular  opinion  by 
abolishing  the  paulette,  but  the  only  result  was  to  alienate 
the  official  classes,  who  represented  that  he  merely  wanted 
to  make  money  by  the  sale  of  their  offices.  He  showed 
no  mercy  towards  his  opponents,  and  thought  he  could 
rule  by  terror  like  an  Italian  prince.  He  did  all  he 
could  in  the  trial  of  Barbin  to  induce  the  judges  to 
sentence  him  to  death,  and  when  a  bare  majority  refused 
to  inflict  a  harsher  penalty  than  exile,  he  persuaded  the 
king  to  reverse  his  prerogative  of  mercy,  and  to  com- 
mute the  sentence  to  perpetual  imprisonment.  The 
queen-mother  was  treated  with  great  severity  at  Blois  ; 
all  her  trusted  servants  were  removed,  and  their  places 
filled  by  nominees  of  Luynes,  whose  real  functions  were 
to  act  as  spies  upon  her  actions.  At  the  same  time  his 
personal  ambition  was  still  more  insatiable  than  that  of 


in  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  QUEEN-MOTHER  43 

Concini  had  been.  He  married  the  daughter  of  the 
duke  of  Montbazon,  afterwards  famous  as  the  duchess 
of  Chevreuse.  He  extorted  from  Mayenne  the  im- 
portant government  of  the  Ile-de-France,  to  which  he 
afterwards  added  that  of  Picardy.  He  was  raised  to 
the  rank  of  duke  and  peer. 

The  great  nobles  were  furious  at  this  rapid  rise  of  a 
man,  whose  father,  as  they  said,  was  the  bastard  son  of 
a  canon  of  Marseilles  and  his  chambermaid.  In  their 
jealous  indignation  they  rallied  to  the  support  of  the 
queen-mother,  to  whom  they  had  so  long  been  opposed. 
The  chief  agent  in  the  negotiations  was  Eucelai,  another 
of  the  numerous  Italian  adventurers  who  had  been 
attracted  to  France  by  the  marriages  of  French  kings 
with  ladies  of  the  house  of  Medici.  It  was  arranged 
that  the  queen  should  be  released  from  prison,  and 
that  the  duke  of  Epernon,  the  veteran  champion  of  the 
nobles,  should  undertake  the  task  of  aiding  her.  In 
the  night  of  February  21,  1619,  she  escaped  from  a 
window  of  the  castle  of  Blois  by  means  of  a  rope-ladder, 
and  succeeded  in  making  her  way  to  Loches,  where  she 
was  received  by  Epernon. 

The  escape  of  the  queen-mother  caused  great  con- 
sternation at  court,  and  preparations  were  at  once 
made  for  the  civil  war  which  seemed  inevitable.  At 
the  same  time  the  struggle  might  be  averted  if  she 
could  only  be  separated  from  the  aristocratic  party, 
with  which  circumstances  had  forced  her  into  an  un- 
natural alliance.  Richelieu's  old  allies,  Father  Joseph 
and  Sebastien  Bouthillier,  suggested  that  he  was  the 
very  man  for  the  purpose.  He  already  possessed  the 
confidence  of  Mary  de  Medici,  and  his  influence  would 


44  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

serve  to  counteract  the  hot-headed  counsels  of  Epernon 
and  Rucelai.  Luynes,  who  had  never  shown  such 
hostility  to  Richelieu  as  others  of  his  party,  readily 
adopted  the  suggestion ;  and  the  sieur  de  Tremblay, 
Father  Joseph's  brother,  was  sent  to  carry  the  necessary 
instructions  to  Avignon.  As  Richelieu  set  out  to  obey 
the  order  he  was  captured  by  a  body  of  soldiers  at 
Vienne,  but  was  at  once  released  when  it  was  known 
that  he  had  instructions  from  the  king.  He  found  the 
queen-mother  at  Angouleme,  where  his  arrival  was 
resented  by  the  councillors,  who  sought  to  monopolise 
influence  over  her.  Richelieu's  attitude  during  the  next 
two  years  has  often  been  a  puzzle  to  historians,  but  it 
is  really  perfectly  clear.  The  part  which  he  had  to 
play  was  a  difficult  one,  and  he  has  frequently  been 
accused  of  betraying  the  queen-mother  in  the  interests 
of  the  court.  But  the  charge  is  absolutely  unfounded. 
Devotion  to  Mary  de  Medici  was  rendered  imperative 
by  his  interest,  as  well  as  by  his  duty,  but  he  was 
under  no  such  obligations  to  her  associates.  His  clear 
and  unmistakable  object  was  to  separate  his  mistress 
from  the  great  nobles,  and  to  effect  her  complete  recon- 
ciliation with  the  king.  He  was  conscious  of  a  double 
allegiance,  to  the  queen-mother  and  the  king,  and  he 
displayed  no  common  skill  and  dexterity  in  steering  his 
course  when  the  two  points  to  be  aimed  at  seemed  to 
lie  in  opposite  directions. 

A  personal  quarrel  between  Epernon  and  Rucelai 
induced  the  former  to  urge  Richelieu's  admission  to  the 
council,  which  he  had  formerly  opposed.  His  presence 
gave  a  great  impulse  to  the  negotiations  with  the  court, 
and  the  treaty  of  Angouleme  was  hastily  concluded  on 


in  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  QUEEN-MOTHER  45 

April  30.  A.  complete  amnesty  was  promised  to  the 
adherents  of  Mary  de  Medici,  and  she  resigned  the 
government  of  Normandy  for  that  of  Anjou,  with  the 
towns  of  Angers,  Pont-de-Ce,  and  Chinon.  Normandy 
was  given  to  the  duke  of  Longueville  in  exchange  for 
Picardy,  which  Luynes  took  into  his  own  hands.  The 
partisans  of  Rucelai  were  bitterly  dissatisfied  with  the 
treaty,  which  they  had  done  all  in  their  power  to  pre- 
vent, and  their  discontent  had  disastrous  consequences 
for  Richelieu.  The  queen  had  entrusted  the  govern- 
ment of  Angers  to  his  eldest  brother,  who  received  a 
challenge  from  the  marquis  de  Themines,  a  member  of 
Rucelai's  faction.  In  the  duel  which  followed,  Henri 
de  Richelieu  was  killed.  This  was  a  terrible  blow  to 
Richelieu,  who  was  sincerely  attached  to  his  brother. 
The  latter  was  a  general  favourite  at  court,  and,  in  the 
judgment  of  Fontenay-Mareuil,  he  might,  if  he  had 
lived,  have  rendered  valuable  services  to  the  great 
cardinal. 

The  treaty  of  Angouleme  was  far  from  producing 
the  results  which  Richelieu  hoped.  The  dominant 
faction  at  the  court  remained  bitterly  hostile  to  the 
queen  -  mother.  When  she  met  her  son  at  Tours, 
Luynes  or  one  of  his  brothers  was  always  present  at 
their  interviews,  and  succeeded  in  averting  the  restoration 
of  her  influence.  The  king  set  out  to  return  to  Paris, 
while  Mary  de  Medici  proceeded  to  Angers  to  take 
possession  of  her  new  government.  The  desired  re- 
conciliation was  as  far  off  as  ever.  The  queen's  ad- 
herents were  treated  with  marked  neglect  or  resentment. 
A  new  guardian,  the  Colonel  d'Ornano,  was  appointed 
for  her  younger  son,  without  even  asking  her  opinion. 


46  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

But  the  most  direct  blow  was  the  release  of  Conde  and 
the  issue  of  a  royal  declaration  in  his  favour,  which 
virtually  condemned  the  queen  and  all  who  had  had  a 
hand  in  his  imprisonment.  Richelieu  in  vain  urged 
her  to  go  to  Paris,  and  to  trust  to  the  gradual  revival 
of  maternal  authority  over  the  king.  She  preferred  to 
listen  to  the  counsels  of  her  more  extreme  followers, 
who  wished  her  to  remain  at  the  head  of  the  party  of 
princes,  and  she  demanded  the  dismissal  of  Luynes  as  an 
enemy  of  the  s.tate.  It  was  the  fear  of  this  that  had 
led  to  the  release  of  Conde,  in  order  that  he  might  form 
a  rival  party  among  the  nobles  in  opposition  to  the 
queen's  adherents. 

The  year  1620  witnessed  the  outbreak  of  the  civil 
war,  which  Richelieu  had  striven  so  desperately  to  avert. 
One  after  another  the  chief  princes,  Venddme  and  his 
brother,  Soissons,  Longueville,  Nemours,  left  the  court 
with  the  avowed  intention  of  resorting  to  armed  force. 
Unfortunately  all  except  Longueville  hastened  to  join 
Mary  de  Medici  at  Angers,  where  they  strengthened  the 
violent  opponents  of  Richelieu,  while  their  jealous 
rivalry  for  the  post  of  leader  did  much  to  weaken  the 
cause  which  they  had  espoused.  Their  dissensions 
encouraged  Luynes  and  Conde,  now  closely  allied  to- 
gether, to  take  energetic  measures.  Carrying  the  king 
with  them,  they  advanced  into  Normandy,  where  Rouen 
and  the  other  chief  towns  surrendered  in  rapid  succession, 
while  Longueville  fled  to  Dieppe  without  striking  a  blow. 
They  then  turned  southward  to  confront  the  hostile 
coalition  in  Anjou.  The  most  futile  arrangements  had 
been  made  by  Venddme  and  Marillac  to  resist  the 
attack.  Instead  of  strengthening  the  defences  of  Angers, 


in  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  QUEEN-MOTHER  47 

which  might  have  held  out  for  months,  they  undertook 
to  unite  Angers  and  Pont-de-C6  by  an  entrenchment  two 
leagues  long,  which  they  could  not  possibly  complete  in 
time,  and  which  they  had  not  men  enough  to  defend, 
even  if  it  had  been  completed.  Richelieu  pointed  out 
the  folly  of  the  enterprise,  but  he  was  not  in  a  position 
to  insist  upon  his  opinion,  and  it  was  probably  rejected 
with  scorn.  The  royal  troops  earned  the  position  with 
an  ease  that  was  almost  ridiculous.  The  rout  of  Pont- 
de-Ce"  became  a  byword  in  that  generation.  Vendome 
himself  was  the  first  to  carry  the  news  to  Mary  de 
Medici,  whose  position  was  now  hopeless.  Richelieu 
urged  her  to  cross  the  Loire  and  escape  to  Angouleme, 
where  she  could  at  least  negotiate  in  security.  But  his 
advice  was  overruled  by  the  cowardice  of  Vendome  and 
the  countess  of  Soissons,  and  nothing  remained  but  an 
unconditional  surrender.  Richelieu  and  the  cardinal 
de  Sourdis  were  entrusted  with  the  negotiations  on  their 
behalf,  and  they  were  relieved  to  find  that  Luynes  was 
ready  to  grant  the  same  terms  after  -the  victory  as  he 
had  offered  before.  The  treaty  of  Pont-de-Ce  contained 
no  stipulations  of  any  importance ;  it  professed  to  be 
nothing  more  than  a  reconciliation,  a  mutual  promise 
that  all  injuries  should  be  forgotten. 

Richelieu's  attitude  in  these  events  is  clearly  ex- 
pressed in  his  assertion  that  the  queen-mother  "was 
saved  from  ruin  by  her  defeat."  If  she  had  won  a 
victory,  all  the  fruits  would  have  remained  in  the  hands 
of  the  princes  who  fought  for  her.  As  it  was,  she  was 
freed  from  all  obligations  to  them,  and  the  way  was 
opened  for  the  recovery  of  her  influence  at  court.  His 
most  immediate  object  was  to  effect  a  real  reconciliation 


48  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

between  Mary  de  Medici  and  Luynes,  who  was  beginning 
to  resent  the  pretensions  of  Conde,  and  was  not  unwilling 
to  provide  a  rival  to  him  in  the  person  of  the  queen- 
mother.  In  the  hope  of  effecting  this  purpose,  Richelieu 
agreed  to  a  marriage  between  his  niece,  Mademoiselle 
de  Pont-Courlay,  and  the  sieur  de  Combalet,  nephew  of 
Luynes.  But  the  event  disappointed  his  schemes,  which 
were  destined  to  be  carried  through  in  a  wholly  unfore- 
seen manner. 

The  escape  of  Mary  de  Medici  and  the  events  which 
followed  it  had  completely  diverted  attention  from  the 
edict  about  church  property  in  Beam,  which  had  never 
been  enforced.  After  the  treaty  of  Pont-de-C6,  Luynes 
carried  off  Louis  XIII.  to  suppress  the  resistance  of  the 
Huguenots.  The  campaign  was  soon  over.  Navarreins, 
the  one  fortress  of  the  province,  was  compelled  to 
surrender,  and  the  Eoman  Catholic  clergy  were  placed 
in  possession  of  the  ecclesiastical  lands.  A  royal  edict 
was  issued  to  unite  B6arn  and  Lower  Navarre  with  the 
crown  of  France.  Thus  one  of  the  great  bulwarks  of 
Protestantism  was  destroyed,  the  work  of  centralisation 
made  a  notable  advance,  and  the  king  was  received  in 
triumph  on  his  return  to  Paris. 

Meanwhile  the  French  Huguenots  had  watched  the 
progress  of  events  in  Beam  with  growing  misgivings. 
The  leaders  of  the  extreme  party  determined  to  antici- 
pate attack  by  organisation.  In  defiance  of  a  royal 
prohibition,  they  held  an  assembly  at  La  Eochelle  and 
demanded  the  restoration  in  B6arn  of  the  state  of  things 
existing  in  1616,  the  withdrawal  of  the  garrisons 
recently  established  in  Guienne  and  Poitou,  and  the 
satisfaction  of  the  demands  preferred  in  their  last  meet- 


in  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  QUEEN-MOTHER  49 

ing.  The  king  offered  to  remove  some  of  their 
grievances,  but  ordered  the  immediate  dissolution  of 
their  assembly.  This  was  urged  by  Lesdiguieres  and 
other  moderate  leaders ;  but  they  were  powerless  to 
control  the  more  turbulent  spirits,  who  believed  that 
the  divided  court  would  never  venture  on  active 
measures  against  them.  In  order  to  be  prepared, 
however,  for  every  danger,  they  proceeded  to  divide 
France  into  seven  great  provinces,  in  each  of  which 
there  was  to  be  a  military  commander  and  a  provincial 
council.  The  supreme  direction  was  to  be  entrusted  to 
a  commander-in-chief,  who  was  to  receive  instructions 
from  the  general  assembly  at  La  Eochelle.  As  Bouillon 
refused  the  office  and  Lesdiguieres  was  suspected  on 
account  of  his  relations  with  the  court,  the  supreme 
command  was  entrusted  to  the  duke  of  Eohan,  the 
governor  of  St.  Jean  d'Angely.  These  preparations 
and  the  evident  intention  to  form  "a  republic  within 
the  kingdom  "  excited  the  greatest  indignation  in  Paris, 
and  Louis  XIII.  determined  to  crush  the  rebellion  by 
force. 

Meanwhile  Richelieu  had  failed  to  effect  the  desired 
reconciliation  between  Luynes  and  the  queen-mother, 
and  the  latter  was  jealously  excluded  from  the  royal 
council.  The  marriage  between  Combalet  and  Made- 
moiselle de  Pont-Courlay  had  been  completed,  but  it 
had  failed  to  produce  any  confidence  between  the  two 
uncles.  Luynes  even  took  advantage  of  the  marriage 
to  endeavour  to  separate  Richelieu  from  Mary  de 
Medici,  by  giving  out  that  the  bishop  of  Lu9on  was  now 
devoted  to  his  interests,  and  that  through  him  he  was 
informed  of  all  the  queen's  secrets.  There  were  not 

£ 


60  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

wanting  advisers  who  urged  Mary  to  renew  her  alliance 
with  the  princes,  and  to  try  once  more  the  chances  of 
war  against  the  favourite.  Richelieu,  however,  was 
eager  to  prevent  a  coalition  which  he  had  been  at  such 
pains  to  break  up,  and  he  succeeded  in  persuading  the 
queen-mother  to  remain  patient  and  to  avoid  hostilities. 
This  moderation  enabled  Luynes  to  embark  in  the 
campaign  of  1621.  In  order  to  raise  funds,  he  was 
obliged  to  restore  the  paulette,  and  to  raise  a  ruinous 
loan  on  the  security  of  the  gabelle  on  salt.  At  the  same 
time  the  office  of  constable,  which  had  been  vacant  since 
the  death  of  Montmorency  in  1614,  was  revived  and  con- 
ferred upon  Luynes,  although  his  military  distinctions 
were  of  the  slightest.  In  May  the  king  with  his  army 
entered  Poitou,  and  after  a  short  siege  captured  St.  Jean 
d'Angely.  After  detaching  Epernon  to  blockade  La 
Rochelle,  Louis  entered  Guienne,  and  for  a  time  carried 
all  before  him.  These  successes  encouraged  Luynes  to 
undertake  the  siege  of  Montauban,  the  chief  Huguenot 
stronghold  in  the  south.  But  here  his  good  fortune 
deserted  him,  and  after  serious  losses  had  been  sus- 
tained he  was  compelled  to  raise  the  siege.  After  the 
death  of  du  Vair,  Luynes  held  the  seals  for  a  short  time, 
and  this  led  Conde"  to  remark  that  "he  was  a  good 
keeper  of  the  seals  in  time  of  war,  and  a  good  constable 
in  time  of  peace."  His  omnipotence  had  been  tolerated 
as  long  as  he  was  successful,  but  his  first  failure  led  to 
the  outbreak  of  opposition.  Puisieux  intrigued  against 
him  in  the  ministry,  but  he  was  still  strong  enough  to 
maintain  his  position  against  attack.  To  recover  his  lost 
prestige  he  laid  siege  to  Monheur,  a  fortress  near  Toulouse. 
There  he  was  seized  by  a  fever,  which  carried  him  off 


in  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  QUEEN-MOTHER  51 

in  four  days  (December  14,  1621).  The  reputation  of 
Luynes  has  suffered  from  the  unpopularity  which  dogs  the 
footsteps  of  favourites ;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  he 
deserves  a  more  prominent  place  in  history  than  has  been 
usually  allotted  to  him.  He  anticipated  in  some  respects 
the  future  policy  of  Eichelieu.  He  crushed  a  formidable 
coalition  of  the  princes,  and  he  inflicted  the  first  serious 
blow  upon  the  political  independence  of  the  Huguenots. 
Eichelieu  and  Mary  de  Medici  had  good  reason  to 
rejoice  at  the  constable's  death,  but  they  soon  found 
that  all  obstacles  were  not  yet  removed  from  their  path. 
Conde"  and  the  ministers  continued  Luynes's  policy  of 
opposition  to  the  queen -mother.  Unable  to  prevent 
any  longer  her  admission  to  the  council,  they  did  all 
they  could  to  exclude  her  from  any  real  control  of  affairs. 
The  first  subject  of  discussion  in  1622  was  the  desira- 
bility of  continuing  the  war  against  the  Huguenots. 
Mary  de  Medici,  expressing  in  council  the  opinions 
which  Richelieu  had  drawn  up  for  her,  urged  that  civil 
war  was  rendered  impolitic  by  the  present  condition  of 
affairs  in  Europe,  and  that  the  primary  duty  of  France 
was  to  check  the  growing  power  of  the  house  of  Hapsburg. 
But  Conde",  eager  to  separate  the  king  from  his  mother, 
succeeded  in  persuading  him  to  undertake  a  new  cam- 
paign. The  queen  determined  to  follow  him,  but  she 
fell  ill  at  Nantes,  and  was  compelled  to  retire  to  the 
waters  of  Pougues,  whither  Richelieu  accompanied  her. 
Meanwhile  the  king  advanced  into  Poitou,  where  he 
defeated  Soubise,  Rohan's  brother,  and  took  Royan  after 
a  six  days'  siege.  But  for  the  second  time  he  declined 
to  attack  La  Rochelle,  and  leaving  Soissons  to  cover 
the  great  stronghold  of  the  enemy,  he  marched  into 


52  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

Languedoc.  In  order  to  restrain  the  growing  preten- 
sions of  Cond6,  the  constableship  was  given  to  Les- 
diguieres,  who  was  thus  induced  to  throw  himself 
altogether  on  the  side  of  the  crown,  and  to  become  a 
convert  to  Roman  Catholicism.  The  chief  event  of  the 
campaign  was  the  siege  of  Montpellier,  which  was  under- 
taken by  Cond6.  But  he  was  unsuccessful,  and  his 
failure  enabled  the  moderate  party  to  induce  the  king 
to  agree  to  a  peace.  The  treaty  of  Montpellier  was 
arranged  between  Lesdiguieres  and  Rohan.  The  Edict 
of  Nantes  was  confirmed,  but  the  Huguenots  were  only 
allowed  to  retain  two  fortified  places,  Montauban  and 
La  Rochelle.  Conde"  was  so  indignant  at  the  treaty, 
which  was  signed  without  his  having  any  knowledge  of 
it,  that  he  left  the  court  and  set  out  on  a  journey  to 
Italy. 

This  year  witnessed  an  important  event  in  the  life 
of  Richelieu — his  elevation  to  the  cardinalate.  As  early 
as  1619  Mary  de  Medici  had  persuaded  Louis  XIIL, 
when  she  met  him  after  the  treaty  of  Angouleme,  to 
demand  this  appointment  from  the  pope.  In  the  next 
year,  after  the  affair  at  Pont-de-C6,  she  induced  him  to 
write  a  second  letter,  and  to  send  Sebastien  Bouthillier 
to  Rome  to  urge  the  matter  on  the  pope's  attention. 
For  two  years  the  faithful  adherent  of  Richelieu  re- 
mained at  Rome  trying  to  remove  the  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  the  nomination.  The  chief  of  these  difficulties 
arose  from  the  resolute  opposition  of  Luynes,  and  this 
ended  with  his  death,  but  Richelieu  always  suspected 
the  ministers  of  intriguing  against  his  candidature.  At 
last  Gregory  XV.  was  induced  to  grant  the  coveted 
dignity,  and  Richelieu  received  the  news  of  his  promo- 


in  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  QUEEN-MOTHER  53 

tion  in  September.  He  went  to  Tarascon  to  thank  the 
king  in  person,  and  Louis,  who  seems  never  to  have 
regarded  him  with  disfavour,  told  him  that  he  could 
not  have  succeeded  as  long  as  Luynes  lived. 

Eichelieu  had  welcomed  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty 
of  Montpellier  as  rendering  possible  a  vigorous  foreign 
policy  in  opposition  to  the  threatening  power  of  Austria 
and  Spain.  But  he  was  grievously  disappointed.  The 
withdrawal  of  Conde  left  the  chief  power  in  the  hands 
of  Sillery  and  his  son  Puisieux,  both  experienced  in  the 
conduct  of  affairs,  but  inclined  by  temperament  to  half- 
hearted measures,  and  absorbed  in  the  desire  of  main- 
taining their  own  authority.  Even  the  queen-mother, 
so  long  devoted  to  the  Spanish  alliance,  was  at  last 
awakened  to  the  dangers  which  threatened  France,  and 
wished  to  abandon  the  vacillating  policy  which  had  so 
long  been  followed.  This  brought  her  into  collision 
with  the  ministers,  who  sought  to  strengthen  themselves 
by  an  alliance  with  the  great  nobles.  When  Conde 
returned  from  Italy  they  invited  him  to  court  in  the 
hope  of  playing  him  off  against  Mary  de  Medici.  But 
they  were  destined  to  fall  before  the  opposition  of  one 
of  their  own  supporters.  They  had  obtained  the 
removal  of  Schomberg  from  the  control  of  finances,  on 
an  unfounded  charge  of  malversation,  and  his  office  was 
given  to  the  marquis  of  la  Vieuville.  But  la  Vieuville 
soon  began  to  chafe  at  the  subordinate  position  in 
which  he  was  kept  by  his  colleagues,  and  intrigued 
against  them  with  the  queen-mother.  The  discovery 
that  considerable  sums  of  money  had  passed  througli 
the  hands  of  Puisieux  and  had  never  been  properly 
accounted  for,  gave  his  enemies  a  handle  against  him 


54  RICHELIEU  CHAP,  in 

and  his  father.  In  January  1624  Sillery  for  the 
second  time  was  driven  from  court,  and  the  office  of 
first  minister  passed  into  the  hands  of  la  Vieuville. 
But  he  soon  realised  that  he  possessed  neither  the 
experience  nor  the  capacity  to  deal  with  the  difficulties 
in  which  France  was  involved,  and  he  looked  round  for 
assistance.  His  connection  with  Maryde  Medici  naturally 
suggested  that  he  should  have  recourse  to  the  ablest  of 
her  servants,  but  he  feared  that  he  would  himself  be  over- 
shadowed by  Richelieu's  superiority.  He  proposed  to 
form  a  council  for  foreign  affairs,  with  the  cardinal  as 
president ;  but  the  members  were  to  be  excluded  from 
the  council  of  the  king.  Such  a  position  was  not  likely 
to  commend  itself  to  Richelieu,  and  in  April  1624  la 
Vieuville  was  compelled  to  advise  the  king  to  admit 
the  cardinal  to  the  council  of  state. '  Thus  Richelieu 
entered  office  for  the  second  time,  and  commenced  an, 
administration  which  was  destined  to  be  the  most! 
glorious  in  the  history  of  France./ 


CHAPTEE   IV 

THE   VALTELLINE   AND    LA   ROCHELLE 
1624-1628 

Richelieu's  schemes  of  domestic  reform  —  Compelled  to  abandon 
them  for  foreign  politics — Threatening  progress  of  the  house 
of  Hapsburg — Difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  ministers — Renewed 
alliance  with  the  Dutch — Negotiations  about  the  English 
marriage — Fall  of  la  Vieuville — Richelieu  first  minister — His 
policy  in  the  English  negotiations — Question  of  the  Valtelline 
— The  forts  in  the  hands  of  the  pope — De  Cceuvres  seizes  the 
Valtelline — Revolt  of  the  Huguenots — Ships  obtained  from 
England  and  Holland — Naval  victory  over  the  rebels — Negotia- 
tions with  the  Huguenots — Indignation  of  the  Ultramontane 
party  against  Richelieu — Treaty  of  Monzon  with  Spain — Treaty 
with  the  Huguenots — Conspiracy  of  Ornano  and  Madame  de 
Cbevreuse — Collapse  of  the  conspiracy — Fate  of  Chalais — 
Richelieu  appointed  superintendent  of  navigation  and  commerce 
— His  maritime  schemes — Quarrel  between  France  and  England 
— Buckingham's  expedition  to  Rhe — Critical  position  of  France 
— Energy  displayed  by  Richelieu  —  Relief  of  the  fort  of  St. 
Martin — Buckingham  compelled  to  abandon  Rhe' — Siege  of 
La  Rochelle — Plan  of  blocking  the  harbour — Period  of  the 
king's  absence — Richelieu  directs  the  siege — Failure  of  the 
English  attempts  to  relieve  La  Rochelle — Surrender  of  the 
city — Its  treatment. 

RICHELIEU,  according  to  his  own  account,  pleaded  ill- 
health  Us  an  excuse  for  declining  the  burdensome  responsi- 
bilities of  office,  but  his  scruples  were  overcome  by  the 


56  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

urgent  entreaties  of  the  king  and  the  queen -mother, 
and  on  April  29,  1624,  he  was  formally  admitted  to  the 
council  La  Vieuville,  who  regarded  his  new  colleague 
with  the  jealousy  of  conscious  inferiority,  wished  to 
subordinate  him  to  the  chancellor  and  the  constable, 
but  Richelieu  insisted  on  the  right  of  a  cardinal  to 
precedence  even  over  princes  of  the  blood.  M.  d'Avenel 
has  published  an  interesting  document,  in  which  the 
new  minister  drew  up  a  comprehensive  scheme  of  internal 
reforms.  The  decrees  of  the  Council  of  Trent  were  to 
be  accepted,  but  without  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  the 
crown  and  the  liberties  of  the  Gallican  Church.  The 
monasteries  were  to  be  reformed  and  their  number 
diminished,  on  the  ground  that  they  were  a  serious 
obstruction  to  industry.  The  expenses  of  the  royal 
household  were  to  be  reduced  by  rigid  economy.  The 
paulette  and  the  sale  of  offices  were  to  be  abolished,  and 
on  the  death  of  existing  office-holders  the  number  of 
places  was  to  be  diminished.  To  relieve  the  people, 
the  gdbelle  on  salt  was  to  be  reformed  so  as  to  fall 
upon  foreigners  rather  than  upon  subjects,  and  the 
exemptions  from  the  faille  were  to  be  cut  down  in 
number  and  refused  in  the  future.  Provincial  govern- 
ments were  only  to  be  held  for  three  years,  and  all 
useless  fortifications  were  to  be  demolished. 

If  Richelieu  had  carried  out  these  reforms  he  would 
have  deserved  the  lasting  gratitude  of  France.  But 
they  represent  the  pious  wishes  of  a  newly-appointed 
minister  rather  than  the  matured  intentions  of  an 
experienced  statesman.  Possibly  many  of  the  changes 
would  have  been  repudiated  by  Richelieu  himself  in 
later  years ;  but  at  the  moment  his  attention  was 


iv  THE  VALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  57 

distracted  from  domestic  affairs  by  the  overwhelming 
pressure  of  foreign  politics.  Since  the  death  of  Henry 
IV.  the  policy  of  opposition  to  the  house  of  Hapsburg 
had  been  abandoned,  with  fatal  results  to  France.  In 
the  great  war  which  began  in  Germany  in  1618  the 
emperor  and  the  Catholic  League  had  won  a  series  of 
victories.  Not  only  was  the  Bohemian  revolt  suppressed, 
but  both  the  Upper  and  the  Lower  Palatinate  had  been 
'conquered,  and  in  1623  they  were  transferred,  with  the 
electoral  vote,  to  Maximilian  of  Bavaria.  Ferdinand 
II.,  as  the  champion  of  the  Counter-reformation,  held  a 
stronger  position  in  Germany  than  any  of  his  predecessors 
since  Charles  V.,  and  he  threatened  to  become  stronger 
still,  if  once  he  could  form  an  army  of  his  own,  and  thus 
free  himself  from  dependence  upon  the  Catholic  princes. 
Still  more  serious  for  France  was  the  progress  made  by 
the  neighbouring  power  of  Spain,  the  close  ally  of  the 
emperor.  Philip  IV.  and  Olivares  were  reviving  the 
ambitious  aims  of  Philip  II.  Their  troops,  under 
Spinola,  had  reduced  the  Lower  Palatinate,  and  they 
now  threatened  to  conquer  the  United  Provinces,  which 
could  hardly  make  an  effective  resistance  without  support. 
England,  which  under  Elizabeth  had  been  a  champion 
of  Protestantism,  and  which  had  special  reasons  for 
sympathy  with  the  Elector  Palatine,  was  paralysed  by 
the  fatuous  policy  of  James  I.,  who  allowed  himself  to 
be  fooled  by  the  prospect  of  marrying  his  son  to  the 
Spanish  infanta.  Unless  resolute  steps  were  taken, 
Spain  threatened  to  shut  France  in  altogether  on  her 
eastern  frontier  by  a  chain  of  dependent  or  subject 
territories.  Negotiations  had  been  opened  with  Vienna 
for  the  surrender  of  Tyrol  and  Elsass  to  the  Spanish 


58  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

crown.  And  finally  Spain  attempted  to  evade  the 
Alpine  barrier  which  shut  off  her  Italian  territories 
from  her  possessions  in  Central  Europe.  In  1622  her 
troops  had  seized  the  important  pass  of  the  Valtelline, 
which  connected  Lombardy  with  Tyrol,  in  defiance  of 
the  claim  of  France  to  control  the  valley. 

Sillery  and  Puisieux  had  fallen  because  they  had 
failed  to  check  the  aggressions  of  Spain,  and  the  task 
was  now  intrusted  to  la  Vieuville  and  Eichelieu ;  but? 
they  were  hampered  by  serious  difficulties  in  their  way. 
France  was  a  Roman  Catholic  country,  and  Richelieu 
was  a  cardinal  of  the  Church.  Though  he  might  be 
willing  to  subordinate  religious  to  political  interests, 
and  though  he  defended  this  by  the  example  of  the 
Roman  court  itself,  yet  he  could  not  afford  to  give 
Spain  the  advantage  of  posing  as  the  champion  of  the 
orthodox  creed.  Moreover,  in  France  itself  there  was 
a  strong  Ultramontane  party  which  resented  any  rupture 
with  Spain,  and  Richelieu's  patroness,  Mary  de  Medici, 
would  hardly  pardon  such  a  complete  change  of  attitude 
as  would  appear  to  condemn  her  conduct  during  the 
regency.  Above  all,  it  was  imperative  not  to  entangle 
France  in  foreign  relations  which  might  advance  the 
interests  of  the  Huguenots.  Thus  alliances  with  Protest- 
ant powers  could  only  be  half-hearted,  and  accompanied 
with  reservations  fatal  to  their  efficiency.  Vigorous 
intervention  in  Germany,  perhaps  the  best  method  of 
checkmating  the  schemes  of  Spain,  was  impossible, 
because  it  would  alienate  the  Catholic  League,  which 
it  was  Richelieu's  intention  to  conciliate,  in  the  hope 
of  playing  the  princes  off  against  the  emperor.  The 
attempt  to  recover  ascendency  in  the  Valtelline  was 


iv  THE  VALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  59 

rendered  difficult  by  the  necessity  of  keeping  on  good 
terms  with  Rome,  and  of  securing  the  Catholic  inhabitants 
of  the  valley  from  oppression  by  their  Protestant  rulers. 

Through  these  difficulties,  which  were  not  diminished 
by  the  absence  of  a  good  understanding  with  his  principal 
colleague,  Richelieu  steered  his  way  with  a  mixture  of 
caution  and  resolution  which  does  more  credit  to  his 
intellect  than  to  his  convictions.  France  hastened  to 
renew  its  alliance  with  the  Dutch,  which  had  been 
broken  off  since  Henry  IV.'s  death,  and  to  welcome 
the  overtures  made  by  England.  Buckingham's  journey 
to  Madrid  had  resulted  in  breaking  off  the  proposed 
Spanish  marriage,  and  James  I.  now  demanded  the 
hand  of  Louis  XIII.'s  sister,  Henrietta  Maria,  for  the 
Prince  of  Wales.  The  negotiations  were  long  and 
tedious.  Richelieu's  claim  to  precedence  as  a  cardinal 
being  disputed  by  the  English  envoys,  he  feigned  illness, 
and  received  them  in  his  bed.  But  the  great  difficulty 
arose  from  the  French  demand  that  James  should  promise 
toleration  to  the  English  Roman  Catholics,  as  he  had 
offered  to  do  in  his  negotiations  with  Spain.  The  English 
king  was  willing  to  give  a  verbal  promise,  but  France 
insisted  upon  a  formal  and  binding  agreement,  counter- 
signed by  an  English  minister. 

During  the  negotiations  the  differences  between 
Richelieu  and  la  Vieuville  became  more  and  more 
manifest.  The  latter  assured  the  English  envoys  that 
the  demand  for  toleration  was  a  mere  form  to  satisfy 
the  pope  and  the  French  Catholics,  and  that  Louis 
XIII.  really  cared  nothing  about  the  matter.  The  king, 
who  considered  that  his  honour  compelled  him  to  exact 
at  least  as  favourable  terms  as  had  been  proffered  to 


60  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

Spain,  was  furious  at  this  attempt  to  frustrate  his 
wishes.  In  August  la  Vieuville  was  dismissed,  and 
Richelieu  was  left  without  a  rival  in  the  ministry.  His 
superior  tact  and  determination  enabled  him  to  score  a 
diplomatic  triumph.  The  English  court,  urged  on  by 
the  reckless  Buckingham,  agreed  to  make  the  desired 
stipulation,  and  to  be  satisfied  with  the  barren  con- 
cession that  it  should  not  form  part  of  the  marriage 
contract.  Father  Berulle  was  sent  to  Rome  to  procure 
the  papal  dispensation,  and  the  marriage  was  celebrated 
in  the  spring  of  1625,  soon  after  Charles  I.  had  succeeded 
to  the  throne  on  his  father's  death. 

If  Richelieu,  as  he  gives  out  in  his  Memoirs,  was  the 
guiding  spirit  throughout  this  transaction,  his  policy 
is  open  to  serious  criticism.  Buckingham  wished  France 
to  assist  Mansfeld  in  the  recovery  of  the  Palatinate. 
Richelieu,  on  the  other  hand,  was  determined  not  to 
entangle  himself  in  Germany,  but  wished  to  involve 
England  in  a  war  with  Spain,  in  order  to  divert  Spanish 
attention  from  the  Valtelline.  His  trump  card  in  the 
negotiations  was  the  knowledge  that  Buckingham  was 
resolved  on  the  French  alliance,  and  that  Buckingham 
dominated  both  James  and  Charles.  This  enabled  him 
to  make  the  alliance  on  his  own  terms.  But  it  was 
extremely  foolish,  from  the  political  point  of  view,  to 
exact  such  concessions  to  the  Roman  Catholics.  Not 
only  were  causes  of  quarrel  certain  to  arise  from  so 
one-sided  an  agreement,  but  it  necessarily  involved  the 
English  court  in  a  quarrel  with  the  parliament,  and 
without  the  supplies  of  parliament  English  intervention 
on  the  continent  was  sure  to  be  futile.  Possibly 
Richelieu  may  not  have  appreciated  the  importance  of 


iv  THE  VALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  61 

the  parliamentary  aspect  of  the  matter,  but  it  is  more 
probable  that  he  was  not  a  free  agent,  and  that  the  line 
which  he  took  was  forced  upon  him.  It  was  not  in  his 
power  to  acquire  all  at  once  that  ascendency  over  the 
king  which  he  afterwards  established,  and  in  this  question 
of  the  English  marriage  the  real  decision  rested  with 
Louis  and  his  mother.  If  Richelieu  had  attempted  to 
oppose  them  he  would  have  shared  the  fate  of  la 
Vieuville. 

France  had  been  driven  to  renew  her  Protestant 
alliances  in  Europe,  mainly  by  events  in  the  Valtelline. 
This  important  valley,  which  runs  from  Lake  Como  into 
Tyrol,  was  the  property  of  the  three  Grison  leagues, 
which  themselves  formed  part  of  the  Swiss  Confedera- 
tion. Ever  since  the  reign  of  Louis  XII.  the  Grisons 
had  been  the  allies  of  France,  and  had  pledged  them- 
selves to  close  their  Alpine  passes  against  the  enemies 
of  that  country.  But  for  some  time  the  Spanish  governor 
of  Milan  had  been  endeavouring  by  intrigues  and  threats 
to  secure  the  control  of  the  Valtelline,  and  in  1603  the 
fort  of  Fuentes  had  been  built  at  the  entrance  of  the 
pass.  Since  then  a  Spanish  party  had  grown  up  in  the 
Grisons,  and  had  set  itself  to  oppose  the  dominant 
influence  of  France.  In  1620  this  party  organised  a 
revolt  of  the  Roman  Catholic  population  of  the  Val- 
telline against  the  oppressions  of  the  judges  appointed 
by  the  Protestant  leagues.  The  Spaniards  aided  the 
rebels  in  expelling  the  Swiss  troops  that  were  sent 
against  them,  and  four  forts  were  constructed  in  the 
valley  and  garrisoned  by  Spanish  troops.  The  Grisons 
now  appealed  for  assistance  to  France,  and  a  French 
envoy  negotiated  the  treaty  of  Madrid  (April  25, 


62  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

1621),  by  which  the  forts  were  to  be  destroyed,  and 
everything  restored  to  its  former  condition.  But  the 
outbreak  of  the  Huguenot  war  encouraged  the  Spaniards 
to  evade  the  fulfilment  of  the  treaty,  and  in  1622  the 
Grisons,  attacked  simultaneously  from  Austria  and  from 
Milan,  and  despairing  of  French  aid,  made  terms  with 
Spain,  by  which  they  renounced  their  sovereignty  over 
the  Valtelline,  and  agreed  to  grant  a  passage  to  Spanish 
troops.  The  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  Montpellier 
at  last  enabled  Louis  XIII.  to  turn  his  attention  to 
affairs  in  Italy,  and  in  February  1623  he  formed  a 
league  with  Venice  and  Savoy  to  compel  Spain  to  carry 
out  the  treaty  of  Madrid.  The  Spaniards,  who  were 
not  prepared  to  embark  in  a  new  war,  now  agreed  to 
submit  the  dispute  to  the  arbitration  of  the  pope,  and 
the  forts  were  handed  over  to  papal  troops  under 
the  command  of  the  marquis  of  Bagny.  But  Urban 
VIII.,  although  personally  inclined  to  oppose  the  domina- 
tion of  Spain  in  Italy,  was  unable  to  resist  the  pressure 
of  the  Spanish  party  in  Rome,  which  urged  the  impiety 
of  restoring  Protestant  rule  in  the  Valtelline.  The 
terms  which  the  pope  proposed  were  so  favourable  to 
Spain  that  they  were  unhesitatingly  rejected  by  Riche- 
lieu, who  at  last  decided  on  energetic  measures.  In 
the  winter  of  1624  the  marquis  de  Cceuvres,  who  had 
been  sent  on  an  embassy  to  the  Swiss  cantons,  was 
ordered  to  raise  troops  for  the  reduction  of  the  Val- 
telline. The  attack  was  entirely  successful ;  the  papal 
garrisons  were  taken  unprepared,  and  early  in  1625  the 
valley  and  the  forts  were  completely  in  the  hands  of 
the  Swiss  and  the  Grisons.  At  the  same  time,  in  order 
to  divert  the  attention  of  Spain,  the  constable  Kes- 


iv  THE  VALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  63 

diguieres   was   sent   to   co-operate   with   the   duke    of 
Savoy  in  an  attack  on  Genoa. 

But  Spain  could  count  on  efficient  supporters  within 
France.  No  sooner  had  the  government  embarked  in  a 
foreign  war  than  Huguenot  discontent  broke  out  into 
open  rebellion.  The  Huguenots,  who  were  still  headed 
by  Rohan  and  Soubise,  complained  that  the  treaty  of 
Montpellier  had  not  been  carried  out,  and  especially 
that  the  forti6cations  of  Fort  St.  Louis,  which  threat- 
ened La  Rochelle,  had  been  strengthened  instead  of 
being  destroyed.  In  January  1625  Soubise,  who  had 
already  seized  the  island  of  Rhe,  suddenly  attacked  and 
captured  the  royal  vessels  in  the  harbour  of  Blavet. 
This  success  was  the  signal  for  a  general  rising ;  La 
Rochelle  espoused  the  cause  of  Soubise,  and  Rohan  took 
up  arms  in  Languedoc.  The  court  was  panic-stricken 
at  the  news,  and  a  majority  of  the  council  wished  to 
conclude  a  peace  with  Spain  at  any  price.  All  Richelieu's 
firmness  was  needed  to  prevent  an  abject  surrender  of 
French  interests  in  Italy.  The  great  difficulty  in  the 
way  of  suppressing  the  Huguenots  was  the  want  of 
ships,  and  Richelieu  resolved  to  obtain  them  from  the 
.  Protestant  powers.  Both  England  and  Holland  were 
furious  with  the  Huguenots  for  threatening  to  ruin  the 
grand  combination  against  Spain,  and  they  promptly 
agreed,  not  only  to  supply  vessels,  but  to  allow  France 
to  man  them  with  French  captains  and  troops.  Mont- 
morency  took  command  of  the  fleet  and  won  a  complete 
victory  over  the  rebels,  who  were  driven  from  Rlie"  and 
Oleron.  Soubise  fled  to  England,  and  the  Huguenots 
hastened  to  sue  for  peace. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  Christian  IV.  of  Denmark 


64  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

undertook  the  championship  of  the  Protestant  cause  in 
Germany.  Eichelieu  considered  that  Spain,  involved  in 
hostilities  with  the  English  and  Dutch,  and  pledged  to 
the  assistance  of  the  emperor,  could  not  act  with  energy 
in  Italy,  and  that  a  very  moderate  effort  would  compel  her 
to  concede  to  the  French  demands.  He  therefore  made 
use  of  English  mediation  to  conduct  negotiations  with 
the  Huguenots.  This 'policy  excited  the  bitter  hostility 
of  the  Ultramontane  party,  who  resented  the  collision 
with  the  papacy  even  more  than  the  breach  with  Spain. 
This  party  was  now  headed  by  Berulle,  and  it  was  sup- 
ported within  the  council  by  Marillac,  the  controller  of 
finance,  and  afterwards  keeper  of  the  seals.  Virulent 
pamphlets  were  published  against  Richelieu,  in  one  of 
which  he  was  stigmatised  as  the  "cardinal  of  la  Rochelle." 
To  conciliate  his  opponents,  who  might  at  any  moment 
be  strengthened  by  the  adhesion  of  the  queen-mother, 
he  was  compelled  to  authorise  the  comte  du  Fargis,  the 
French  ambassador  at  Madrid,  to  open  negotiations  with 
Ob'vares.  But  du  Fargis  allowed  himself  to  be  gained 
over  by  the  Ultramontanes,  and  in  January  1626,  without 
authority,  he  signed  a  treaty  with  Spain.  Richelieu,  who 
saw  clearly  that  powerful  influences  were  at  work  in  the 
matter,  and  who  feared  the  alienation  of  Venice  and  Savoy, 
insisted  on  repudiating  this  treaty,  and  also  another  which 
du  Fargis  signed  at  Monzon  on  March  5.  The  final 
treaty,  modified  to  suit  the  interests  of  France,  was  not 
signed  till  May  10  at  Barcelona,  but  it  is  usually  known 
in  history  as  the  treaty  of  Monzon.  The  sovereignty  of 
the  Valtelline  was  to  be  restored  to  the  Grisons.  Spain 
abandoned  all  claim  to  control  the  passes,  and  the  forts 
were  to  be  again  handed  over  to  the  pope  and  destroyed. 


iv  THE  VALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  65 

Meanwhile  the  English  ambassadors,  ignorant  of  the 
events  in  Spain,  were  urging  on  the  negotiations  with 
the  Huguenots,  in  order  that  France  might  be  able  to 
act  with  energy  in  Italy.  Thanks  to  their  exertions  the 
Huguenots  were  induced  to  withdraw  their  demand  for 
the  destruction  of  Fort  St.  Louis,  and  to  accept  a  very- 
disadvantageous  treaty  on  February  5.  But,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  government,  the  treaty  had  one  very 
serious  defect — that  it  was  based  upon  English  mediation. 
Charles  I.  had  revenged  himself  for  Louis's  intervention 
on  behalf  of  the  Roman  Catholics.  The  Huguenot 
deputies  declared  that  they  would  never  have  accepted 
the  treaty  but  for  pressure  from  England,  and  for  the 
assurance  that  henceforth  "they  might  lawfully  accept 
assistance  from  the  English  king." 

For  the  moment,  however,  Richelieu  seemed  to  have 
triumphed.  He  had  humbled  the  Huguenots  with  the 
help  of  their  natural  allies,  and  he  had  forced  Spain  to 
resign  her  hold  upon  the  Valtelline.  But  his  very 
success  had  served  to  stimulate  discontent  at  home.  All 
the  interests  which  dreaded  the  growth  of  a  strong 
monarchy  combined  against  the  minister  who  threatened 
to  destroy  all  restrictions  upon  royal  absolutism.  Even 
before  peace  was  concluded  rumours  began  to  circulate 
of  approaching  changes  in  the  government.  The  per- 
sonage upon  whom  all  eyes  were  turned  was  the  king's 
younger  brother,  Gaston,  whose  succession  to  the  throne 
seemed  almost  inevitable,  since  Louis's  health  was  feeble 
and  his  marriage  had  proved  for  many  years  unfruitful. 
But  Gaston  himself  was  not  very  formidable ;  he  was 
only  the  tool  of  those  who  surrounded  him.  The  real 
contrivers  of  the  plot  were  the  marshal  d'Ornano,  whom 

F 


66  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

Kichelieu  himself  had  released  from  prison  and  restored 
to  his  former  office  as  governor  to  Monsieur,  and  the 
duchess  of  Chevreuse,  the  widow  of  Luynes,  who  had 
since  married  a  member  of  the  house  of  Guise.  It  is 
difficult  to  ascertain  their  precise  objects  ;  probably  they 
had  never  distinctly  formulated  them  themselves.  Their 
overt  measures  were  to  demand  the  admission  of  Gaston 
to  the  council,  and  to  oppose  the  plan  of  marrying  him 
to  Mademoiselle  de  Montpensier.  Rumour  accused  them 
of  having  further  designs :  to  remove  Louis  XIII.  to  a 
monastery,  to  place  Gaston  on  the  throne,  and  to  marry 
him  to  Anne  of  Austria.  The  latter  is  said  to  have  ex- 
claimed in  answer  to  the  charge,  "  I  should  not  have 
gained  enough  by  the  change."  It  is  certain,  at  all 
events,  that  the  conspiracy  was  directed  against  Riche- 
lieu, whose  removal  was  a  necessary  preliminary  to  any 
further  measures.  Nearly  all  the  princes  were  more  or 
less  involved  :  Conde,  because  he  resented  his  continued 
exclusion  from  the  court ;  the  young  Soissons,  because 
he  wished  to  secure  the  Montpensier  inheritance  for 
himself ;  the  rest  from  a  general  desire  to  increase  their 
own  importance  and  independence.  To  the  Frenchmen 
of  the  seventeenth  century  a  plot  was  an  attraction 
itself;  they  did  not  need  any  carefully-prepared  schemes 
or  skilfully-dangled  bribes  to  induce  them  to  embark  in 
it.  According  to  Richelieu,  foreign  powers  were  also 
implicated.  England,  Holland,  and  Savoy  all  resented 
the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  Monzon,  and  were  willing 
to  overthrow  the  statesman  whom  they  considered 
responsible ;  while  Spain  was  always  on  the  look-out  for 
the  opportunity  of  stirring  up  domestic  disorder  in 
France. 


iv  THE  VALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  67 

The  plotters  seemed  to  have  talked  with  a  reckless 
indiscretion,  which  had  been  natural  enough  under  the 
feeble  regency,  but  which  was  madness  now  that  power 
had  fallen  to  a  man  capable  and  willing  to  use  it 
Richelieu  waited  till  he  had  collected  enough  evidence 
to  satisfy  the  king,  and  then  struck  with  vigour  and 
decision.  On  May  4,  Ornano  was  seized  and  imprisoned 
at  Vincennes,  where  he  died  four  months  later.  Gaston 
went  in  a  rage  to  the  cardinal,  who  firmly  accepted  the 
responsibility  for  the  action.  To  most  of  the  conspirators 
little  severity  was  shown.  The  king's  half-brothers,  the 
duke  of  Vend6me  and  the  Grand  Prior,  were  taken 
prisoners,  and  Madame  de  Chevreuse,  exiled  from  the 
court,  escaped  to  Lorraine.  Conde  hastened  to  come 
to  terms  with  the  government,  and  the  other  princes 
were  treated  with  passive  contempt.  Gaston,  who  was 
formally  reconciled  with  Louis  and  his  mother,  received 
the  duchies  of  Orleans  and  Chartres  as  an  appanage,  and 
Richelieu  himself  officiated  at  his  marriage  with  Made- 
moiselle de  Montpensier.  But  while  a  politic  clemency 
spared  the  leaders,  one  of  their  tools  was  selected  for 
condign  punishment,  as  an  example  of  the  dangers  of 
conspiring.  Henri  de  Talleyrand,  count  of  Chalais,  whose 
mother  had  bought  for  him  the  office  of  master  of  the 
wardrobe,  had  been  drawn  into  the  plot  by  the  seductive 
charms  of  the  duchess  of  Chevreuse.  His  youthful  in- 
discretion had  led  him  into  foolish  conversations,  which 
were  now  brought  up  against  him.  He  was  tried  before 
a  specially  appointed  commission,  and  was  condemned 
to  be  beheaded  and  quartered.  In  spite  of  the  frantic 
supplications  of  his  mother,  the  sentence  was  carried  out. 
That  he  was  more  or  less  guilty  there  is  little  doubt ; 


68  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

but  he  was  far  less  to  blame  than  others  who  escaped, 
and  his  untimely  fate  will  always  excite  a  feeling  of  in- 
dignation against  the  ruthless  policy  which  chose  him  as 
a  sacrifice. 

The  inevitable  result  of  this  abortive  conspiracy  was 
to  strengthen  the  minister  against  whom  it  was  directed. 
The  king  granted  Richelieu  a  bodyguard  of  a  hundred 
men,  to  protect  him  against  the  malice  of  his  enemies. 
His  control  over  the  government  became  the  more 
absolute  as  it  appeared  that  he  was  the  necessary 
bulwark  of  the  royal  power.  At  this  moment  the 
constableship  was  left  vacant  by  the  death  of  the  veteran 
Lesdiguieres,  and  Richelieu  seized  the  opportunity  to 
suppress  an  office  which  gave  excessive  authority  and 
independence  to  its  holder.  The  corresponding  office  of 
admiral  was  purchased  from  Montmorency  for  1,200,000 
livres,  and  was  also  suppressed.  Thus  the  army  and 
navy  were  brought  under  the  direct  control  of  the 
ministers,  and  a  great  step  was  taken  in  the  process  of 
centralisation.  Richelieu  himself  was  profoundly  im- 
pressed with  the  necessity  of  making  France  a  great 
naval  power,  in  order  to  protect  and  extend  French 
commerce,  and  to  avoid  the  humiliation  of  depending  for 
foreign  assistance  against  Huguenot  rebellion.  To  give 
him  the  necessary  authority,  the  king  conferred  upon 
him  the  novel  office  of  "  grand-master,  chief,  and  super- 
intendent-general of  navigation  and  commerce."  Large 
sums  of  money  were  raised  to  build  and  purchase  ships, 
and  to  furnish  them  with  crews  and  necessary  stores. 
As  a  navy  in  those  days  must  be  based  upon  a  large 
mercantile  marine,  Richelieu  projected  the  formation 
of  a  great  company  at  Morbihan,  which  should  dispute 


IV  THE  VALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  69 

the  trade  with  the  East  and  "West  Indies,  with  England, 
Holland,  and  Spain. 

Eichelieu's  measures  were  not  only  dictated  by  a  wise 
comprehension  of  the  future  interests  of  France  :  his 
gaze  was  never  long  withdrawn  from  the  immediate 
drama  of  foreign  affairs.  The  Protestant  cause  in 
Europe,  with  which  France  could  not  but  be  intimately 
connected,  had  suffered  severe  blows  in  1626.  Christian 
IV.  of  Denmark  had  been  crushed  by  Tilly  and  the 
troops  of  the  Catholic  League  ;  Mansfeld  had  been 
irretrievably  defeated  by  the  imperial  army  under 
Wallenstein.  To  make  matters  worse,  England,  which 
was  more  responsible  than  any  other  power  for  the  failure 
of  the  Danish  king,  and  which  had  failed  in  its  own 
naval  attack  upon  Spain,  did  not  hesitate  to  add  to 
its  difficulties  by  picking  a  quarrel  with  France.  The 
marriage  contract  of  Henrietta  Maria  had  produced 
nothing  but  quarrels  and  misunderstandings  between 
the  two  powers.  Charles  I.  could  not  grant  the  pro- 
mised toleration  to  the  Roman  Catholics  in  face  of 
parliamentary  opposition,  and  so  he  calmly  repudiated 
his  promise  and  allowed  the  penal  laws  to  be  enforced. 
He  quarrelled  with  his  wife  for  her  avowed  partiality 
for  her  native  country  and  her  own  religion.  So  far 
did  his  anger  carry  him  that  he  expelled  with  insult  the 
French  ladies  and  priests  of  the  queen's  household. 
He  resented  the  maritime  schemes  of  Richelieu  as  an 
encroachment  upon  the  naval  supremacy  which  he 
claimed  as  England's  right.  English  cruisers  captured 
French  vessels  on  the  slightest  pretext,  and  their 
cargoes  were  sold  by  order  of  the  English  courts  as 
contraband  of  war. 


70  RICHELIEU  CHAV. 

So  far  as  these  disputes  constituted  causes  of  war,  it 
was  France  which  had  most  cause  of  complaint.  But 
indignant  as  Louis  XIII.  and  Mary  de  Medici  might  be 
at  the  treatment  of  Henrietta  Maria  and  the  shameless 
disregard  of  the  marriage  contract,  they  would  have 
been  restrained  by  Eichelieu  from  endeavouring  to 
redress  their  grievances  by  arms.  It  was  England 
which  embarked  upon  the  war,  and  her  conduct  was  so 
obviously  fatuous  under  existing  circumstances  that  men 
were  at  a  loss  to  account  for  it.  The  real  author  of  the 
French  war,  as  of  the  French  alliance,  was  Buckingham. 
When  he  had  visited  France  to  escort  Charles  L's  bride 
to  England,  he  had  been  audacious  enough  to  make  open 
love  to  Anne  of  Austria,  the  neglected  wife  of  Louis 
XIII.  Since  then  he  had  several  times  suggested  his 
return  to  Paris  as  envoy  for  the  settlement  of  disputes, 
but  his  proposal  had  always  been  rejected  by  the  king 
and  queen-mother,  who  had  no  desire  that  he  should 
carry  his  insolent  overtures  any  further.  Contem- 
poraries did  not  hesitate  to  assert  and  to  believe 
that  the  proud  favourite  considered  himself  in- 
sulted, and  that  he  revenged  himself  by  attacking 
France.  It  is  more  probable  that  he  wished  to  con- 
ciliate the  hostile  majority  in  parliament,  who  had 
never  forgiven  him  for  allowing  English  ships  to  be 
employed  against  the  Huguenots.  With  a  sublime  self- 
confidence,  which  no  failure  had  been  able  to  weaken,  he 
believed  that  his  enterprise  would  be  irresistible,  and 
that  a  rapid  success  would  give  him  a  position  in  England 
which  nothing  could  shake.  Although  the  Huguenots 
were  not  in  revolt,  he  announced  himself  as  the  champion 
of  their  interests,  and  complained  that  the  recent  treaty 


iv  THE  VALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  71 

had  been  broken  by  the  retention  of  Fort  St.  Louis,  and 
by  the  construction  of  the  two  forts  of  St.  Martin  and 
La  Free  on  the  island  of  Rh6,  which  commanded  the 
entrance  to  the  harbour  of  La  Eochelle.  No  pains  were 
spared  in  fitting  out  the  fleet,  which  sailed  from  Stokes 
Bay  on  June  27,  1627.  Its  exact  destination  was  at 
first  uncertain,  but  on  July  10  it  anchored  off  the  coast 
of  Rlie".  Two  days  later  the  troops  were  landed  after 
a  stubborn  struggle,  and  proceeded  to  lay  siege  to  the 
fort  of  St.  Martin. 

It  was  a  critical  moment  in  the  career  of  Richelieu. 
Louis  XIII.  was  ill  with  a  tertian  fever,  and  the 
cardinal  did  not  dare  to  leave  him.  Yet  upon  him  fell 
all  the  responsibility  of  resisting  an  invasion,  which  had 
been  foreseen  but  very  insufficiently  provided  against. 
And  the  English  were  not  the  only  enemies  to  be 
considered.  Rohan,  urged  on  by  Buckingham,  hastened 
to  raise  once  more  the  standard  of  revolt  in  Languedoc. 
La  Rochelle  was  at  first  inclined  to  resent  an  enterprise 
about  which  it  had  never  been  consulted,  and  to  remain 
obstinately  neutral.  But  it  was  certain  that  the 
citizens  would  be  forced  before  long  to  espouse  the 
English  cause.  And  Buckingham  had  made  careful 
preparations  to  divert  the  attention  of  France.  His 
envoy  had  gained  over  Charles  IV.  of  Lorraine,  at 
whose  court  the  duchess  of  Chevreuse  continued  her 
incessant  intrigues  against  Richelieu.  The  discon- 
tented count  of  Soissons  was  at  Turin,  and  both  Savoy 
and  Venice  only  waited  for  the  news  of  an  English 
victory  to  join  the  coalition  against  France.  And 
within  France  itself  there  were  many  opponents  of  the 
cardinal  who  would  have  welcomed  a  defeat  which 


72  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

should  discredit  his  administration.  He  had  no  ally  to 
look  to  except  Spain,  with  whom  France  had  concluded 
a  treaty  in  April.  But  it  was  notorious  that  Spain  only 
desired  to  embroil  France  with  England,  and  that 
Olivares  had  actually  revealed  the  treaty  to  Buckingham 
in  order  to  induce  him  to  accept  his  terms.  The  most 
immediate  danger,  however,  was  in  the  island  of  Rhe". 
Toiras,  the  commander,  had  received  lavish  grants  of 
money,  but  had  neglected  to  hurry  on  his  preparations. 
Neither  of  the  two  forts  was  in  a  condition  to  resist 
attack,  and  at  the  moment  of  his  landing  Buckingham 
might  have  carried  either  of  them  by  assault.  But  he 
paid  no  attention  to  La  Free,  and  wasted  four  days 
before  reaching  St.  Martin.  His  delay  enabled  the 
garrison  by  great  exertion  to  complete  the  defences  just 
in  time,  and  the  English  were  compelled  to  abandon  the 
assault  for  a  blockade.  This  gave  the  French  time  to 
organise  the  relief  of  the  fortress ;  but  the  matter  was 
still  urgent.  Toiras  had  barely  food  enough  to  last 
two  months,  and  his  needs  were  increased  when 
Buckingham  collected  the  mothers,  wives,  and  daughters 
of  the  garrison,  and  drove  them  into  the  fortress  by  a 
volley  of  English  bullets.  As  the  English  naval  force 
was  superior  to  any  that  France  could  bring  against  it, 
and  as  the  assailants  must  sooner  or  later  have  the 
co-operation  of  La  Rochelle,  it  seemed  as  if  the  surrender 
of  the  fort  was  only  a  question  of  time. 

But  Richelieu's  energy  rose  to  the  occasion.  Though 
he  spent  the  whole  day  and  many  nights  by  the  king's 
bed,  and  was  compelled  to  disguise  his  anxieties  for  fear 
of  alarming  the  patient,  he  undertook  the  whole  super- 
intendence of  the  necessary  measures  for  the  relief  of  St 


IV  THE  VALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  73 

Martin.  He  had  the  capacity,  which  seems  peculiar  to 
great  statesmen,  of  grasping  every  minute  detail  as 
clearly  as  the  general  outline  of  a  scheme.  Nothing 
was  too  small  for  him,  and  he  shrank  from  no  labour  or 
responsibility.  The  duke  of  Angouleme  was  appointed 
to  command  the  army  in  Poitou,  with  instructions  to 
watch  over  La  Eochelle  and  prevent  any  assistance  being 
given  to  the  English.  Before  long  it  was  found  neces- 
sary to  extend  this  supervision  to  a  regular  siege. 
Agents  were  sent  in  every  direction  to  collect  sailors, 
ships,  and  provisions,  at  the  ports  of  Brouage  and  the 
Sables  d'Olonne.  Special  care  was  taken  to  provide  a 
number  of  pinnaces  and  rowing-boats  from  Bayonne,  so 
that  the  relieving  force  might  be  independent  of  the 
wind,  and  might  evade  the  shallows  of  a  low  tide. 
Succour  was  sent  to  the  island  of  Oleron,  which  was 
more  fertile  than  Rhe,  and  which  would  become  of 
immense  importance  if  the  latter  were  lost.  The  Spanish 
offers  of  assistance  were  accepted,  though  Richelieu  had 
little  confidence  in  their  good  faith,  and  the  subsidy 
treaty  was  renewed  with  the  Dutch,  so  as  to  secure  at 
least  their  neutrality.  As  the  treasury  was  wholly  un- 
able to  meet  the  extraordinary  expenditure,  Richelieu 
employed  his  own  money  and  his  own  credit  to  supply 
the  deficiency. 

Before  the  end  of  August  the  king  was  well  enough 
to  travel,  and  he  and  Richelieu  at  once  set  out  to  join 
the  army  before  La  Rochelle.  Their  arrival  did  much 
to  stimulate  the  exertions  to  assist  the  besieged  fort,  but 
though  some  few  supplies  had  been  smuggled  in, 
nothing  substantial  had  been  achieved.  The  garrison 
was  more  and  more  pressed  by  want,  and  on  Sep- 


74  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

tember  25  an  offer  of  surrender  was  actually  made,  but 
postponed  to  the  next  day.  That  very  evening  the 
wind  took  a  favourable  turn,  and  the  relieving  force 
succeeded  in  making  its  way  through  the  English  fleet, 
with  the  loss  of  only  one  boat.  St.  Martin  was  safe  for 
nearly  six  weeks.  For  the  moment  the  English  were 
so  discouraged  as  to  decide  on  abandoning  the  enterprise, 
but  the  promise  of  speedy  reinforcements  induced  them 
to  change  their  mind.  But  the  English  administration 
was  hopelessly  corrupt  and  inefficient,  and  Charles's  good- 
will was  not  enough  to  fit  out  the  ships  in  time,  or  to 
provide  favourable  winds  when  they  were  ready.  Mean- 
while the  besiegers  were  suffering  from  the  inclemency 
of  an  early  winter,  and  found  themselves  in  danger  of 
being  in  their  turn  besieged.  Eichelieu  had  succeeded  in 
sending  troops  across  to  the  island,  where  they  found 
a  safe  shelter  in  the  neglected  fort  of  La  Pr6e.  It 
was  known  that  Toiras  could  not  hold  out  beyond 
November  5,  but  Buckingham  could  not  hold  out  so 
long.  On  October  27  he  made  a  futile  attempt  to 
storm  the  fort,  and  two  days  later  he  proceeded  to 
embark  his  troops.  But  Marshal  Schomberg  brought 
up  the  newly-arrived  soldiers  from  La  Free,  and  the 
English  retreat  was  turned  into  a  confused  and  ruinous 
rout.  Buckingham  returned  to  England  with  barely  a 
third  of  the  force  that  had  accompanied  him.  Some 
three  weeks  later  the  Spanish  fleet,  which  a  little  before 
might  have  rendered  invaluable  services,  arrived  at 
Morbihan. 

The  English  invasion  had  forced  Eichelieu  into  a 
closer  alliance  with  the  ultra-Catholic  party  than  he 
would  have  formed  of  his  own  accord,  and  he  found 


iv  THE  YALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  75 

it  advisable  to  cement  the  alliance  by  inducing  the 
pope  to  give  the  cardinal's  hat  to  B6rulle,  though 
the  latter  was  his  avowed  rival  for  the  favour  of  the 
queen-mother.  The  full  extent  of  the  dangers  which 
threatened  France  had  been  recently  revealed  by  the 
papers  of  Montague,  the  English  envoy,  who  had  been 
captured  on  the  borders  of  Lorraine.  These  disclosed, 
not  only  the  intrigues  of  Buckingham  with  Lorraine, 
Savoy,  and  the  count  of  Soissons,  but  also  a  design 
on  the  part  of  the  emperor  to  assert  his  claim  to 
the  bishoprics  of  Metz,  Toul,  and  Verdun,  which  had 
been  occupied  by  France  since  1553,  but  had  never 
been  resigned  by  the  Empire.  Some  documents  found 
in  Buckingham's  camp  at  St.  Martin  also  revealed 
the  intrigues  of  Spain  with  England.  But  Richelieu 
determined  to  disregard  as  much  as  possible  these 
external  dangers,  and  to  concentrate  his  attention 
upon  the  siege  of  La  Rochelle.  The  task  of  making 
head  against  Rohan  in  Languedoc  was  entrusted  to 
Cond6,  a  notorious  hater  of  the  religion  which  his 
fathers  had  professed,  and  to  Montmorency,  the 
governor  of  the  province.  The  king  and  cardinal 
set  to  work  to  form  an  efficient  blockade  of  the 
Huguenot  stronghold  in  the  west.  The  three  com- 
manders of  the  army,  Angoule'me,  Schomberg,  and 
Bassompierre,  undertook  to  close  all  access  to  the  town 
by  land  by  the  construction  of  a  line  of  fortifications, 
three  leagues  in  length,  which  were  defended  by 
eleven  forts  and  eighteen  redoubts.  But  relief  from 
the  land  side  was  little  to  be  dreaded,  and  the  most 
serious  problem  was  to  close  the  entrance  to  the 
harbour.  This  was  the  special  care  of  Richelieu  him- 


76  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

self.  Acting  on  the  advice  of  two  French  engineers, 
he  ordered  the  construction  of  two  great  moles,  one 
from  each  side  of  the  harbour,  at  a  sufficient  distance 
from  the  town  to  be  out  of  range  of  cannon-shot. 
The  moles  were  to  be  built  of  huge  stones,  with  a 
slope  on  each  side,  so  as  to  break  the  force  of  the 
waves.  In  the  middle  a  space  was  to  be  left  for  the 
tide  to  go  in  and  out,  but  this  was  to  be  partially 
blocked  by  sunken  ships,  and  to  be  guarded  by  the 
French  fleet.  In  January  this  fleet  arrived  from 
Morbihan  under  the  command  of  the  duke  of  Guise, 
and  with  it  came  the  Spanish  vessels  which  had 
professed  to  come  for  the  relief  of  St.  Martin.  But 
they  had  scarcely  been  eight  days  at  anchor  when  a 
false  report  of  the  approach  of  the  English  compelled 
the  Spaniards  to  show  their  true  colours,  and  to 
demand  leave  to  depart.  The  officers  themselves  were 
ashamed  of  the  part  which  they  had  to  play,  and 
which  they  vainly  tried  to  excuse  on  the  ground  of 
necessary  preparation  for  a  joint  attack  upon  England 
in  the  summer. 

Eichelieu  had  other  difficulties  to  contend  with 
besides  the  fury  of  the  winds,  the  heroic  obstinacy  of 
the  besieged  citizens,  and  the  aid  which  was  promised 
to  them  by  England.  All  whose  interests  were 
opposed  to  the  strengthening  of  the  monarchy  looked 
forward  to  the  fall  of  La  Kochelle  with  serious  mis- 
givings. Bassompierre  only  expressed  the  prevalent 
sentiment  of  his  class  when  he  exclaimed,  "We  shall 
be  fools  enough  to  take  the  city."  The  most  careful 
supervision  and  the  exercise  of  sovereign  authority 
were  needed  to  prevent  careless  or  treasonable  neglect 


iv  THE  VALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  77 

of  the  siege  operations.  It  was,  therefore,  a  heavy 
blow  to  him  when  he  learnt  that  Louis  XIIL,  weary 
of  the  monotony  of  camp  life,  and  dreading  the  winter 
climate  on  the  salt  marshes,  announced  his  determina- 
tion to  return  to  Paris.  At  first  he  risked  the  royal 
displeasure  by  opposing  the  king's  wishes,  and  when 
he  had  to  give  way,  he  found  it  necessary  to  offer 
an  opportunity  for  the  intrigues  of  his  opponents  by 
consenting  to  remain  at  La  Rochelle.  Fortunately 
Louis  was  capable  of  appreciating  his  devotion.  Not 
only  did  he  entrust  Richelieu  during  his  absence  with 
the  supreme  command  by  sea  and  land,  but  he  resisted 
the  attempts  of  his  mother  to  prolong  his  stay  in  the 
capital,  and  in  April  had  once  more  returned  to  the 
siege. 

Richelieu  had  now  the  opportunity  of  displaying 
the  military  tastes  and  capacity  which  he  had 
developed  in  his  younger  days.  Attired  in  a  garb 
which  betrayed  the  soldier  rather  than  the  ecclesiastic, 
he  undertook  the  personal  direction  of  the  siege 
works  by  land  and  sea.  The  strictest  discipline  was 
maintained,  and  the  cardinal  triumphantly  compared 
his  camp  to  a  well-ordered  monastery.  The  men 
were  well  paid,  well  fed,  and  well  clothed — a  striking 
contrast  to  the  condition  of  most  of  the  armies  of  that 
period, — and  the  amount  of  sickness  was  surprisingly 
small.  Steady  progress  was  made  with  the  moles, 
though  the  ravages  of  the  sea  more  than  once  made 
it  necessary  to  do  much  of  the  work  over  again ;  but 
each  time  some  lesson  was  learnt  and  some  fault 
of  construction  was  remedied.  Richelieu  had  good 
reason  for  energetic  action,  when  he  heard  that  the 


78  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

queen-mother  had  joined  the  ranks  of  his  opponents, 
and  that  war  had  broken  out  in  Italy  about  the 
succession  to  Mantua  and  Montferrat.  Twice  he  tried 
to  surprise  the  town  during  the  night,  but  both 
attempts  failed,  and  he  had  to  trust  to  the  slow  but 
certain  results  of  the  blockade.  The  return  of  the 
king  removed  some  of  his  worst  anxieties,  but  he 
was  still  worried  by  the  urgent  necessity  of  relieving 
Casale,  which  was  besieged  by  the  Spaniards.  He 
could,  however,  do  nothing  till  La  Kochelle  had  fallen. 
In  May  an  English  fleet  under  Lord  Denbigh  sailed 
to  relieve  the  town,  but  it  was  ill-equipped,  and  the 
sailors  were  the  discontented  victims  of  impressment. 
After  viewing  the  defences  of  the  harbour,  and  up- 
braiding the  deputies  from  La  Kochelle  for  their  false 
information,  the  English  retired  without  striking  a 
blow,  but  promising  that  they  would  return  with  a 
stronger  force.  Meanwhile  the  besieged  were  reduced 
to  the  greatest  straits.  The  supplies  of  food  were 
carefully  reserved  for  the  fighting  men;  the  women 
and  children,  and  all  who  could  not  bear  arms,  were 
forced  to  support  a  miserable  existence  on  roots,  shell- 
fish, and  even  boiled  leather.  At  last  the  useless 
mouths  were  driven  out,  but  the  king  sternly  refused 
to  let  them  pass,  and  many  died  of  starvation 
between  the  walls  and  the  royal  lines.  Nothing  but 
the  iron  resolution  of  the  mayor,  Guiton,  prevented 
an  immediate  surrender,  when  the  news  came  that 
Buckingham,  just  as  he  was  preparing  to  start  for 
their  relief,  had  fallen  a  victim  to  Felton's  knife. 
This  event  delayed  the  expedition,  but  it  sailed  in 
September  under  the  command  of  the  earl  of  Lindsay. 


iv  THE  VALTELLINE  AND  LA  ROCHELLE  79 

It  was  now  too  late.  The  two  moles  had  been 
completed,  and  the  gap  between  them  had  not  only 
been  filled  with  sunken  vessels,  but  was  also  guarded 
night  and  day  by  a  number  of  ships  fastened  together 
in  the  shape  of  a  half-moon.  The  only  chance  was 
to*  make  a  way  through  by  means  of  fire-ships,  which 
had  once  been  so  successful  at  Antwerp.  But  the 
fire-ships  were  ill-directed,  and  were  grappled  and 
towed  to  shore  by  French  boats.  The  English 
attack  was  a  failure.  Charles  vainly  tried  to  negotiate 
on  terms  which  might  have  been  possible  before 
Buckingham's  repulse  from  Eh 6,  but  which  were 
preposterous  now  that  the  fall  of  La  Rochelle  was 
inevitable.  The  citizens  at  last  realised  that  their 
cause  was  hopeless,  and  on  October  28  they  agreed 
to  capitulate,  on  condition  that  their  lives  should  be 
spared,  and  liberty  of  worship  allowed  to  them. 
Kichelieu's  influence  over  the  king  was  strong  enough 
to  prevent  the  attack  upon  a  rebellious  city  from 
being  converted  into  a  crusade  against  heresy.  Two 
days  later  the  triumphal  entry  took  place.  The  three 
marshals  marched  abreast  to  avoid  any  disputes  as  to 
precedence,  then  came  the  cardinal  alone,  and  then 
the  king.  Richelieu  appeared  on  that  day  as  the 
first  subject  of  France.  On  the  city  of  La  Rochelle 
fell  the  punishment  from  which  the  citizens  were 
spared.  Its  walls  were  destroyed,  its  municipal 
privileges  were  cancelled,  and  no  Protestant  who  had 
not  been  born  there  might  take  up  his  residence  in 
the  town.  Even  the  fortresses  of  St.  Louis  and  St. 
Martin  were  to  be  razed  to  the  ground,  as  there  was 
no  longer  any  need  for  their  existence. 


80  RICHELIEU  CHAP,  iv 

Thus  Richelieu  had  lived  to  achieve  the  scheme 
which  he  had  dreamed  of  when  he  was  simple  bishop 
of  Lu9on.  He  had  humbled  the  last  municipality 
which  was  capable  of  resisting  the  power  of  the 
monarchy.  To  him,  more  than  any  other  man,  was 
the  victory  due,  and  his  wise  moderation  had  prevented 
its  being  abused  in  a  way  that  would  have  produced 
lasting  disaffection  and  disunion  in  France.  The 
capture  of  La  Rochelle  was  the  achievement  to  which, 
in  his  later  years,  he  looked  back  with  the  greatest 
pride  and  the  most  unalloyed  satisfaction. 


P.  JH. 


CHAPTER   V 

THE   MANTTJAN    SUCCESSION   AND   THE   DAY    OF   DUPES 
1628-1631 

The  question  of  the  Mantuan  succession — Siege  of  Casale — Louis 
XIII.  and  Richelieu  cross  the  Alps  for  its  relief — Treaty  of 
Susa — Peace  with  England — Treaty  between  Spain  and  Rohan 
— Campaign  in  Languedoc — Submission  of  the  Huguenots — 
They  retain  religious  toleration  but  lose  their  political  privileges 
—  Discontent  of  Gaston  of  Orleans — He  goes  to  Lorraine — 
Enmity  of  Mary  de  Medici  against  Richelieu — Its  motives — 
Relations  of  Richelieu  and  Louis  XIII.  — Gaston  returns  to 
France — Imperialist  troops  sent  to  Mantua— Richelieu's  second 
expedition  to  Italy — Attitude  of  Charles  Emmanuel  of  Savoy — 
The  French  take  Pinerolo — Conquest  of  Savoy — Fall  of  Mantua 
— Siege  of  Casale — Truce  of  Rivalta — Relations  of  France  with 
Gustavus  Adolphus — The  emperor  and  the  Catholic  League — 
Diet  of  Ratisbon — Treaty  of  Ratisbon —  Richelieu  refuses  to 
confirm  it — Illness  of  Louis  XIII. — Relief  of  Casale  —  Open 
quarrel  of  Mary  de  Medici  with  Richelieu — The  Day  of  Dupes 
— Gaston  goes  to  Orleans — Mary  de  Medici  at  Compiegne — 
Gaston  goes  to  Lorraine — The  queeu-mother  escapes  to  Brussels 
— Settlement  of  the  Mantuan  succession  by  treaties  of  Cherasco 
— France  keeps  Pinerolo — Successes  of  Richelieu. 

LA  ROCHELLE  had  fallen,  but  Casale  was  still  holding  out 
It  was  not  yet  too  late  for  Richelieu  to  resume  that 
policy  of  opposition  to  Spain  which  the  quarrel  with 
England  and  the  revolt  of  the  Huguenots  had  compelled 

a 


82  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

him  for  a  time  to  abandon.  He  had  allied  himself  with 
the  Ultramontane  party,  but  he  was  not  their  slave.  To 
their  intense  disgust  he  again  postponed  the  annihilation 
of  Eohan  and  the  Huguenots  in  the  south,  while  he 
concentrated  his  attention  upon  the  maintenance  of 
French  interests  in  Italy.  The  question  of  the  Man- 
tuan  succession  requires  a  few  words  of  explanation. 

Vincenzo  di  Gonzaga,  who  had  succeeded  two  of  his 
brothers  as  duke  of  Mantua  and  marquis  of  Mont- 
ferrat,  died  without  issue  on  December  26,  1627.  His 
nearest  male  heir  was  Charles  of  Gonzaga,  duke  of 
Nevers,  a  French  subject,  and  governor  of  the  French 
province  of  Champagne.  But  though  female  succession 
was  excluded  in  Mantua,  it  was  lawful  in  Montferrat, 
and  to  prevent  the  separation  of  his  territories,  the  late 
duke  had  married  his  niece,  Mary,  to  Nevers's  son,  the 
duke  of  Rethel.  In  January  1628  the  duke  of  Nevers 
took  possession  of  his  inheritance,  to  which  his  legal 
claim  was  unquestionable.  But  Spain,  the  dominant 
power  in  Italy,  was  determined  to  prevent  the  establish- 
ment of  French  influence  within  that  country.  En- 
couraged by  the  prospect  of  Spanish  support,  various 
claimants  came  forward  to  oppose  the  succession  of  the 
French  duke.  The  duke  of  Guastalla,  also  a  descendant 
of  the  Gonzagas,  laid  claim  to  Mantua  on  the  ground 
that  the  Nevers  family  had  forfeited  its  rights  by 
having  borne  arms  against  the  emperor.  The  duchess 
of  Lorraine,  sister  of  the  three  last  dukes,  maintained 
the  legality  of  female  succession  in  Montferrat,  and 
Charles  Emmanuel  of  Savoy  advanced  an  old  claim  of 
his  family  to  the  same  province.  The  emperor  Ferdi- 
nand II.,  urged  on  by  Spain,  asserted  his  right  as  suzerain 


v  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  83 

to  settle  these  disputes,  and  in  the  meanwhile  ordered 
the  provinces  to  be  handed  over  to  his  commissioner, 
John  of  Nassau. 

The  new  duke  of  Mantua,  trusting  in  support  from 
France,  refused  to  obey  this  order,  and  the  Spaniards 
at  once  undertook  to  enforce  the  imperial  authority. 
They  were  most  immediately  interested  in  Montferrat, 
which  they  regarded  as  a  bulwark  of  the  duchy  of 
Milan.  The  alliance  of  Savoy  was  easily  purchased  by 
the  promise  of  considerable  territories  in  Montferrat, 
and  Don  Gonzales,  governor  of  Milan,  led  an  army  to 
the  siege  of  Casale,  the  chief  fortress  of  the  province. 
Nevers,  hardly  established  in  Mantua,  could  not  hope 
to  resist  the  combined  forces  of  Spain  and  Savoy. 
France,  occupied  in  the  siege  of  La  Eochelle,  could  not 
interfere  effectually  in  Italy,  and  a  small  force  which 
was  sent  under  the  marquis  of  Uxelles  was  repulsed  at 
the  entrance  into  Piedmont.  Fortunately  a  small  body 
of  French  volunteers  had  thrown  themselves  into  the 
citadel  of  Casale,  where  the  defective  skill  and  vigilance 
of  the  besiegers  enabled  them  to  maintain  themselves 
until  the  fall  of  La  Rochelle  set  Richelieu  and  the  royal 
army  at  liberty. 

Although  the  season  was  extremely  ill-suited  for 
such  an  enterprise,  Richelieu  determined  to  cross  the 
Alps  for  the  relief  of  Casale,  and  if  possible  to  take  the 
king  with  him.  Mary  de  Medici,  who  cherished  an  old 
grudge  against  Nevers,  and  disapproved  of  the  expedition 
altogether,  did  all  in  her  power  to  induce  her  son  to 
stay  in  Paris.  But  Louis  XIII.  had  tasted  the  sweets 
of  martial  glory  before  La  Rochelle,  and  the  success  of 
his  arms  had  inspired  him  with  enthusiastic  confidence 


84  RICHELIEU  CHAP, 

in  the  cardinal.  On  January  15,  1629,  they  quitted 
Paris  together,  and  after  travelling  through  Champagne 
they  reached  Grenoble  on  February  14.  No  other 
minister  accompanied  them,  Schomberg  having  fallen  ill 
at  Troyes,  and  the  whole  burden  of  making  preparations 
for  the  campaign  fell  upon  Richelieu.  The  adminis- 
trative system  in  the  provinces  was  extremely  corrupt 
and  inefficient,  and  only  the  most  authoritative  super- 
vision could  secure  that  orders  should  be  punctually 
carried  out.  But  the  cardinal's  energy  vanquished  all 
obstacles,  and  on  February  22  the  king  set  out  from 
Grenoble  for  the  pass  of  Mont  Genevre.  Charles 
Emmanuel  sent  his  eldest  son,  who  had  married 
Louis's  sister,  to  negotiate,  but  Richelieu  discovered 
that  the  negotiations  were  merely  intended  to  procure 
delay  while  the  intrenchments  on  the  Italian  side  of  the 
pass  were  being  strengthened.  The  order  to  advance 
was  given,  and  the  French  attack  carried  all  before  it. 
The  intrenchments  were  forced,  and  on  March  3  the 
king  entered  Susa  in  triumph.  This  vigorous  action 
brought  the  duke  of  Savoy  to  reason,  and  the  prince  of 
Piedmont  was  again  sent  to  arrange  terms  with  Richelieu. 
The  treaty  of  Susa  was  signed  on  March  11.  The 
duke  promised  to  give  the  French  passage  through  his 
territories,  and  to  furnish  supplies  for  the  relief  of  Casale. 
As  security  for  the  fulfilment  of  his  promise  Susa  was 
to  be  left  in  French  occupation.  He  also  undertook  for 
Don  Gonzales  that  the  Spaniards  would  retire  from 
Casale  and  Montferrat,  that  they  would  abstain  from 
any  further  acts  of  hostility  against  the  duke  of 
Mantua,  and  that  the  confirmation  of  these  terms  by 
Philip  IV.  should  be  obtained  within  six  weeks.  Louis, 


V  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  85 

on  the  other  hand,  promised  to  procure  for  the  duke  the 
town  of  Trino  and  other  lands  in  Montferrat  to  the 
value  of  15,000  crowns,  as  the  price  of  the  renunciation 
of  his  claims.  At  the  same  time  Richelieu  drew  up  a 
projected  league  for  mutual  defence  between  France,  the 
pope,  Venice,  Mantua,  and  Savoy.  Charles  Emmanuel 
undertook  to  adhere  to  this  league  when  it  had  been 
joined  by  the  other  states. 

The  prompt  action  of  the  French  had  thus  secured 
for  them  a  second  military  triumph  within  six  months. 
The  Spaniards  could  not  hope  to  resist  the  royal  army, 
and  Don  Gonzales  was  compelled  to  accept  the  terms 
which  Charles  Emmanuel  had  arranged  for  him.  Casale 
was  relieved,  and  there  was  yet  plenty  of  time  left  to 
reduce  the  Huguenots.  Louis  XIII.  set  out  from  Susa 
in  April  to  commence  this  task.  Richelieu  remained 
behind  to  watch  the  duke  of  Savoy,  who  was  too  veteran 
an  intriguer  to  be  trusted  to  fulfil  his  engagements  of 
his  own  accord,  but  on  May  19  the  cardinal  was  able  to 
join  the  king  before  Privas,  the  Protestant  stronghold 
of  the  Vivarais.  He  had  already  dealt  a  crushing  blow 
to  the  Huguenots  by  concluding  a  treaty  with  England. 
Charles  I.  abandoned  the  cause  of  the  rebels,  who  had 
been  led  to  rely  upon  English  assistance,  and  Louis 
withdrew  his  demand  for  the  restoration  of  Henrietta's 
household.  Rohan,  who  had  foreseen  the  defection  of 
England,  had  sought  compensation  in  an  alliance  with 
Spain,  and  the  Most  Catholic  king  had  not  hesitated 
to  sign  a  treaty  with  the  leader  of  Protestantism  in 
France.  If  any  had  been  needed,  this  treaty  would 
have  supplied  ample  justification  to  Richelieu  for  his 
determination  to  crush  the  Huguenots.  It  provided 


86  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

that  if  they  succeeded  in  forming  an  independent  state, 
they  would  grant  toleration  to  Roman  Catholic  worship. 
The  possibility  of  such  an  ideal  being  entertained  was 
enough  to  convince  Richelieu  that  he  must  strike  boldly 
and  decisively  if  he  wished  to  effect  that  unity  of  France 
which  was  the  ultimate  object  of  all  his  exertions. 

Before  Spanish  assistance  could  arrive  the  blow  had 
been  struck.  Privas  was  taken  soon  after  Richelieu's 
arrival,  and  sacked  with  all  the  horrors  of  war.  This 
severity,  which  the  cardinal  in  his  Memoirs  maintains 
to  have  been  unintentional,  was  as  effective  as  if  it  had 
been  deliberately  planned.  The  Vivarais  submitted, 
and  the  king  entered  the  Cevennes,  offering  amnesty 
and  toleration  to  all  who  submitted,  and  to  those  who 
resisted  the  fate  of  Privas.  The  alternative  was 
irresistible,  and  one  town  after  another  opened  its 
gates.  The  rebellion  had  collapsed,  and  the  Huguenot 
deputies  hastened  to  accept  the  terms  which  were 
offered  to  them,  not  as  a  treaty  between  equals,  but 
as  an  act  of  grace  from  a  sovereign  to  his  subjects. 
The  Edict  of  Nantes  was  confirmed,  but  the  political 
privileges  which  had  been  granted  at  the  same  time  by 
supplemental  edicts  were  cancelled.  The  Huguenot 
fortifications  were  to  be  razed  to  the  ground,  and  there  were 
to  be  no  more  "  towns  of  surety."  Freedom  of  worship 
and  of  individual  belief  was  granted,  but  it  was  granted 
as  a  royal  favour  which  could  at  any  time  be  revoked. 
Henry  IV.  had  not  been  strong  enough  to  enforce 
toleration  by  the  royal  authority,  and  had  been  forced 
to  place  weapons  of  self-defence  in  the  hands  of  the 
Huguenots.  Thanks  to  Richelieu,  the  monarchy  could 
now  afford  to  dispense  with  such  precautions,  and  could 


v         .  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  87 

thus  revoke  privileges  which  its  own  weakness  had 
rendered  necessary,  and  which  had  been  used  against 
itself.  The  danger  of  the  formation  of  "  a  state  within 
the  state "  was  at  an  end.  The  only  misfortune  was 
that  Richelieu  could  not  ensure  that  the  monarchy 
should  always  be  tolerant. 

After  a  triumphal  entry  into  Nimes,  Louis  XIII.  set 
out  for  Paris  on  July  25.  Richelieu  remained  behind 
to  obtain  the  submission  of  Montauban,  only  second  to 
La  Rochelle  as  a  Huguenot  fortress,  to  supervise  the 
destruction  of  the  fortifications,  and  to  put  an  end  to 
the  administrative  independence  of  Languedoc.  It  was 
not  till  September  14  that  he  was  able  to  rejoin  the 
king  at  Fontainebleau.  He  soon  found  that  he  had  to 
confront  difficulties  at  court  quite  as  serious  as  those 
which  he  had  coped  with  abroad.  Gaston  of  Orleans 
had  never  been  well  disposed  to  Richelieu,  whom  he 
accused  of  a  deliberate  scheme  to  exclude  him  from  all 
voice  in  public  affairs.  He  was  still  the  puppet  of  a 
small  group  of  interested  associates,  who  wished  to  use 
him  as  a  catspaw  for  their  own  advancement.  His  first 
wife  had  died  in  childbirth,  and  he  was  anxious  to 
marry  Mary  of  Gonzaga,  the  daughter  of  the  duke  of 
Mantua.  This  was  opposed  both  by  his  brother  and 
mother ;  and  Mary  de  Medici,  during  the  king's  absence 
in  Italy,  went  so  far  as  to  imprison  the  princess  Mary 
at  Vincennes.  Gaston  then  demanded  an  increase  of 
his  appanage,  and  the  government  of  some  important 
provinces,  such  as  Champagne  and  Burgundy.  Louis 
was  so  jealous  of  his  younger  brother  that  Richelieu's 
advice  was  not  needed  to  convince  him  of  the  danger 
of  handing  over  frontier  provinces  to  a  discontented 


88  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

heir-apparent.  Gaston,  however,  attributed  the  refusal 
to  the  influence  of  the  cardinal,  and  loudly  demanded 
his  dismissal.  When  Louis  returned  from  Languedoc, 
Gaston  refused  to  meet  him  at  court,  and  retired  to 
Champagne.  There  he  professed  to  believe  that  he  was 
in  personal  danger,  and  proceeded  to  Lorraine,  where 
Charles  IV.,  always  willing  to  harass  the  French  govern- 
ment, received  him  with  open  arms. 

Still  more  formidable  to  Eichelieu  was  the  open 
hostility  displayed  to  him  on  his  arrival  by  Mary  de 
Medici.  For  the  last  three  years  the  relations  of  the 
queen-mother  and  her  former  servant  had  been  growing 
more  and  more  strained,  and  the  chief  causes  of  her  ill- 
will  are  not  difficult  to  trace.  Throughout  her  life 
Mary  de  Medici  was  guided  rather  by  passion  than  by 
policy.  She  cherished  strong  likes  and  dislikes,  but 
they  were  directed  against  persons,  not  against  principles. 
She  had  learnt  to  regard  Richelieu  as  a  creature  of  her 
own,  who  owed  his  advancement  to  her  patronage,  and 
she  was  chagrined  to  find  him  acting  in  complete 
independence  of  her  wishes.  She  intended  to  keep 
her  elder  son  entirely  under  her  own  control,  and  she 
discovered,  to  her  dismay,  that  the  cardinal's  influence 
over  Louis  was  stronger  than  her  own.  The  guiding 
thread  to  the  tortuous  labyrinth  of  her  caprices  is  to  be 
found  in  a  steady  attachment  to  dynastic  interests,  and 
especially  to  those  of  her  three  daughters. 

This  brought  her  into  direct  collision  with  the 
cardinal's  policy,  which  was  dictated  solely  by  a  regard 
to  the  interests  of  France.  Her  eldest  daughter  was 
the  queen  of  Spain,  and  Eichelieu  was  the  arch  opponent 
of  that  power.  Another  daughter  was  married  into  the 


v  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  89 

house  of  Savoy,  and  Mary  de  Medici  would  gladly  have 
supported  its  claims  to  Montferrat.  But  Richelieu  had 
actually  carried  Louis  off  to  Piedmont,  had  humiliated 
the  duke  of  Savoy,  and  had  forced  him  to  resign  his 
claims  in  favour  of  the  duke  of  Nevers,  whom  she 
hated,  both  for  his  past  career,  and  because  he  wished 
to  become  the  father-in-law  of  her  younger  son.  The 
third  daughter  was  the  wife  of  Charles  I.,  and  hes 
interests — so  her  mother  thought — had  been  completely 
sacrificed  in  the  last  treaty  with  England.  After  the 
interests  of  her  family,  Mary  de  Medici  was  most 
solicitous  for  the  interests  of  religion,  and  these  were 
specially  urged  upon  her  at  this  time  by  her  most 
intimate  advisers,  Cardinal  B6rulle  and  Michel  Marillac. 
They  wished  for  a  general  alliance  of  Catholic  against 
Protestant  states,  for  the  maintenance  of  a  good  under- 
standing with  Spain,  and  for  the  persecution  of  the 
Huguenots  at  home.  But  their  aims  were  not  those 
of  Richelieu.  If  political  reasons  rendered  it  advisable, 
he  was  as  willing  to  ally  himself  with  Holland  or 
Sweden  as  with  Bavaria  or  Austria.  He  had  ample 
experience  of  the  hollowness  of  Spanish  promises,  and 
of  the  resolution  of  the  court  of  Madrid  to  do  all  in  its 
power  to  weaken  France  by  stimulating  internal  discord 
and  encouraging  foreign  enemies.  He  may  also  have 
been  actuated  by  a  sentiment  of  personal  rivalry  against 
the  Spanish  minister,  Olivares,  who  certainly  entertained 
that  feeling  towards  Richelieu.  Finally,  he  had  reduced 
La  Rochelle  and  Languedoc,  but  Be"rulle,  a  bigoted 
mystic,  could  not  pardon  him  for  having  left  the  heretics 
in  enjoyment  of  religious  toleration. 

Against   the   hostility    of   the  queen-mother,   based 


90  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

upon  personal,  dynastic,  and  religious  motives,  Richelieu 
was  not  without  supporters.  Mary  de  Medici,  as  in  the 
days  of  her  regency,  had  connected  herself  with  the 
Guise  party  at  court.  Her  favourite  confident  was  the 
princess  of  Conti,  a  sister  of  the  duke  of  Guise.  She 
made  up  her  former  quarrel  with  her  daughter-in-law, 
Anne  of  Austria,  also  a  vigorous  hater  of  Richelieu,  and 
opened  a  connection  with  the  queen's  exiled  favourite, 
Madame  de  Chevreuse,  whose  husband  was  a  Guise. 
The  duke  of  Guise  himself  had  a  personal  quarrel  with 
Richelieu  because  he  claimed  the  command  in  the 
Mediterranean  as  pertaining  to  his  governorship  of 
Provence,  whereas  the  cardinal  held  that  his  office  gave 
him  control  over  all  maritime  affairs  in  every  sea.  But 
the  old  antagonism  between  the  Guises  and  the  princes  of 
the  blood — a  dominant  factor  in  the  history  of  the  later 
part  of  the  sixteenth  century — still  subsisted,  and  the 
cardinal  could  oppose  to  the  queen's  partisans  the  support 
of  Cond6,  who  had  become  his  enthusiastic  admirer  since 
the  siege  of  La  Rochelle,  and  of  the  count  of  Soissons, 
who  had  now  returned  to  France,  and  had  made  up 
his  quarrel  with  the  government.  His  only  real 
security,  however,  lay  in  the  hold  which  he  had  acquired 
over  Louis  XIII.  Richelieu  was  no  favourite,  in  the 
proper  sense  of  the  word.  He  did  not  rise  to  power, 
like  Buckingham,  by  personal  favour,  nor  did  he  retain 
it  by  flattering  his  master  and  humouring  his  foibles. 
But  he  was  a  favourite  in  the  sense  that  every  minister 
of  a  despotic  sovereign  must  be  a  favourite.  He  could 
not  hold  his  office  if  he  forfeited  the  king's  confidence 
or  incurred  his  serious  displeasure.  Circumstances  had 
brought  him  into  Louis  XIII.'s  service,  and  he  had  so 


v  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  91 

employed  them  as  to  make  himself  indispensable. 
Much  has  been  written,  in  contemporary  memoirs  and 
in  later  histories,  of  the  ascendency  acquired  by  Richelieu 
over  the  king,  and  of  the  jealous  hatred  which  Louis 
entertained  against  the  minister,  whose  superiority  he 
resented,  but  whom  he  dared  not  thwart  or  dismiss. 
Much  of  this  can  be  proved  by  documentary  evidence 
to  be  an  exaggeration  of  the  cardinal's  enemies.  Louis 
XIII.  was  rather  timid  than  weak,  and  his  moral 
cowardice  made  him  eager  to  say  what  would  please 
the  person  he  was  talking  to.  He  was  also  slow  and 
hesitating  in  his  speech,  and  he  was  often  unable  to 
find  words  to  answer  the  violent  expostulations  of  his 
mother,  or  the  voluble  entreaties  of  his  wife.  His 
silence  was  easily  interpreted  to  imply  what  he  had  no 
intention  of  expressing,  for  under  his  apparent  weak- 
ness was  concealed  considerable  obstinacy  of  opinion 
and  purpose.  He  really  shared  his  minister's  devotion 
to  the  aggrandisement  of  France  in  Europe  and  the 
increased  authority  of  the  monarchy.  Probably  they 
often  differed  as  to  the  means  which  were  to  be 
employed,  and  the  cardinal's  superior  abilities  doubtless 
enabled  him  as  a  rule  to  convince  and  persuade  the 
king ;  but  there  were  several  occasions  when  Eichelieu 
found  it  advisable  to  give  way,  and  any  temporary 
resentment  which  Louis  may  have  entertained  was 
more  than  removed  by  the  success  which  attended  their 
joint  exertions.  It  is  impossible  to  prove  that  Louis 
loved  his  minister,  but  he  respected  him,  and  he  loved 
nobody. 

The  coldness  with  which  the  queen-mother  received 
Richelieu  at  Fontainebleau  was  too  obvious  to  escape 


92  RICHELIEU  OHAP. 

the  notice  of  a  curious  court.  Richelieu  met  the 
hostility  of  his  former  patroness  by  offering  his  resigna- 
tion— a  favourite  weapon  in  the  hands  of  a  minister 
conscious  of  his  fidelity  and  of  the  merit  of  his  services. 
Louis,  who  "  wept  bitterly  for  nearly  a  whole  day  "  on 
account  of  his  mother's  importunities,  refused  to  accept 
the  resignation,  and  issued  letters  -  patent  conferring 
upon  the  cardinal  the  formal  dignity  of  "principal 
minister  of  state."  Mary  de  Medici  was  compelled  to 
swallow  her  indignation,  and  she  was  the  more  willing 
to  postpone  her  desire  for  vengeance  as  the  death  of 
Be"rulle — whom  Richelieu  was  absurdly  accused  of 
poisoning — deprived  her  of  one  of  her  most  trusted 
advisers.  Richelieu  now  set  himself  to  arrange  terms 
with  Gaston  of  Orleans,  whose  residence  at  a  foreign 
court  was  a  glaring  proof  of  French  dissensions, 
and  an  encouragement  to  the  enemies  of  France. 
Months  were  wasted  in  the  attempt  to  satisfy  the 
jealous  prince  and  his  ambitious  councillors,  and  it 
was  not  till  January  1630  that  the  offer  of  an  increased 
appanage  induced  Gaston  to  return  to  France,  though  he 
still  refused  to  see  his  brother  or  to  appear  at  court. 

Meanwhile  Richelieu  discovered  that  he  ran  the  risk 
of  losing  all  that  he  had  achieved  by  his  march  to 
Piedmont.  The  emperor,  elated  by  his  victories  over 
the  German  Calvinists  and  their  Danish  champion,  was 
furious  at  the  attempt  of  France  to  settle  the  succession 
to  imperial  fiefs  without  any  regard  to  his  authority. 
He  looked  on  the  treaty  of  Susa  as  an  insult,  and  with- 
drew a  considerable  number  of  his  troops  from  the 
north  to  vindicate  his  suzerainty  in  Italy.  In  the 
spring  of  1629  the  imperial  army  entered  the  Grison 


v  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  93 

territory  and  proceeded  to  occupy  the  Valtelline  and 
other  passes.  After  some  time  had  been  spent  in 
negotiations,  the  imperial  general,  Colalto,  descended 
into  the  Lombard  plain.  Philip  IV.  and  Olivares  were 
eager  to  seize  the  opportunity  for  resuming  the  schemes 
which  they  had  been  forced  for  the  moment  to  abandon. 
The  unconquered  Spinola  was  sent  to  supersede  Don 
Gonzales  in  the  government  of  Milan.  While  the 
Imperialists  advanced  upon  Mantua,  where  the  duke 
himself  was  shut  up,  Spinola  led  the  Spanish  troops 
into  Montferrat  and  again  threatened  Casale,  which  was 
now  defended  by  a  French  garrison  under  Toiras,  the 
hero  of  St.  Martin. 

France  could  not  allow  Spain  and  the  empire  to 
triumph  in  Italy,  and  the  despatch  of  a  new  army  was 
an  obvious  necessity.  But  who  was  to  lead  it?  The 
expedition  involved  diplomatic  as  well  as  military 
difficulties,  and  their  solution  could  not  safely  be 
trusted  to  a  subordinate.  Eichelieu,  of  course,  was 
anxious  not  to  leave  Louis  XIII.  to  resist  unaided  the 
influence  and  intrigues  of  Mary  de  Medici  and  her 
partisans.  On  the  other  hand,  he  could  hardly  venture 
once  more  to  expose  the  still  childless  king  to  the 
hardships  and  dangers  of  a  winter  campaign.  Moreover 
the  treaty  with  Gaston  was  not  yet  finally  settled,  and 
there  was  danger  of  an  attack  from  Germany  on  the 
side  of  Champagne.  In  the  interests  of  France 
Bichelieu  was  compelled  to  risk  his  personal  security. 
On  December  29,  1629,  he  set  out  from  Paris  with 
powers  such  as  have  rarely  been  granted  to  a  subject. 
He  was  appointed  "  lieutenant-general,  representing  the 
person  of  the  king  with  his  army  both  within  and 


94  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

without  the  kingdom."  He  had  authority  to  receive 
and  send  envoys,  and  to  conclude  or  reject  treaties. 
Under  him  served  Marshals  Crequi,  Schomberg,  and 
la  Force. 

The  passage  of  the  Alps  was  effected  without  opposi- 
tion, though  not  without  considerable  loss,  and  in  the 
first  week  of  March  the  French  army  reached  Susa. 
Eichelieu  had  made  up  his  mind  not  only  to  fight  the 
battles  of  the  duke  of  Mantua,  but  also  to  secure  some 
fortress  at  the  foot  of  the  Alps  that  would  enable 
France  at  any  time  to  interfere  decisively  in  Italy. 
He  had  no  intention  of  falling  into  the  error  of  Louis 
XII.  and  Francis  I.,  and  of  attempting  to  make  France 
the  mistress  of  Italian  provinces,  but  he  meant  to  strike 
a  blow  at  Spanish  domination,  and  to  gain  the  confi- 
dence of  those  Italian  states  which  still  retained  a 
shadow  of  independence.  The  great  difficulty  in  his 
way  was  the  attitude  of  Savoy.  If  Charles  Emmanuel 
had  been  willing  to  fulfil  the  treaty  of  Susa,  it  would 
have  been  impossible  to  pick  a  quarrel  with  him,  and  it 
was  only  at  his  expense  that  the  desired  fortress  could 
be  acquired.  But  the  wily  duke  played  into  the 
cardinal's  hands.  His  one  idea  was  to  involve  France 
and  Spain  in  open  hostilities  with  each  other,  and  to 
make  his  own  profit  by  selling  his  support  to  the 
highest  bidder.  He  offered  to  aid  the  French,  if  they 
would  join  him  in  attacking  Milan  and  Genoa,  and 
would  promise  not  to  lay  down  arms  till  both  had  been 
conquered.  This  Richelieu  refused,  as  he  did  not  wish 
for  an  open  rupture  with  Spain,  and  desired  that 
France  should  continue  to  play  the  part  of  an 
auxiliary  and  not  of  a  principal  in  the  war.  Then  the 


v  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  95 

duke  offered  to  remain  neutral,  and  to  supply  provisions 
for  the  French.  This  Richelieu  at  first  accepted,  in 
order  that  Casale  might  obtain  ample  supplies  to  resist 
a  blockade.  But  he  soon  discovered  that  Charles 
Emmanuel  was  also  negotiating  with  Spinola  and 
Colalto,  and  that  he  was  strengthening  the  intrenched 
camp  which  he  had  formed  at  Avigliana,  between  Susa 
and  Turin,  as  a  barrier  against  the  French  advance. 
Richelieu  now  decided  to  abandon  negotiations,  and  to 
turn  his  arms  against  his  treacherous  ally,  as  it 
would  be  madness  to  advance  upon  Casale  with  a  hostile 
Piedmont  in  his  rear.  On  March  19  the  French 
army  advanced  against  Rivoli,  where  Charles  Emmanuel 
had  his  headquarters.  An  eye-witness  has  described 
the  cardinal's  appearance  as  he  crossed  the  little  river 
Dora  at  the  head  of  the  troops.  "He  wore  a  blue 
cuirass  over  a  brown  coat  embroidered  with  gold.  He 
had  a  feather  round  his  hat,  and  two  pages  marched 
before  him  on  horseback,  one  carrying  his  gauntlets, 
the  other  his  helmet.  Two  other  pages  marched  on 
either  side  of  him,  and  each  held  by  the  bridle  a 
valuable  charger;  behind  rode  the  captain  of  his 
guards.  In  this  guise  he  crossed  the  river  on  horseback, 
with  his  sword  at  his  side  and  two  pistols  at  his 
saddle-bow.  When  he  had  reached  the  other  side  he 
made  his  horse  caracole  a  hundred  times  in  presence  of 
the  army,  boasting  aloud  that  he  knew  something  of  this 
exercise."  In  spite  of  all  this  martial  pomp,  the  assault 
on  Rivoli  failed  to  effect  the  desired  capture  of  the 
duke  and  his  son,  who  escaped  to  Turin.  But  instead 
of  advancing  upon  the  capital  of  Piedmont,  the  French 
suddenly  returned  towards  the  Alps  and  invested 


96  RICHELIEU  CHAP, 

Pinerolo,  a  fortress  commanding  the  exit  of  the  chief 
pass  from  Dauphine".  Pinerolo,  which  had  been  held  by 
France  for  a  considerable  period  in  the  previous  century, 
was  compelled  to  surrender  on  March  30,  before  the 
duke  of  Savoy  had  time  to  relieve  it. 

The  capture  of  Pinerolo  was  a  terrible  blow,  not  only 
to  the  duke  of  Savoy,  but  also  to  the  Spaniards  and 
Imperialists,  whose  chief  dread  was  that  the  French 
might  obtain  a  permanent  footing  in  Italy.  They  at 
once  offered  to  negotiate,  and  Urban  VIII.  undertook 
the  office  of  mediator.  It  was  on  this  occasion  that 
Griulio  Mazarin,  who  was  employed  as  a  papal  agent, 
first  attracted  the  notice  of  Richelieu,  whose  service  he 
afterwards  entered,  and  whom  he  eventually  succeeded 
as  first  minister  in  France.  The  negotiations  came  to 
nothing,  because  the  one  essential  condition  of  peace  was 
the  cession  of  Pinerolo,  and  Richelieu  had  no  intention 
of  resigning  his  conquest  except  in  the  last  necessity. 
But  so  far  he  had  done  nothing  for  the  duke  of 
Mantua,  and  Spinola  and  Colalto  were  already  preparing 
to  resume  the  sieges  of  Casale  and  Mantua,  which  had 
been  abandoned  during  the  winter.  The  cardinal  con- 
ceived the  bold  plan  of  saving  these  fortresses  by  an 
invasion  of  Savoy.  If  the  Spaniards  and  Imperialists 
advanced  to  the  aid  of  their  ally,  they  would  have  to 
postpone  their  enterprises  in  Montferrat  and  Mantua. 
If  they  did  not,  the  duke  of  Savoy  would  be  compelled 
to  come  to  terms,  and  this  would  render  possible  the 
despatch  of  an  army  to  relieve  Casale.  If  the  worst 
came  to  the  worst,  and  both  Mantua  and  Casale  fell, 
France  would  have  something  substantial  in  hand  to 
offer  in  return  for  their  restitution. 


v  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  97 

On  May  2  Eichelieu  left  the  army  at  Pinerolo 
under  Schomberg  and  la  Force,  and  hurried  to  Grenoble 
to  meet  Louis  XIII. ,  who  had  undertaken  to  conduct 
the  invasion  of  Savoy.  The  king  had  started  in  the 
company  of  his  mother  and  his  wife,  both  of  whom  dis- 
approved of  the  expedition,  but  he  had  left  the  two 
queens  at  Lyons.  From  Grenoble  the  king  and  cardinal 
advanced  into  Savoy,  and  their  operations  were  con- 
ducted with  the  good-fortune  which  had  always  attended 
their  joint  presence.  Chambe"ry  surrendered  after  a 
siege  of  one  day,  and  in  June  the  whole  duchy  had 
been  reduced,  with  the  exception  of  the  single  fortress 
of  Montmelian.  The  natural  sequel  to  this  success  was 
an  advance  to  the  relief  of  Casale,  which  was  now 
closely  besieged  by  Spinola.  But  the  outbreak  of 
pestilence  in  Piedmont  made  it  impossible  for  Louis 
XIII.  to  enter  Italy,  and  Richelieu's  position  was  now 
so  directly  threatened  by  the  queen-mother  and  her 
adherents  that  he  dared  not  risk  another  period  of 
absence  from  the  king.  The  bulk  of  the  royal  army 
was  despatched  on  July  6  under  Montmorency  and 
d'Effiat  across  Mont  Cenis,  and  they  succeeded,  after  a 
sharp  contest  with  the  troops  of  Charles  Emmanuel  at 
Avigliana,  in  effecting  a  junction  with  the  army  which 
had  been  left  at  Pinerolo.  The  marquisate  of  Saluzzo 
was  now  conquered  by  the  French,  but  their  success 
was  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  news  that 
Mantua,  which  the  Venetians  had  undertaken  to  relieve, 
had  been  stormed  on  July  17,  and  that  the  Imperialist 
forces  were  free  to  advance  to  the  aid  of  Spinola. 
Charles  Emmanuel,  whose  intrigues  had  resulted  in  the 
loss  of  the  greater  part  of  his  dominions,  died  on  July 

H 


98  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

26,  but  his  successor,  Victor  Amadeus,  though  less 
committed  to  an  anti-French  policy,  could  not  free  him- 
self at  once  from  the  obligations  which  his  father 
bequeathed  to  him.  France,  therefore,  gained  nothing 
directly  from  the  change  of  rulers.  Meanwhile  Casale 
was  being  hardly  pressed,  and  Toiras  announced  that 
he  could  not  hold  out  much  longer  without  assistance. 
If  Richelieu  could  have  come  to  Italy  in  person,  the 
threatened  fortress  might  have  been  relieved,  but  the 
cardinal  was  more  than  ever  absorbed  by  the  king's  ill- 
health  and  the  machinations  of  his  enemies.  In  his 
absence,  the  French  marshals  were  afraid  to  run  the 
risk  of  a  bold  and  decisive  march,  and  their  troops  were 
harassed  by  sickness  and  bad  weather.  Under  these 
circumstances  Mazarin  was  at  last  able  to  arrange  a 
truce  at  Eivalta  on  September  4.  Hostilities  were  to 
be  suspended  on  all  sides  until  October  15 ;  the  town 
and  castle  of  Casale  were  to  be  handed  over  to  the 
besieging  army,  who  were  to  supply  provisions  for  the 
interval  to  the  garrison  of  the  citadel.  After  Octo- 
ber 15,  if  peace  had  not  been  concluded,  the  French 
army  might  resume  its  advance,  but  Toiras  pledged 
himself  to  surrender  if  relief  did  not  reach  him  before 
October  30.  Spinola,  who  was  lying  on  his  deathbed, 
refused  to  abandon  his  prey  by  signing  the  truce,  but  it 
was  accepted  by  the  duke  of  Savoy  and  Colalto,  and 
the  death  of  the  veteran  general  three  days  later  re- 
moved all  difficulties,  as  his  successor  pledged  himself 
to  observe  the  stipulations. 

It  was  fortunate  for  France,  in  its  quarrel  with  the 
emperor  and  with  Spain,  that  Richelieu  had  not  relied 
solely  upon  the  achievements  of  the  French  arms  in 


v  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  99 

Italy.  His  gaze  embraced  the  whole  field  of  European 
politics,  and  he  knew  how  to  make  the  most  various 
and  distant  circumstances  subserve  his  immediate  aims. 
It  was  the  retirement  of  Christian  IV.  of  Denmark 
from  the  German  war  which  had  enabled  the  emperor 
to  send  an  army  against  Mantua.  But  Eichelieu  had 
already  made  preparations  to  bring  another  prince  on 
the  stage  to  take  the  place  vacated  by  the  Danish  king. 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  the  young  and  energetic  king  of 
Sweden,  had  many  motives  for  hostility  to  the  emperor, 
and  he  was  eager  to  defend  the  cause  of  Protestantism 
and  to  extend  the  power  of  Sweden  on  the  Baltic  coasts. 
He  had  already  thwarted  Wallenstein's  attempt  to  take 
Stralsund,  and  nothing  but  his  dynastic  quarrel  with 
the  Polish  king  prevented  him  from  throwing  himself 
into  Germany.  Here  was  Richelieu's  opportunity. 
Early  in  1629  a  French  envoy,  Charnace1,  had  been 
despatched  to  the  northern  courts.  He  succeeded  in 
negotiating  a  ten  years'  truce  between  Poland  and 
Sweden,  and  he  drew  up  a  projected  treaty  of  alliance 
between  Sweden  and  France.  Thus  Gustavus  Adolphus 
was  able  to  enter  Germany  in  the  next  year  without 
leaving  his  own  territories  exposed  to  invasion,  and 
with  the  additional  advantage  that  a  large  contingent 
of  the  emperor's  troops  was  engaged  in  Italy. 

Still  more  skilful  were  the  combinations  of  Richelieu's 
policy  in  Germany.  The  victories  of  Wallenstein  had 
raised  the  power  of  the  empire  to  a  height  which  had 
not  been  reached  for  more  than  three  centuries ;  but  at 
the  same  time  they  had  weakened  the  alliance  between 
the  emperor  and  the  Catholic  League.  Maximilian  of 
Bavaria  and  his  associates  had  fought  to  humiliate  the 


100  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

Protestants ;  but  they  had  no  intention  of  sacrificing 
their  princely  independence  to  the  domination  of  Ferdi- 
nand II.  and  his  haughty  general.  They  demanded  the 
dismissal  of  Wallenstein  and  the  disbandment  of  his 
army.  It  was  in  vain  that  Ferdinand  tried  to  con- 
ciliate them  by  issuing  in  1629  an  edict  ordering  the 
restitution  of  all  ecclesiastical  possessions  which  had 
been  occupied  by  Protestants  since  the  great  religious 
peace  of  Augsburg.  The  only  result  was  to  alienate 
the  Lutheran  princes,  who  had  been  the  most  loyal  ad- 
herents of  the  empire,  and  who  were  forced  against 
their  will  to  form  an  alliance  with  Sweden.  The 
Catholics  continued  to  persist  in  their  demands,  and 
their  opposition,  carefully  stimulated  by  Richelieu, 
brought  matters  to  a  crisis  at  the  diet  of  Ratisbon, 
which  Ferdinand  summoned  in  June  1630,  to  procure 
the  election  of  his  son  as  king  of  the  Romans.  Richelieu 
sent  Leon  de  Brulart  as  French  ambassador  to  the  diet, 
and  with  him  went  the  cardinal's  alter  ego,  the  famous 
Father  Joseph.  Their  intrigues  were  crowned  with 
complete  success.  At  the  moment  when  G-ustavus 
Adolphus  landed  on  the  coast  of  Pomerania,  Ferdinand 
was  compelled  to  dismiss  Wallenstein  and  to  hand  over 
his  army  to  Tilly,  the  general  of  the  Catholic  League. 
Even  at  this  price  he  was  unable  to  obtain  his  son's 
election,  which  Richelieu  had  instructed  his  envoys  to 
oppose. 

The  emperor,  deprived  of  his  German  army  and  his 
greatest  general,  was  no  longer  able  to  continue  the 
war  in  Italy.  The  Catholic  princes  had  always  been 
opposed  to  the  war,  and  they  were  eager  to  bring  about 
peace  with  France,  which  they  had  learnt  to  regard  as 


v  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  101 

their  ally.  On  October  13  Father  Joseph  and  his  col- 
league signed  the  treaty  of  Ratisbon,  which  was  to 
settle  the  question  of  the  Mantuan  succession.  The 
dukes  of  Savoy  and  Guastalla  were  to  receive  compen- 
sation for  the  resignation  of  their  claims ;  the  emperor 
was  to  give  formal  investiture  to  the  duke  of  Mantua 
within  six  weeks,  and  a  fortnight  after  the  investiture 
had  been  granted  the  Imperialists  were  to  quit  Mantua, 
the  Spaniards  Montferrat,  and  the  French  their  con- 
quests in  Savoy  and  Piedmont.  After  all  this  had 
been  done  the  emperor  was  to  withdraw  his  forces  from 
the  Grison  passes  and  to  destroy  the  newly-erected 
fortifications.  France  pledged  herself  to  give  no  assist- 
ance, direct  or  indirect,  to  the  enemies  of  the  emperor. 
Copies  of  the  treaty  were  at  once  despatched  to  the 
court  at  Lyons  and  to  the  French  camp  in  Italy. 

It  is  extremely  improbable  that  Father  Joseph  acted 
in  this  matter  in  opposition  to  Eichelieu's  instructions, 
and  it  is  certain  that  he  never  forfeited  the  cardinal's 
favour  or  confidence.  But  Richelieu  clamoured  that 
the  envoys  had  exceeded  their  powers,  and  that  the 
treaty  was  so  disadvantageous  to  France  that  it  could 
not  possibly  be  confirmed.  The  solution  of  the  problem 
seems  to  be  that  Father  Joseph  was  playing  a  pre- 
concerted part  at  Ratisbon.  At  all  costs  he  was  to 
conciliate  the  Catholic  electors  to  France  and  to  prevent 
the  election  of  a  king  of  the  Romans.  These  ends  he 
could  only  obtain  by  signing  the  treaty.  But  Richelieu 
had  so  worded  the  instructions  of  his  representatives 
as  to  reserve  to  himself  the  power  of  rejecting  the 
terms  which  they  had  found  it  advisable  to  accept. 
And  it  is  possible  that  events  at  home  made  the  prompt 


102  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

conclusion  of  peace  at  this  moment  peculiarly  unaccept- 
able to  him.  The  health  of  Louis  XIII.  had  suffered 
from  the  hot  weather  in  Savoy.  The  solicitations  of 
his  mother  induced  him  to  return  to  Lyons,  and  there 
he  was  seized  with  an  attack  of  dysentery,  which  was 
aggravated  by  the  exhausting  treatment  then  in  vogue. 
As  his  doctor  bled  him  seven  times  in  a  week,  and 
administered  an  innumerable  variety  of  drugs,  it  is  no 
wonder  that  his  life  was  despaired  of.  The  crisis  to 
which  Richelieu  must  often  have  looked  forward  seemed 
to  have  arrived  on  September  20,  when  the  king 
received  extreme  unction  and  took  a  formal  farewell  of 
the  world.  Gaston  of  Orleans  prepared  to  succeed  to 
his  brother's  crown,  if  not,  as  some  say,  to  his  brother's 
wife.  The  enemies  of  the  cardinal  discussed  who 
should  take  his  place,  and  whether  it  was  better  to 
remove  him  by.  imprisonment  or  by  death.  Their 
schemes  were  suddenly  disconcerted  by  the  king's 
recovery ;  but  in  the  exhaustion  of  convalescence  he 
gave  way  to  the  incessant  pressure  of  his  wife  and  his 
mother,  and  held  out  hopes  that  he  would  dismiss  the 
cardinal  as  soon  as  peace  was  concluded.  The  king's 
promise  was  not  very  definite ;  but  the  mere  suspicion 
of  such  an  intention  was  enough  to  make  Richelieu 
insist  upon  the  defects  of  the  treaty  of  Ratisbon. 

Meanwhile  the  news  of  this  treaty  reached  the  French 
camp  just  as  the  army  was  advancing  to  effect  the  relief 
of  Casale  before  October  30.  Montmorency  had  been 
recalled  to  France,  and  his  place  was  taken  by  Louis 
Marillac,  brother  of  the  keeper  of  the  seals,  who  had 
previously  commanded  the  army  of  Champagne.  He 
wished  to  accept  the  terms,  but  his  colleagues,  Schomberg 


V  THE  DAY  OF  DUPES  103 

and  d'Effiat,  insisted  that  they  were  too  favourable  to 
the  enemy.  By  the  truce  of  Rivalta  the  Spaniards  were 
to  quit  Casale  as  soon  as  the  citadel  had  been  relieved, 
whereas  by  the  treaty  they  would  be  allowed  to  remain 
there  for  two  months.  The  march  was  resumed,  and  on 
October  27  the  two  armies  were  on  the  point  of  an 
engagement,  when  Mazarin  appeared  between  them 
at  the  imminent  risk  of  being  shot  for  his  pains,  and 
announced  that  peace  had  been  arranged.  The  Spaniards 
agreed  to  quit  Montferrat  at  once,  on  condition  that 
Casale  was  handed  over  to  the  duke  of  Maine,  the  son 
of  the  duke  of  Mantua,  who  was  to  pledge  himself  to 
maintain  only  a  native  garrison  in  the  citadel.  The 
French  had  so  far  triumphed  that  Casale  had  never  been 
taken,  and  that  they  retained  their  conquests  in  Savoy 
and  Piedmont  as  security  for  the  evacuation  by  the 
Imperialists  of  Mantua  and  the  Valtelline. 

The  news  of  the  relief  of  Casale  reached  the  French 
court  as  it  was  returning  from  Lyons  to  Paris  after  the 
king's  recovery,  and  Mary  de  Medici  had  a  bonfire 
kindled  to  celebrate  the  event.  She  believed  that  the 
Italian  difficulty  was  at  an  end,  and  that  Louis  would 
now  dismiss  the  hated  minister,  whom  he  no  longer 
needed.  To  her  astonishment  the  king  opposed  an 
obstinate  resistance  to  her  entreaties,  refused  to  recog- 
nise any  engagements  made  during  his  illness,  and 
desired  his  mother  to  abandon  her  ill-founded  enmity 
against  the  cardinal.  At  last  Mary's  passion  got  the 
better  of  the  crafty  dissimulation  which  was  the  tradition 
of  her  family.  On  November  10  she  picked  a  violent 
quarrel,  in  the  king's  presence,  with  Madame  de  Com- 
balet,  the  cardinal's  favourite  niece.  After  upbraiding 


104  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

her  in  language  that  would  have  disgraced  a  fishwife, 
she  bade  her  leave  her  service  and  presence  for  ever. 
The  king  himself  escorted  the  young  woman,  weeping 
and  scared  by  such  an  unexpected  scene,  to  the  door, 
which  was  soon  afterwards  entered  by  the  uncle.  Mary 
de  Medici  turned  her  fury  upon  him  with  the  same 
vehemence  of  language  and  gesticulation.  Richelieu 
made  no  attempt  to  defend  himself,  but  listened  in 
respectful  silence,  and  quitted  the  room.  Then  the 
queen  turned  to  her  son :  she  accused  the  cardinal  of 
designing  to  marry  his  niece  to  the  count  of  Soissons, 
to  depose  Louis,  and  to  place  the  count  on  the  throne. 

Forgetting  that  she  supplied  evidence  of  a  precon- 
certed conspiracy,  she  divulged  her  schemes  for  the 
conduct  of  the  government  after  Richelieu's  fall.  Michel 
Marillac  was  to  become  chief  minister,  and  his  brother 
was  to  assume  the  supreme  command  of  the  army.  The 
king  made  no  attempt  to  interrupt  or  reply  to  this 
violent  monologue.  He  retired  to  his  chamber  and 
threw  himself  in  a  rage  upon  his  bed.  He  was  unwilling 
to  quarrel  irretrievably  with  his  mother,  but  he  had  no 
intention  of  parting  with  his  minister.  The  very  com- 
plaints which  he  had  listened  to  only  furnished  a  strik- 
ing proof  of  Richelieu's  fidelity.  The  basis  of  the 
queen-mother's  resentment  was  that  the  cardinal  was 
more  devoted  to  the  king  than  to  herself.  Louis's 
chamberlain  and  favourite,  St.  Simon,  father  of  the 
famous  memoir -writer,  strengthened  his  resolution  by 
urging  that  he  had  duties  not  only  as  a  son,  but  also 
as  a  king,  and  that  the  cardinal  was  necessary  to  France. 
To  escape  any  further  maternal  intimidation,  the  king 
determined  to  depart  for  Versailles. 


V  THE  DAY  OF  DUPES  105 

Meanwhile  Mary  de  Medici  had  convinced  herself 
that  her  son's  silence  implied  acquiescence.  The  news 
of  her  victory  was  circulated  through  Paris,  and  couriers 
were  sent  to  announce  the  cardinal's  downfall  to  foreign 
courts.  The  French  courtiers  crowded  to  the  queen- 
mother's  magnificent  palace,  the  Luxemburg,  to  offer 
their  congratulations.  The  rumour  spread  that  Richelieu 
was  collecting  his  papers  and  valuables,  and  was  prepar- 
ing to  depart  from  Paris,  if  not  from  France.  And  it 
is  true  that  the  cardinal  was  profoundly  discouraged. 
He  knew  how  a  violent  woman  may  influence,  in  spite 
of  himself,  a  man  who  dislikes  to  have  troubles  and  dis- 
pleasure around  him.  He  may  well  have  feared  that 
Mary  de  Medici's  estimate  of  her  success  was  no  ex- 
aggeration. While  he  thus  desponded  and  hesitated  as 
to  his  future  course,  a  messenger  arrived  to  bid  him 
join  the  king  at  Versailles.  Louis  had  never  really 
doubted  as  to  his  ultimate  decision ;  he  was  conscious 
that  his  reign  owed  its  success  and  its  reputation  to  the 
cardinal ;  and  if  he  had  to  choose  between  his  mother 
and  his  minister,  his  mind  was  already  made  up.  He 
only  waited  till  he  was  safe  from  interference  to  an- 
nounce his  determination.  On  the  next  day  Michel 
Marillac  was  called  upon  to  surrender  the  great  seals, 
and  a  courier  was  despatched  to  Schomberg  ordering  him 
to  arrest  Marshal  Marillac  and  to  send  him  a  prisoner 
to  France.  November  11,  1630,  has  come  down  to 
history  as  the  "  day  of  dupes." 

Richelieu's  position  was  all  the  stronger  for  the 
failure  of  the  attack  upon  him.  Mary  de  Medici  was 
compelled  to  acknowledge  her  defeat,  and  in  December 
she  controlled  her  rage  so  far  as  to  be  formally  recon- 


106  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

ciled  with  the  cardinal,  and  to  resume  her  seat  in  the 
council  But  she  had  no  intention  of  abandoning  her 
desire  for  vengeance  on  the  man  who  had  thwarted  and 
humiliated  her.  As  open  violence  had  failed,  she  deter- 
mined to  try  once  more  the  paths  of  intrigue.  Her 
elder  son  had  escaped  from  her  influence,  but  she  still 
had  some  control  over  his  younger  brother.  Gaston's 
importance  as  heir-apparent  to  the  throne  was  far 
greater  than  his  own  abilities  would  have  given  him, 
and  he  was  readily  induced  to  fall  in  with  his  mother's 
wishes.  In  January  1631  he  appeared  in  the  cardinal's 
chamber  and  openly  renounced  his  friendship ;  directly 
afterwards  he  set  out  for  Orleans.  It  was  the  intention 
of  the  queen-mother  to  rally  round  her  second  son  all 
the  elements  of  opposition  to  the  monarchy,  and,  if 
necessary,  to  trust  to  the  chances  of  a  civil  war. 
Richelieu  fully  appreciated  her  designs.  To  allow  her 
to  remain  in  impunity  at  court  would  only  strengthen 
and  encourage  her  faction,  and  the  king  was  easily  per- 
suaded to  separate  himself  from  an  influence  which  he 
now  dreaded  and  disliked.  The  court  journeyed  to 
Compiegne,  and  the  queen-mother  followed  to  watch 
her  son.  Early  in  the  morning  of  February  23  the 
king  and  the  cardinal  hurried  back  to  Paris.  Anne  of 
Austria  was  ordered  to  follow  her  husband,  but  was 
allowed  to  take  a  tender  farewell  of  her  mother-in-law, 
with  whom  she  had  been  closely  united  of  late  years  by 
common  antipathy  to  Richelieu.  They  never  met  again. 
Mary  de  Medici  received  written  instructions  to  retire 
for  a  time  to  Moulins,  as  circumstances  made  her 
presence  at  court  undesirable.  The  princess  of  Conti 
and  other  ladies  of  her  household  were  exiled  to  their 


v  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  107 

estates,  and  Marshal  Bassompierre,  an  ally  of  the 
Marillacs,  was  committed  to  a  prison  from  which  he 
never  emerged  while  Richelieu  lived. 

The  cardinal  now  tried  to  conciliate  Gaston,  but  the 
prince  was  persuaded  by  his  followers  to  reject  all  offers, 
and  in  March  he  retired  for  a  second  time  to  Lorraine. 
Meanwhile  Mary  de  Medici  obstinately  refused  to  leave 
Compiegne,  and  endeavoured  to  excite  sympathy  by  re- 
presenting that  she  was  harshly  imprisoned  by  the  man 
whom  she  had  raised  to  greatness.  Her  residence  so 
near  to  Paris  was  a  constant  source  of  annoyance  to  the 
king  and  minister,  but  they  did  not  venture  to  risk  un- 
popularity by  removing  her  by  force.  Their  end  was 
at  last  effected  by  relaxing  the  careful  watch  hitherto 
maintained  over  her  movements.  Weary  of  inaction, 
the  queen  escaped  from  France  in  July,  and  made  her 
way  to  Brussels.  She  was  destined  never  to  revisit  the 
country  in  which  her  marriage  had  enabled  her  to  play 
so  prominent  a  part. 

These  exciting  events  had  distracted  public  attention 
from  the  Mantuan  question,  which  had  so  long  absorbed 
it.  Hostilities  had  been  terminated  by  the  truce  con- 
cluded by  Mazarin  before  Casale,  but  as  Richelieu  had 
steadily  refused  to  confirm  the  treaty  of  Ratisbon,  no 
permanent  settlement  had  been  agreed  to.  Early  in 
1631  the  French  envoys,  Toiras  and  Servien,  proceeded 
to  Cherasco  in  Piedmont  to  meet  the  plenipotentiaries  of 
the  emperor,  and  the  representatives  of  Spain,  Savoy, 
and  Mantua.  The  chief  difficulties  arose  about  the  com- 
pensation to  be  given  to  the  duke  of  Savoy  for  the 
resignation  of  his  claims,  and  about  the  dates  at  which 
the  various  powers  were  to  abandon  their  conquests. 


108  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

At  length  everything  was  settled  by  two  treaties,  in 
April  and  June,  and  in  July  the  duke  of  Nevers  received 
the  imperial  investiture  of  Mantua  and  Montferrat.  To 
the  surprise  of  contemporaries,  it  was  the  duke  of  Man- 
tua who  had  most  reason  to  be  dissatisfied  with  the 
treaties  of  Cherasco.  His  champion,  France,  compelled 
him  to  sell  the  greater  part  of  Montferrat  to  the  duke 
of  Savoy.  The  explanation  was  not  long  a  secret. 
Richelieu  publicly  agreed  to  restore  Pinerolo  in  order 
to  satisfy  European  opinion  and  to  obtain  peace.  But 
he  was  determined  to  keep  the  fortress  if  any  opportunity 
offered.  Victor  Amadeus,  instructed  by  the  failure  of 
his  father's  policy,  was  inclined  to  the  French  alliance 
which  his  marriages  rendered  natural.  The  offer  of 
larger  territories  in  Montferrat  induced  him  to  consent 
that  the  French  should  have  Pinerolo,  and  a  secret  treaty 
to  that  effect  was  signed  on  March  31.  The  only  diffi- 
culty that  remained  was  to  obtain  some  plausible  pre- 
text for  breaking  the  treaty  of  Cherasco,  which  stipulated 
for  the  restoration  of  all  French  conquests.  Eichelieu 
was  not  at  a  loss  for  an  expedient.  He  complained  that 
Spain  kept  so  large  a  garrison  in  Milan  as  to  excite  the 
fear  of  a  new  attack  on  Mantua,  and  he  called  upon 
Savoy  to  give  surety  against  any  new  league  with  the 
Spaniards.  Victor  Amadeus,  after  feigning  an  appeal 
for  aid  to  Milan,  agreed  that  Pinerolo  should  be  handed 
over  as  a  pledge,  nominally  to  the  Swiss,  but  in  reality 
to  the  French.  In  1632  this  flimsy  pretence  was 
abandoned,  and  Pinerolo  was  bought  by  France. 

Thus  Richelieu  had  achieved  a  complete  triumph  in 
these  years.  He  had  obtained  the  submission  of  the 
Huguenots ;  he  had  defeated  the  intrigues  and  the  open 


v  THE  MANTUAN  SUCCESSION  109 

assaults  of  his  domestic  enemies ;  he  had  humbled  Spain 
and  the  empire ;  and  he  had  secured  French  influence 
in  Italy  by  seating  a  Frenchman  in  the  duchy  of  Man- 
tua, and  by  obtaining  for  France  the  key  of  the  Alpine 
passes. 


CHAPTER  VI 

FRANCE   INVOLVED    IN   THE   EUROPEAN   WAR 
1631-1635 

Richelieu  made  duke  and  peer — Threatened  coalition  in  favour  of 
Gaston — Lorraine — Treaty  of  Vic — Gaston's  marriage  and  re- 
treat to  Brussels — Gustavus  Adolphus  in  Germany — Services 
which  he  renders  to  France — Louis  XIII.  and  Richelieu  in 
Lorraine — Treaty  of  Liverdun — Gaston  in  France — Montmor- 
ency — Battle  of  Castelnaudari — Execution  of  Montmorency — 
Gaston  retires  to  Brussels — Death  of  Gustavus  Adolphus — 
Illness  and  recovery  of  Richelieu — Fall  and  imprisonment  of 
Chateauneuf — Richelieu  and  his  colleagues — League  of  Heil- 
bronn — Renewed  invasion  of  Lorraine — Surrender  of  Nancy — 
Abdication  of  Charles  IV. — Complete  occupation  of  Lorraine — 
Gaston's  marriage  with  Margaret  annulled — Return  of  Gaston 
and  Puylaurens — Imprisonment  and  death  of  Puylaurens — 
Wallenstein's  policy— His  death — Battle  of  N.  ordlingen — Break 
up  of  the  Protestant  League  in  Germany — Treaty  of  Prague — 
Dangers  to  France  if  the  war  came  to  an  end — Seizure  of  the 
elector  of  Trier  by  the  SpaniarSs — France  declares  war  against 
Spain. 

Louis  XIII.  was  not  ungrateful  to  the  minister  who  in 
seven  years  had  already  done  enough  to  make  the  reign 
notable  in  the  history  of  France.  In  August  1631  he 
issued  letters-patent  creating  Richelieu  duke  and  peer. 
On  September  5  the  ceremony  took  place  of  admitting 
the  new  peer  to  the  parliament.  Cond6,  Montmorency, 


CH.VI  FRANCE  INVOLVED  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR    111 

and  the  chief  nobles  of  France  formed  his  escort,  but 
such  a  crowd  had  assembled  at  the  doors  that  the  pro- 
cession could  only  make  its  way  to  the  grand  chamber 
through  the  galleries.  Kichelieu  was  never  popular,  but 
the  people  appreciated  the  grandeur  of  his  aims  and  his 
achievements.  They  admired,  if  they  did  not  love.  At 
the  same  time  the  cardinal  received  the  government  of 
Brittany,  so  important  for  his  maritime  and  commercial 
projects.  Nor  was  it  at  home  only  that  his  merits  were 
applauded.  The  Republic  of  Venice,  always  eager  to 
recognise  greatness  outside  her  own  walls,  sent  a  special 
envoy  to  offer  him  the  rank  of  noble,  with  power  to 
name  any  of  his  relatives  as  his  successor. 

But  no  one  knew  better  than  Kichelieu  that  he  was 
only  on  the  threshold  of  greater  difficulties  than  those 
which  he  had  already  overcome.  The  triumph  of  French 
policy  in  Italy  had  provoked  and  alarmed  the  house  of 
Hapsburg.  Both  Austria  and  Spain  were  now  fully 
alive  to  the  danger  which  threatened  them  if  France, 
united  at  home,  were  to  espouse  the  cause  of  their 
enemies  in  Germany  and  the  United  Provinces.  Such 
a  catastrophe  could  only  be  prevented  by  doing  all  in 
their  power  to  revive  the  embers  of  dissension  in  France. 
Spain  -was  the  more  immediately  interested  in  this  be- 
cause the  line  of  provinces  through  which  a  connection 
was  maintained  between  Lombardy  and  the  Netherlands 
ran  along  the  eastern  frontier  of  France.  If  the  emperor 
could  only  crush  the  opposition  in  Germany,  Spain  would 
be  free  to  suppress  its  dangerous  rival  in  the  west,  and 
the  means  for  attaining  this  end  were  sufficiently  ob- 
vious. The  heir  to  the  French  crown  was  more  danger- 
ous outside  France  than  he  could  be  within.  With  the 


112  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

assistance  of  foreign  troops,  and  the  support  of  the  dis- 
contented nobles  and  parliaments  of  his  own  country, 
Gaston  might  succeed  in  overthrowing  the  minister 
whom  his  favourites  had  taught  him  to  detest.  And 
with  the  fall  of  Richelieu  France  might  again  become  as 
powerless  and  contemptible  as  it  had  been  under  the 
regency  of  Mary  de  Medici. 

The  headquarters  of  the  conspiracy  were  at  Nancy, 
where  Gaston  had  taken  refuge.  Charles  IV.  of  Lorraine 
was  eager  to  free  his  duchy  from  the  control  which 
France  had  secured  by  the  seizure  in  1552  of  the  three 
bishoprics  of  Metz,  Toul,  and  Verdun.  He  had  already 
raised  an  army  of  15,000  men,  and  he  had  persuaded 
the  emperor  to  enforce  his  suzerainty  over  the  three 
bishoprics  by  the  capture  of  Moyenvic,  a  disputed  de- 
pendency. With  the  assistance  of  troops  from  the 
Netherlands  and  from  Germany,  Lorraine  might  be  a 
formidable  starting-point  for  an  invasion  of  France. 
Gaston  was  to  be  bound  to  the  confederacy  by  a  mar- 
riage with  the  duke's  sister,  Margaret. 

But  Eichelieu  was  far  too  prompt  to  allow  his  enemies 
to  complete  their  preparations.  In  the  winter  of  1631 
he  despatched  la  Force  and  Schomberg  to  drive  the 
Imperialists  from  Moyenvic,  while  he  carried  off  the 
king  and  court  to  Metz,  leaving  Soissons  as  lieutenant- 
governor  in  Paris.  Complete  success  rewarded  both 
movements,  Moyenvic  was  taken,  and  the  duke  of 
Lorraine  hastened  to  conclude  the  Treaty  of  Vic 
(January  6,  1632),  by  which  he  promised  to  withdraw 
from  all  hostile  alliances,  and  to  expel  from  his 
territories  all  the  enemies  of  France.  Eichelieu  hoped 
by  depriving  Gaston  of  his  refuge  to  induce  him  to 


vi      PRANCE  INVOLVED  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR    113 

accept  a  reconciliation,  but  the  latter  was  persuaded 
by  his  chief  adviser,  Puylaurens,  to  withdraw  to  Brussels. 
The  plot  was  postponed  and  not  abandoned.  Charles  IV. 
had  no  intention  of  observing  the  promises,  and  almost 
at  the  moment  of  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  Vic 
Gaston  was  secretly  married  to  Margaret  of  Lorraine. 

While  Richelieu  was  engaged  in  averting  the  im- 
mediate perils  which  threatened  France,  events  were 
occurring  in  Germany  which  were  destined  not  only  to 
frustrate  the  schemes  of  his  enemies,  but  to  open  the 
way  for  a  new  policy  of  aggrandisement  and  annexation. 
In  1632  the  cardinal  began  to  dream  of  that  extension 
of  the  French  frontier  to  the  Rhine  which  becomes  so 
dominant  a  tradition  in  subsequent  generations.  The 
beginning  of  this  great  enterprise  was  one  of  the  many 
important  results  of  the  victories  of  Gustavus  Adolphus. 
Although  the  Swedish  king  had  been  urged  by  Richelieu 
to  invade  Germany,  and  although  a  formal  treaty  be- 
tween them  was  concluded  at  Barwalde  in  January 
1631,  the  aims  of  the  two  great  protagonists  were  far 
from  harmonious.  For  the  chief  objects  of  Gustavus, 
the  aggrandisement  of  Sweden  and  the  maintenance  or 
extension  of  Protestantism,  Richelieu  cared  not  at  all.  To 
him  the  Swedish  army  was  merely  a  tool  to  be  used  for 
the  humiliation  of  the  house  of  Hapsburg,  and  to  divert 
the  attention  of  Austria  from  Italy  and  France.  He 
would  have  preferred  to  attain  his  ends  by  an  alliance 
with  the  Catholic  League,  if  that  had  been  possible,  and 
it  was  only  when  he  found  that  Maximilian  of  Bavaria 
had  too  many  interests  in  common  with  the  emperor 
that  he  finally  decided  on  a  treaty  with  Sweden.  And 
his  diplomacy,  skilful  as  it  was,  was  insufficient  to  keep 

I 


114  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

a  man  like  Gustavus  Adolphus  in  the  leading-strings  of 
France.  The  latter  set  himself  to  secure  his  position 
in  the  north  before  he  would  risk  a  direct  attack  upon 
the  enemies  whom  he  had  come  to  seek.  The  emperor's 
obstinate  persistence  in  enforcing  the  Edict  of  Restitution 
drove  the  Lutheran  princes  into  an  alliance  with  Sweden. 
The  hesitation  of  John  George  of  Saxony,  averse  to  the 
intervention  of  a  foreigner  in  German  affairs,  and  still 
more  unwilling  to  acknowledge  a  superior,  was  finally 
overcome  by  the  sack  of  Magdeburg.  Having  at  last 
achieved  his  first  aim,  Gustavus  Adolphus  advanced  to 
meet  the  army  of  the  League  under  Tilly.  Few  more 
important  battles  have  been  fought  than  that  of  Leipzig 
(September  7,  1631).  On  its  issue  were  staked  the  main- 
tenance of  Protestantism  in  Germany,  the  very  existence 
of  Sweden  as  a  state,  and  in  a  lesser  degree  the  future 
of  France  and  its  great  minister.  If  Tilly  had 
triumphed,  it  would  have  been  immensely  difficult  to 
resist  the  foreign  coalition  in  favour  of  Gaston  of 
Orleans. 

The  victory  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  removed  this 
danger,  but  the  attention  of  Europe  was  at  once  con- 
centrated upon  the  conqueror's  future  movements.  If 
he  marched  straight  upon  Vienna,  it  seemed  impossible 
that  the  emperor,  without  either  army  or  general,  could 
make  any  effective  resistance,  and  terms  of  peace  might 
be  dictated  in  the  capital  of  the  Austrian  Hapsburgs. 
This  seemed  the  most  obvious  policy,  and  it  had 
much  to  recommend  it  to  Richelieu,  who  had  always 
desired  to  employ  the  Swedes  against  Austria  and  to 
spare  the  Catholic  League.  But  Gustavus  Adolphus 
was  jealous  of  French  dictation,  and  resolute  to  follow 


vi       FRANCE  INVOLVED  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR     115 

his  own  course.  Leaving  John  George  to  invade 
Bohemia,  he  led  his  own  army  against  the  defenceless 
states  of  the  Ehine  prelates.  No  resistance  was  offered 
to  his  triumphal  march,  and  hefore  the  end  of  the  year 
Mainz  itself  was  in  his  hands.  That  Kichelieu  was 
chagrined  by  his  decision  is  undeniable.  In  his  Memoirs 
he  asserts  that  Gustavus  Adolphus,  like  Hannibal,  knew 
how  to  conquer,  but  not  how  to  use  his  victory. 

But  in  spite  of  the  cardinal's  criticism  it  is  doubtful 
whether  France  could  have  been  better  served  by  a 
direct  attack  upon  Vienna  than  she  was  by  Gustavus's 
triumphal  march  along  the  "priests'  lane."  The 
European  coalition  in  favour  of  Gaston,  which  depended 
more  upon  Spain  than  upon  Austria,  was  practically  anni- 
hilated. The  duke  of  Lorraine  was  deprived  of  the 
allies  who  might  have  interfered  to  protect  him  from 
the  consequences  of  his  continued  intrigues,  and  of  his 
treacherous  breach  of  the  treaty  of  Vic.  But  the  chief 
result  was  to  give  an  opening  for  French  intervention 
in  Southern  Germany.  The  ecclesiastical  electors 
hastened  to  implore  the  mediation  of  the  cardinal,  and 
the  archbishop  of  Trier  promptly  placed  himself  under 
French  protection,  and  offered  to  admit  French  garrisons 
into  his  fortresses  of  Hermanstein  (now  Ehrenbreitstein) 
and  Philipsburg.  The  marquis  de  Br^z6,  Eichelieu's 
brother-in-law,  was  sent  to  warn  Gustavus  Adolphus 
from  a  further  advance  into  Elsass,  and  to  negotiate 
terms  for  the  neutrality  of  Bavaria  and  Cologne. 

In  order  to  profit  by  the  opportunity  which  the 
Swedish  successes  offered  to  him,  Eichelieu  determined 
to  make  himself  master  of  Lorraine,  an  enterprise  for 
which  the  conduct  of  Charles  IV.  offered  a  convenient 


116  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

pretext.  Gaston,  after  collecting  troops  in  Brussels,  had 
returned  to  Lorraine  on  his  way  to  France,  where  his 
emissaries  were  active  in  stirring  up  the  malcontent 
nobles  to  active  measures  against  the  cardinal.  As  a 
warning  to  his  enemies,  Eichelieu  brought  Marshal 
Marillac  to  trial  for  peculation  before  a  special  com- 
mission, and  he  was  condemned  and  executed  (May  8). 
Eichelieu  then  recalled  the  French  army,  which  had 
already  appeared  on  the  Rhine  and  occupied  Ehren- 
breitstein,  and  carried  the  king  with  him  to  Lorraine. 
In  eight  days  the  campaign  was  over.  The  capture  of 
Pont-a-Mousson,  and  the  advance  of  Marshal  d'Effiat  to 
lay  siege  to  Nancy,  brought  the  duke  to  his  knees.  By 
the  treaty  of  Liverdun  (June  26)  he  undertook  to 
observe  the  promises  he  had  made  at  Vic,  to  do  homage 
for  his  duchy  of  Bar,  and  to  sell  the  county  of  Clermont 
to  France.  As  security  for  his  good  faith  he  was  to 
leave  his  brother,  the  cardinal  of  Lorraine,  as  a  hostage, 
and  to  place  the  fortresses  of  Stenay  and  Jametz  in 
French  hands.  The  French  army  was  now  free  to 
renew  the  campaign  in  Germany,  and  in  spite  of  the 
discouragement  caused  by  the  death  of  d'Effiat,  his 
successor,  d'Estr^es,  succeeded  in  driving  the  Spaniards 
from  the  city  of  Trier.  By  thus  seizing  the  bridge  over 
the  Moselle,  the  French  cub  off  the  most  direct  route 
between  the  Netherlands  and  the  Spanish  provinces  in 
Italy. 

Having  drawn  the  teeth  of  the  duke  of  Lorraine,  it 
was  now  high  time  for  Eichelieu  to  turn  his  attention 
to  Gaston,  who  had  entered  France  on  June  8,  and 
had  issued  a  manifesto  containing  a  violent  attack  upon 
the  cardinal.  Personally  the  heir  to  the  throne  was  a 


vi       FRANCE  INVOLVED  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR     117 

contemptible  antagonist,  but  he  had  succeeded  in  gaining 
over  the  greatest  noble  in  France,  after  the  princes  of 
the  royal  blood.  Henri  de  Montmorency,  the  last  bearer 
of  a  famous  name  in  history,  had  won  reputation  as  a 
soldier  at  Avigliana,  and  had  since  been  on  terms  of 
affectionate  intimacy  with  Richelieu,  who  relied  on  his 
fidelity.  But  the  young  duke  was  discontented  with 
the  humble  part  which  the  great  nobles  had  to  play 
under  the  cardinal's  rule.  He  coveted  his  ancestors' 
office  of  constable,  which  had  been  suppressed,  and  he 
resented  the  harsh  treatment  of  his  province  of  Langue- 
doc.  Above  all,  the  influence  of  his  wife,  a  relative  of 
Mary  de  Medici,  urged  him  to  come  forward  as  the 
champion  of  the  oppressed  mother  and  brother  of  the 
king.  He  invited  Gaston  to  advance  from  Burgundy 
into  Languedoc,  and  it  was  confidently  hoped  that  his 
name  and  reputation  would  give  the  rebels  a  firm  foot- 
ing in  Southern  France.  But  Richelieu  was  now  to 
reap  the  reward  of  his  firm  and  prudent  policy.  The 
Huguenots,  contented  with  religious  toleration,  refused 
to  join  a  movement  which  was  encouraged  by  Spain. 
The  chief  nobles  and  governors  of  provinces,  warned  by 
the  fate  of  Marillac,  hesitated  to  commit  themselves 
until  some  substantial  success  had  been  obtained,  and 
the  leaders  of  the  rising  were  at  variance  among  them- 
selves. Puylaurens,  eager  to  maintain  his  ascendency 
over  the  feeble  Gaston,  was  jealous  of  Montmorency's 
influence,  and  the  latter's  claim  to  command  was  dis- 
puted by  d'Elbceuf.  These  dissensions  had  already 
assured  the  failure  of  the  rebels  when  they  came  into 
collision  with  the  royal  army  under  Schomberg  at 
Casteluaudari  (September  1).  A  chivalrous  but  reckless 


118  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

cavalry  charge  carried  Montmorency  into  the  middle  of 
the  enemy ;  his  horse  was  killed  under  him,  and  he  was 
carried  from  the  field  wounded  and  a  prisoner. 

Gaston,  who  accepted  the  devotion  of  his  adherents 
without  sharing  their  risks,  and  who  had  taken  no 
part  in  the  battle,  at  once  realised  that  all  was  lost,  and 
opened  negotiations  with  Louis.  There  was  no  dis- 
position to  treat  him  harshly,  and  he  received  most 
lenient  terms  from  his  brother.  On  condition  of  abandon- 
ing all  hostile  alliances,  he  recovered  all  his  appanages, 
and  an  amnesty  was  promised  to  most  of  his  adherents, 
with  the  significant  exception  of  Montmorency.  Richelieu 
knew  how  to  be  moderate  in  the  hour  of  victory.  The 
king  presided  in  person  at  a  meeting  of  the  estates  of 
Languedoc  at  Beziers,  and  restored  for  a  money  payment 
the  liberties  of  which  the  province  had  been  deprived 
in  1629. 

Attention  was  now  concentrated  upon  the  fate  of 
Montmorency,  who  had  been  basely  deserted  by  his 
accomplices,  but  whose  life  was  pleaded  for  by  illustrious 
relatives,  and  even  by  crowned  heads.  Richelieu,  how- 
ever, merciful  as  he  had  been  to  the  mass  of  the  rebels, 
was  determined  to  make  an  example  of  their  leader. 
He  would  teach  the  French  nobles  that  rebellion,  even 
in  the  interests  of  the  heir  to  the  throne,  was  not  an 
enterprise  to  be  lightly  undertaken.  To  the  king  he 
urged  that  Montmorency's  execution  was  the  only  way 
to  make  Gaston  powerless  by  depriving  him  of  adherents. 
A  still  more  potent  argument  to  himself  was  to  be  found 
in  a  remark  made  by  Bullion,  and  which  is  reproduced 
by  the  cardinal  himself — that  the  house  of  Montmorency 
was  so  powerful  in  Languedoc  that  the  people  regarded 


vi       FRANCE  INVOLVED  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR     119 

the  royal  power  as  imaginary.  To  Richelieu,  the  duke's 
removal  may  well  have  seemed  an  almost  necessary  step 
to  that  absorption  of  the  provinces  under  a  powerful 
monarchy  and  a  centralised  administration  which  was 
the  grand  object  of  his  life.  In  his  Memoirs  he  pleads, 
not  without  plausibility,  that  his  severity  proved  his 
devotion  to  France  at  the  expense  of  his  own  personal 
interests.  To  have  spared  the  prisoner  would  have  been 
an  easy  method  of  gaining  popularity.  To  punish  him 
was  to  expose  his  own  life  to  the  risk  of  assassination, 
because  it  would  convince  his  enemies  that  they  could 
only  secure  themselves  by  his  death.  But  these  con- 
siderations had  little  weight  with  Richelieu,  who  was 
superior  to  vulgar  terrors,  and  who  had  assimilated,  either 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  the  maxim  of  Machiavelli, 
that  it  is  safer  to  be  feared  than  to  be  loved.  Mont- 
morency  was  brought  to  trial  before  the  parliament  of 
Toulouse,  whose  competence  to  pass  judgment  on  a  peer 
was  more  than  doubtful,  condemned  to  death,  and 
executed  on  the  same  day  (October  30).  Men  to  whom 
the  traditions  of  the  civil  wars  were  still  familiar,  and 
who  remembered  the  impunity  with  which  princes  and 
nobles  conspired  under  the  regency,  must  have  realised 
that  a  new  era  had  begun  for  France  when  a  minister 
of  the  crown  ventured  to  bring  to  the  scaffold  the  last 
male  of  a  family  whose  name  was  so  honourably  and 
conspicuously  written  in  the  country's  history. 

One  result  of  the  execution  Richelieu  had  probably 
failed  to  foresee.  Although  Gaston  had  omitted  to 
stipulate  for  Montmorency's  pardon,  even  his  torpid 
selfishness  could  not  but  feel  the  ignominy  which  the 
fate  of  his  chivalrous  supporter  threw  upon  himself. 


120  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

His  own  fears  and  those  of  Puylaurens  were  kindled  by 
the  recollection  that  his  marriage  with  Margaret  of 
Lorraine  had  not  yet  been  acknowledged,  and  that  it 
would  never  be  tolerated  by  the  king  and  cardinal.  On 
November  6  he  fled  from  Tours,  and  again  sought 
refuge  in  Brussels. 

Thus  the  heir  to  the  throne  was  once  more  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemies  of  France,  and  the  task  of  depriv- 
ing them  of  this  dangerous  weapon  had  to  be  commenced 
afresh.  At  the  same  time  an  event  occurred  in  Germany 
which  altered  the  whole  aspect  of  affairs  in  Europe,  and 
demanded  the  exercise  of  all  Richelieu's  prudent  watch- 
fulness. Gustavus  Adolphus  had  listened  to  French  re- 
monstrances so  far  as  to  abstain  from  advancing  into 
Elsass  and  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Trier.  But  he 
refused  to  resign  the  ecclesiastical  territories  which  he 
had  already  seized,  and  the  attempt  to  arrange  terms 
with  the  leaders  of  the  Catholic  League  proved  a  failure. 
Early  in  1632  ,the  Swedes  advanced  against  Bavaria, 
and  Tilly  was  defeated  and  slain  in  attempting  to  dispute 
the  passage  of  the  Lech.  Gustavus  Adolphus  entered 
Munich  in  triumph,  and  Maximilian  was  driven  from 
his  own  duchy.  Austria  was  once  more  exposed  to 
invasion,  and  the  army  of  the  League  was  no  longer 
able  to  defend  the  emperor.  In  his  despair  Ferdinand 
II.  had  been  compelled  to  appeal  to  Wallenstein,  who 
recovered  his  command  on  terms  which  made  him  an 
independent  potentate.  With  an  army  which  was 
brought  together  by  the  magic  of  his  reputation,  and 
which  he  treated  as  his  private  following,  Wallenstein 
had  already  driven  the  Saxons  from  Bohemia,  and  he 
now  advanced  to  check  the  eastward  march  of  the 


VI       FRANCE  INVOLVED  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR     121 

Swedes.  At  Niirnberg  Gustavus  Adolphus  met  with 
his  first  check,  as  he  dared  not  attack  the  enemy's 
intrenchments,  and  failed  to  force  him  into  a  pitched 
battle.  From  Niirnberg  Wallenstein  drew  the  Swedes 
after  him  into  Saxony,  and  on  November  16  their 
heroic  king  lost  his  life  on  the  glorious  field  of  Liitzen. 
At  this  very  moment  Richelieu  was  lying  on  a  bed 
of  sickness,  from  which  it  seemed  more  than  possible 
that  he  would  never  rise  again.  After  settling  affairs 
in  Languedoc,  Louis  XIII.  had  hurried  back  to  Paris, 
while  the  cardinal  undertook  to  escort  the  queen  on  a 
tour  through  Western  France,  where  she  was  to  visit  his 
home  at  Richelieu  and  his  great  conquest,  La  Rochelle. 
But  an  internal  abscess  had  long  preyed  upon  a  frame 
that  had  never  been  strong,  and  to  this  disorder  was 
now  added  disease  of  the  bladder.  The  cardinal  was 
compelled  to  stop  at  Bordeaux,  and  to  leave  the  task  of 
entertaining  Anne  of  Austria  to  his  uncle,  the  commander 
de  la  Porte.  About  November  20  his  condition  seemed 
almost  hopeless,  and  in  Paris  the  rumour  spread  that  he 
was  dead.  Open  enemies  and  faithless  friends  exulted 
over  the  expected  removal  of  an  oppressor  or  a  too- 
powerful  patron.  Chateauneuf,  the  keeper  of  the  seals, 
who  owed  his  elevation  to  Richelieu,  was  indiscreet 
enough  to  betray  his  hopes  of  succeeding  to  the  position 
of  his  dying  colleague.  But  an  indomitable  spirit  often 
triumphs  over  the  weakness  of  its  mortal  covering. 
Richelieu  recovered  as  if  by  a  miracle,  and  as  soon 
as  he  had  rejoined  the  court  he  hastened  to  punish 
those  personal  affronts  which  in  his  eyes  were  almost 
as  unpardonable  as  serious  crimes  against  the  state. 
Chateauneuf  was  accused,  on  the  loose  assertions  of  the 


122  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

cardinal's  spies,  of  being  engaged  in  an  intrigue  with  the 
duchess  of  Chevreuse,  the  queen-mother,  and  Henrietta 
Maria  of  England.  His  real  offence  was  that  he  had 
deserted  Richelieu  at  Bordeaux,  that  he  had  danced 
before  the  queen  while  his  patron  was  thought  to  be 
dying,  and  that  he  had  allowed  himself  to  dream  of 
succeeding  to  the  office  of  first  minister.  For  this  he 
was  deprived  of  the  seals  and  imprisoned  at  Angoule'me, 
but  the  fact  that  he  was  never  brought  to  trial  goes  far 
to  prove  that  there  was  little  foundation  for  the  graver 
charges  against  him. 

Richelieu's  recovery  was  exceedingly  opportune,  as 
he  found  France  threatened  by  three  simultaneous 
dangers.  The  death  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  weakened 
the  league  against  the  Austrian  Hapsburgs,  and  might 
easily  lead  to  its  dissolution.  The  United  Provinces 
were  negotiating  for  a  truce  with  Spain,  and  if  this  were 
arranged,  the  Spaniards  would  be  free  to  carry  out  their 
schemes  for  assisting  Gaston,  who  had  again  joined  the 
enemies  of  his  country.  Never  did  the  cardinal  display 
more  coolness  and  decision  than  at  this  crisis,  when  the 
whole  weight  of  affairs  rested  on  his  own  shoulders.  His 
colleagues  in  the  council,  of  whom  the  chief  were  Bullion 
and  Bouthillier,  had  one  great  qualification — devotion  to 
their  chief.  They  were  always  consulted  by  him,  but 
the  decision  he  always  reserved  to  himself,  and  they 
were  quite  content  to  carry  out  a  policy  which  they 
knew  themselves  to  be  incapable  of  originating.  The 
only  personage  who  may  have  possessed  influence  over 
Richelieu  was  Father  Joseph,  who  was  not  officially  a 
member  of  the  council,  and  whose  relations  with  the 
cardinal  have  always  been  something  of  an  enigma  to 


vi      FRANCE  INVOLVED  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR     123 

historians.  Such  evidence  as  we  possess,  however,  goes 
to  prove  that  the  influence  of  the  "  grey  cardinal "  has 
been  exaggerated  by  Richelieu's  detractors,  and  that  the 
special  subjects  on  which  he  was  consulted  were  affairs 
in  Germany  and  the  relations  with  Rome.  Louis  XIII. 
himself,  whose  penetration  and  decision  the  cardinal  is 
never  tired  of  contrasting  with  his  own  "simplicity," 
was  conspicuously  devoid  of  the  qualities  which  his 
minister  attributes  to  him.  His  notes  on  the  minutes 
of  the  council,  which  are  published  in  the  great  collection 
of  M.  d'Avenel,  proved  that  he  never  dreamed  of  disput- 
ing the  conclusions  of  an  adviser  whose  superiority  he 
always  recognised  even  when  he  was  most  inclined  to 
resent  it. 

Early  in  1633  two  of  the  ablest  of  French  diplom- 
atists, Feuquieres  and  Charnace",  were  despatched  to 
Germany  and  Holland,  and  their  instructions,  which  are 
model  state-papers,  show  how  clearly  Richelieu  compre- 
hended the  situation,  and  how  he  planned  to  turn  it  to 
the  advantage  of  France.  While  avoiding  as  long  as 
possible  an  open  declaration  of  war,  he  wished  to 
strengthen  all  the  elements  of  opposition  to  the  house 
of  Hapsburg,  and  to  seize  every  opportunity  for  strength- 
ening the  monarchy  at  home  and  for  extending  the 
power  of  France  on  the  eastern  frontier.  In  Germany 
the  embassy  of  Feuquieres  was  completely  successful. 
The  alliance  of  France  with  Sweden,  which  was  now 
governed  by  Oxenstiern  on  behalf  of  Christina,  the  young 
daughter  of  Gustavus,  was  renewed.  At  Heilbronn  the 
influence  of  the  French  envoy  was  mainly  instrumental 
in  securing  the  confirmation  of  the  Protestant  League, 
which  was  strengthened  by  further  additions  at  the  later 


124  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

conference  at  Frankfurt.  French  diplomacy  defeated 
the  attempt  of  John  George  of  Saxony  to  procure  the 
direction  of  the  League,  which  was  given  to  Oxenstiern, 
but,  to  his  great  disgust,  with  strictly  limited  powers. 
Richelieu  had  regarded  the  death  of  Gustavus  with 
composure,  if  not  with  secret  complacency,  and  events 
justified  his  view.  The  Swedish  king  was  an  unmanage- 
able ally,  and  continued  successes  might  have  enabled 
him  to  found  a  power  independent  of,  and  possibly 
formidable  to,  France.  His  removal  rendered  the 
Swedes  again  dependent  upon  French  support,  and  at  the 
same  time  enabled  French  influence  gradually  to  supplant 
that  of  Sweden  in  Germany. 

In  Holland  Charnace  was  equally  successful.  By 
making  dexterous  use  of  the  divisions  among  the  seven 
provinces  he  succeeded  in  frustrating  the  negotiations 
with  the  Netherlands,  where  the  Spanish  power  suffered 
a  severe  blow  by  the  death  of  the  popular  and  prudent 
infanta,  Clara  Isabella.  The  continuance  of  the  Dutch 
war  prevented  the  Spaniards  from  sending  assistance 
to  Charles  IV.  of  Lorraine,  who  had  been  encouraged 
by  the  death  of  the  Swedish  king  to  disregard  the 
obligations  he  had  contracted  at  Liverdun.  This  gave 
Richelieu  the  opportunity  which  he  wanted  for  the 
annexation  of  a  province  whose  possession  would  be  as 
advantageous  as  its  hostility  was  dangerous  to  France. 
He  had  already  employed  the  labours  of  learned  anti- 
quarians to  prove  that  the  imperial  suzerainty  was  a 
usurpation  which  no  lapse  of  time  could  legalise,  and 
that  Lorraine  was  properly  a  dependency  of  the  French 
crown.  Fortified  with  their  arguments,  he  proceeded 
to  take  active  measures.  On  the  ground  that  the 


vi       FRANCE  INVOLVED  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR     125 

stipulated  homage  had  never  been  paid  for  Bar,  the 
parliament  of  Paris  declared  the  duchy  confiscated. 
Saint  Chaumont  was  sent  with  an  army  to  advance 
upon  Nancy,  and  in  August  Richelieu  set  out  with  the 
king  to  direct  operations  on  the  spot.  Charles  IV., 
as  unprepared  as  ever  to  resist  invasion,  sent  his  brother, 
the  cardinal  of  Lorraine,  to  offer  to  annul  the  marriage 
between  Gaston  and  Margaret,  and  to  propose  on  his 
own  behalf  a  marriage  with  Madame  de  Combalet. 
Richelieu  refused  the  proffered  honour  to  his  niece, 
and  demanded  that  Nancy  should  be  surrendered  as 
a  pledge  of  the  duke's  good  faith.  As  this  condition 
was  rejected  as  too  harsh,  the  French  laid  siege  to  the 
capital  of  Lorraine,  which  was  regarded  as  one  of  the 
best  fortresses  of  Europe.  Charles  IV.  now  gave  way, 
and  agreed  to  surrender  Nancy,  but  he  still  hoped  for 
the  arrival  of  Spanish  troops  from  Italy,  and  ordered 
the  commander  of  the  citadel  to  delay  the  formal  cession. 
But  the  duke  of  Feria,  who  had  already  marched  from 
Milan  through  the  Valtelline,  was  delayed  at  Constance 
by  the  Swedes  under  count  Horn.  This  check  deprived 
Charles  of  his  last  hope,  and  on  September  25  Richelieu 
accompanied  Louis  in  his  formal  entry  into  Nancy.  He 
was  provided  beforehand  with  an  excuse  for  retaining 
a  pledge  which  he  had  no  intention  of  relinquishing. 
During  the  siege  the  Princess  Margaret,  with  the  con- 
nivance of  her  brothers,  had  escaped  from  the  city  to 
Luxemburg,  whence  she  proceeded  to  join  her  husband  in 
Brussels.  Earlier  in  the  year  the  creation  of  a  parliament 
at  Metz  had  cut  off  the  last  link  between  the  three 
bishoprics  and  the  empire.  The  lilies  supplanted  the 
imperial  eagle,  and  the  duchy  of  Lorraine,  with  all  its 


126  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

chief  fortresses  garrisoned  by  French  troops,  was 
practically  a  province  of  France.  It  was  in  vain  that 
Charles  IV.  sought  to  disarm  the  enmity  of  Louis  by 
abdicating  in  favour  of  his  brother,  who  resigned  the 
cardinalate  and  married  his  cousin  Claude.  France 
refused  to  recognise  the  marriage,  and  the  new  duke 
and  his  bride  found  themselves  compelled  to  escape 
imprisonment  by  flying  to  Florence.  Their  departure 
enabled  Richelieu  to  complete  the  occupation  of  Lorraine 
by  seizing  the  last  fortresses  and  by  establishing  a 
conseil  souverain  at  Nancy  for  the  administration  of 
justice. 

Although  Margaret  of  Lorraine  had  escaped,  Eichelieu 
could  now  proceed  at  leisure  to  procure  the  dissolution 
of  her  marriage  with  Gaston.  This  union  he  had 
always  regarded  with  such  aversion  that  contemporaries 
attributed  it  to  the  desire  to  marry  his  niece  to  the 
heir  of  the  French  throne.  At  first  it  was  decided  to 
appeal  to  the  pope  for  a  divorce,  but  Urban  VIII.  insisted 
upon  trying  the  case  at  Rome,  and  Richelieu  dreaded 
delay  and  Spanish  influence.  Accordingly  a  civil  suit 
was  instituted  before  the  parliament  of  Paris  under  the 
absurd  form  of  a  charge  of  abduction  against  the  duke 
of  Lorraine.  The  decision  of  the  court  was  pronounced 
on  September  5,  1634.  The  marriage  was  declared 
to  have  been  invalidly  contracted,  and  Charles  IV.  was 
found  guilty  of  treason.  To  appease  the  pope  an 
envoy  was  sent  to  Rome  to  explain  that  the  decision 
did  not  affect  the  ecclesiastical  aspect  of  the  marriage, 
and  that  there  was  no  intention  to  contest  the  papal 
jurisdiction. 

About  this  time  Mary  de  Medici,  weary  of  her  exile 


vi   FRANCE'  INVOLVED  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR  127 

in  Brussels,  and  jealous  of  Puylaurens,  who  would  allow 
her  no  influence  over  her  second  son,  made  overtures 
for  a  reconciliation  with  the  king  and  cardinal.  But 
Richelieu  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  his  former 
patroness,  and  had  little  difficulty  in  inducing  Louis 
XIII.  to  fix  impossible  conditions  as  the  price  of  his 
mother's  return.  At  the  same  time  he  was  as  anxious 
as  ever  for  a  reconciliation  with  Gaston,  whose  return 
was  almost  necessary  to  secure  the  unity  of  France  in 
the  face  of  foreign  enemies.  Negotiations  were  being 
carried  on  with  Brussels  when  the  capture  of  one  of 
the  prince's  agents  revealed  the  actual  conclusion  of  a 
treaty  with  Spain  for  the  invasion  of  France.  This 
discovery  exasperated  the  cardinal,  and  he  openly 
declared  to  the  king  in  council  that  there  were  only 
two  means  of  foiling  his  brother's  intrigues.  The  one 
was  the  birth  of  a  son,  which  depended  upon  the  grace 
of  God,  and  the  other  was  the  altering  of  the  succession, 
which  involved  a  revolution  in  the  fundamental  laws 
and  traditions  of  France.  The  dangers  of  the  latter 
alternative  would  not  have  deterred  Kichelieu  from 
urging  its  adoption,  but  it  was  rendered  unnecessary 
by  Gaston's  submission.  The  complete  conquest  of 
Lorraine  and  the  active  measures  which  were  taken  to 
annul  the  marriage  terrified  Gaston  and  Puylaurens, 
who  had  both  discovered  that  the  Spaniards  only  used 
them  as  tools  for  their  own  ends.  A  golden  bridge 
was  built  for  the  return  of  the  baffled  conspirators. 
Gaston  recovered  his  appanages,  with  the  government  of 
Auvergne  instead  of  Orleans,  while  Puylaurens,  together 
with  the  rank  of  duke  and  peer,  received  the  hand  of  a 
wealthy  heiress.  But  it  was  soon  evident  that  their 


128  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

acceptance  of  these  terms  involved  only  a  partial 
reconciliation.  To  the  arguments  of  an  ecclesiastical 
deputation,  which  tried  to  convince  him  of  the  nullity 
of  his  marriage,  Gaston  lent  a  polite  but  evasive  atten- 
tion. It  was  discovered  that  he  had  written  to  Rome 
to  protest  beforehand  against  the  validity  of  any  acts 
or  admissions  that  might  be  extorted  from  him  after  his 
return  to  France.  This  obstinacy  Richelieu  attributed 
to  the  continued  intrigues  of  Puylaurens,  who  had 
indiscreetly  boasted  that  if  anything  happened  to  Louis 
XIII.  he  would  be  first  minister  under  his  successor. 
He  had  to  learn  that  it  was  safer  to  plot  in  Brussels 
than  in  Paris,  and  that  his  marriage  with  a  relative  of 
the  cardinal  was  not  enough  to  secure  his  impunity. 
In  February  1635  he  was  suddenly  seized  and  imprisoned 
at  Vincennes,  where  a  natural  death  saved  him  from 
the  penalties  of  treason.  Deprived  of  his  chief  adviser 
and  absorbed  in  sensual  pleasures,  Gaston  fell  for  a 
time  into  insignificance,  and  was  compelled  to  accept 
the  divorce  from  Margaret,  which  was  ultimately  pro- 
nounced by  a  synod  of  Gallican  clergy. 

All  this  time  the  Swedes,  in  spite  of  their  king's 
death  and  the  vacillation  of  the  elector  of  Saxony,  had 
been  more  than  holding  their  own  in  Germany,  while 
French  influence  was  steadily  extended  in  the  south- 
west. In  1633  the  elector  of  Cologne  had  formally 
put  his  estates  under  French  protection,  and  the  duke 
of  Wurtemberg,  unable  to  defend  Montbe"liard  against 
the  Spaniards,  handed  over  both  town  and  citadel  to  a 
French  garrison.  In  the  next  year  several  towns  in 
Elsass  also  threw  their  gates  open  to  the  French,  who 
thus  acquired  their  first  footing  in  a  province  which 


VI       FRANCE  INVOLVED  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR     129 

was  destined  to  be  Richelieu's  chief  territorial  gift  to 
his  country. 

The  chief  cause  of  these  successes,  and  of  the  failure 
of  the  imperial  forces  to  profit  by  the  death  of 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  was  undoubtedly  the  conduct  of 
Wallenstein.  The  great  general  had  resumed  his  com- 
mand with  the  firm  intention  of  securing,  not  the 
emperor's  interests,  but  his  own.  With  the  religious 
objects  of  Ferdinand  II.  and  the  Catholic  League  he  was 
entirely  out  of  sympathy.  His  object  was  to  make 
himself  a  great  prince  of  the  empire,  and  to  use  his 
military  superiority  to  impose  a  general  pacification 
upon  the  warring  sects,  so  as  to  prevent  Germany  from 
being  torn  in  pieces  to  serve  the  selfish  ends  of  foreign 
princes.  For  Spain,  the  close  and  necessary  ally  of 
the  emperor,  he  had  the  greatest  hatred.  When  the 
Cardinal  Infant,  Philip  IV. 's  brother,  applied  to  him  for 
4000  cavalry,  who  were  needed  to  bring  his  army  from 
Milan  to  Germany,  he  refused.  Instead  of  vigorously 
prosecuting  the  war,  he  contented  himself  with  his  con- 
quest of  Bohemia,  where  he  maintained  almost  royal 
state,  and  whence  he  carried  on  simultaneous  negotia- 
tions with  Sweden,  France,  and  the  Protestant  princes 
of  Germany.  Richelieu  was  willing  enough  to  profit  by 
Wallenstein's  inactivity,  but  he  had  the  keenness  to 
detect  that  antipathy  to  foreign  interference  which  was 
at  the  bottom  of  his  schemes,  and  he  paid  little  atten- 
tion to  overtures  which  could  bring  no  advantage  to 
France.  But  at  Vienna  it  did  not  need  much  exercise 
of  Spanish  influence  to  convince  Ferdinand  that  a 
general  who  presumed  to  treat  with  foreign  states  as  an 
independent  prince  could  not  be  tolerated  in  the  im- 

K 


130  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

perial  service.  In  his  contract  with  his  employer, 
Wallenstein  had  been  careful  to  provide  against  a 
second  dismissal,  but  he  could  not  secure  himself  against 
assassination.  As  long  as  his  army  was  faithful  he  was 
safe.  But  the  fidelity  of  his  officers  was  tampered  with 
by  Spanish  gold,  and  on  February  15,  1634,  he  fell 
under  the  dagger  of  traitors  who  received  his  pay. 

The  death  of  Wallenstein  marks  a  great  turning- 
point  in  the  history  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  His 
army  was  induced  to  accept  the  command  of  the  young 
king  of  Hungary,  Ferdinand's  eldest  son.  In  June  the 
Cardinal  Infant  led  his  long -delayed  expedition  into 
Germany,  and  his  troops  succeeded  in  joining  those  of 
the  emperor.  At  Nordlingen  the  united  armies  in- 
flicted a  crushing  defeat  upon  the  Swedes  under  Horn 
and  Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar.  For  the  moment  it 
seemed  as  if  the  work  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  would  be 
undone  by  the  first  failure  of  his  successors.  The 
League  of  Heilbronn,  the  product  of  the  joint  diplomacy 
of  Eichelieu  and  Oxenstiern,  was  broken  to  pieces. 
John  George  of  Saxony  hastened  to  accept  the  treaty  of 
Prague  (May  1635),  by  which  the  Edict  of  Restitution 
was  revoked,  and  a  compromise  was  arranged  between 
Catholics  and  Lutherans.  Within  a  few  months  these 
terms  were  accepted  by  all  the  Lutheran  princes.  As 
far  as  Germany  was  concerned,  the  Thirty  Years'  War 
was  at  an  end.  The  great  questions  at  issue  at  its  com- 
mencement had  received  a  solution  which  satisfied 
everybody  except  the  German  Calvinists,  and  they  were 
too  few  and  too  powerless  to  continue  hostilities  by 
themselves.  But  the  war  had  long  ceased  to  be  a 
purely  German  struggle.  In  the  course  of  years  the 


vi       FRANCE  INVOLVED  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR     131 

German  contest  had  come  to  involve  in  itself  all  the 
rivalries  and  enmities  which  agitated  Europe :  the 
quarrels  of  Sweden  and  Poland,  the  jealousy  of  Den- 
mark against  its  northern  neighbour,  the  struggle  of 
Spain  to  reduce  the  Dutch  into  subjection,  and,  above 
all,  the  enmity  between  France  and  Spain,  which  dated 
back  to  the  time  of  Charles  V.  It  was  these  foreign 
interests  that  prolonged  the  war  for  the  next  thirteen 
years. 

The  great  schemes  of  Eichelieu  would  have  been  ruined 
if  the  war  had  been  ended  by  the  treaty  of  Prague.  It 
is  true  that  the  battle  of  Nordlingen,  by  weakening 
Sweden,  had  brought  some  direct  gains  to  France.  The 
Swedes,  who  had  seized  Philipsburg  from  the  Spaniards, 
and  had  hitherto  evaded  the  French  demands  for  its 
surrender,  were  compelled  to  abandon  the  fortress,  and 
Colmar  and  other  strong  places  in  Elsass  endeavoured  to 
obtain  security  by  the  admission  of  French  garrisons. 
But  these  and  the  earlier  acquisitions  would  have  to  be 
surrendered  at  a  general  pacification,  and  Eichelieu  had 
no  intention  of  surrendering  them.  Nor  was  this  the 
only  danger.  The  termination  of  the  German  war 
would  enormously  strengthen  Spain.  If  the  Spaniards, 
freed  from  the  heavy  obligation  of  supporting  Austria, 
could  reduce  the  Dutch  or  make  peace  with  them,  they 
would  then  be  able  to  throw  all  their  might  into  the 
recovery  of  their  omnipotence  in  Italy,  or  even  into  a 
direct  attack  upon  France.  And  France  would  be  left 
without  an  efficient  ally,  as  Sweden  could  render  little 
service  in  a  struggle  with  Spain. 

To  avoid  these  certain  and  possible  disasters,  it  was 
necessary  that  the   war  should  be  continued ;  and  to 


132  RICHELIEU  CHAP,  vi 

secure  its  continuation  only  one  expedient  remained — 
the  open  intervention  of  France.  For  such  a  step 
Eichelieu  had  long  been  preparing,  and  it  would  have 
been  easy  enough  to  find  a  pretext  for  hostilities,  even 
if  Spain  had  not  gone  out  of  her  way  to  provide  one. 
In  March  1635  a  Spanish  force  sallied  from  Luxem- 
burg, surprised  the  city  of  Trier,  and  carried  off  the 
elector  a  prisoner  to  the  Netherlands.  Eichelieu  at 
once  sent  to  the  Cardinal  Infant  to  demand  the  release 
of  an  ecclesiastical  dignitary  whose  sole  offence  was  his 
alliance  with  France.  A  refusal  was  followed  by  the 
appearance  of  a  French  herald  in  Brussels,  who,  with  all 
the  old  formalities,  declared  war  against  the  king  of 
Spain.  Eichelieu  had  engaged  France  in  the  greatest 
European  struggle  in  which  that  country  had  taken  part 
since  the  death  of  Henry  II. 


CHAPTER   VII 

REVERSES   AND   TRIUMPHS 
1635-1640 

French  alliances. — Military  preparations — Disasters  of  1635  in  the 
Netherlands,  Germany,  Italy,  and  at  sea — Causes  of  failure- 
Campaign  of  1636^Invasion  of  Picardy — Panic  in  Paris — 
Richelieu's  courage — Repulse  of  the  Spaniards — Conspiracy  of 
Orleans  and  Soissons — Risings  in  Normandy  and  Guienne — 
Episode  of  Louise  de  la  Fayette — Campaign  of  1637 — More 
French  reverses — Loss  of  the  Valtelline — The  French  fleet 
recovers  the  Lerins — Series  of  triumphs  begin  in  1633 — Bern- 
hard  of  Saxe- Weimar  takes  Breisach — His  death — France 
becomes  his  heir — The  Spaniards  in  Piedmont — Battle  and 
capture  of  Turin — Naval  victories — Destruction  of  Spanish 
fleet  in  the  Downs — Relations  with  England — Revolt  of  Cata- 
lonia and  Portugal — Capture  of  Arras — Extent  of  Richelieu's 
triumphs — Birth  of  the  dauphin — Death  of  Father  Joseph. 

RICHELIEU  had  long  contemplated  the  possibility  of 
France  being  forced  to  take  direct  part  in  the  war,  and 
he  had  made  ample  preparations,  so  far  as  they  could 
be  effected  by  diplomacy.  He  had  failed,  it  is  true,  to 
maintain  the  alliance  between  Sweden  and  the  Lutheran 
princes  of  Germany,  and  he  had  never  been  able  to 
detach  the  members  of  the  Catholic  League  from  their 
union  with  the  emperor.  On  the  other  hand,  he  had 
arranged  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  the 


134  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

United  Provinces,  by  which  the  combined  forces  of  the 
two  states  were  to  be  placed  under  the  command  of 
Frederick  Henry,  the  stadtholder.  He  had  hopes  of  a 
rising  in  the  Netherlands,  where  many  of  the  nobles 
were  discontented  with  the  direct  rule'  of  Spain,  which 
had  been  re-established  on  the  death  of  the  Infanta. 
The  neutrality  of  England  was  assured  by  Charles  I.'s 
resolution  to  dispense  with  a  parliament,  without  which 
he  could  not  hope  to  obtain  the  supplies  for  a  war. 
With  Oxenstiern,  who  visited  Paris  in  person  for  the 
purpose,  a  treaty  was  concluded  by  which  France  and 
Sweden  pledged  themselves  to  conclude  no  separate 
peace  with  either  Austria  or  Spain.  Richelieu's  aptest 
pupil  in  diplomacy,  the  count  d'Avaux,  had  foiled  the 
confident  attempt  of  Austria  to  hamper  Sweden  by 
reviving  the  old  feelings  of  jealousy  on  the  part  of 
Poland  and  Denmark.  The  truce  between  Sweden  and 
Poland,  originally  concluded  by  French  mediation,  was 
prolonged  for  another  twenty-five  years  by  the  same 
agency.  In  Italy,  Richelieu  arranged  a  league  with 
Savoy,  Parma,  and  Mantua  for  the  partition  of  the 
duchy  of  Milan,  and  he  had  hopes  that  Urban  VIII., 
always  jealous  of  Spanish  domination,  might  be  brought 
to  regard  the  scheme  without  disfavour.  Finally,  the 
duke  de  Rohan,  who  had  been  skilfully  converted  from 
a  dangerous  opponent  into  a  loyal  agent,  was  despatched, 
with  the  approval  of  the  Grisons,  to  occupy  the  Val- 
telline,  and  thus  to  prevent  assistance  being  sent  from 
Germany  to  the  Milanese.  If  these  grand  schemes  had 
all  been  attended  with  success,  the  power  of  Spain 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  peninsula  would  have  been 
almost  annihilated. 


vn  REVERSES  AND  TRIUMPHS  135 

But  the  most  active  and  far-seeing  diplomacy  could 
create  neither  a  trained  and  disciplined  army,  nor  com- 
petent generals  in  a  country  which  for  the  last  genera- 
tion had  been  engaged  in  nothing  but  short  outbursts 
of  civil  war,  varied  by  an  occasional  brief  expedition  to 
Italy.  The  numbers  of  the  French  forces,  amounting 
in  all  to  130,000  men,  excited  the  astonishment  of 
Europe,  where  no  equal  effort  had  been  made  during 
sixteen  years  of  incessant  warfare.  But  nothing  was 
gained  to  correspond  to  these  exhausting  preparations. 
The  campaign  in  the  Netherlands,  to  which  Richelieu 
attached  the  greatest  importance,  ended  in  complete 
failure.  The  expected  rising  never  took  place,  as  dis- 
content with  Spanish  rule  gave  way  to  patriotic  indigna- 
tion at  the  outrages  of  French  invaders.  The  arrival  of 
imperial  troops,  set  free  by  the  treaty  of  Prague,  enabled 
the  Spaniards  to  raise  the  siege  of  Louvain,  and 
Frederick  Henry  of  Orange,  who  commanded  the 
combined  French  and  Dutch  forces,  was  not  strong  or 
enterprising  enough  to  risk  a  battle  in  the  open  field. 
On  the  German  frontiers  the  French  succeeded  in 
defending  their  position  in  Elsass  and  Lorraine,  but 
their  aid  was  not  sufficient  to  enable  Bernhard  of  Saxe- 
Weimar  to  hold  his  own  on  the  Rhine.  By  the  end  of 
1635  Frankfort,  Mannheim,  Heidelberg,  and  Mainz 
had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Imperialists.  In  Italy, 
although  Rohan  succeeded  in  occupying  the  Valtelline, 
and  thus  cut  off  German  aid  from  Lombardy,  the 
attempted  invasion  of  the  Milanese  proved  a  fiasco. 
Victor  Amadeus  and  Crequi,  at  the  head  of  a  large 
force  of  Piedmontese  and  French,  wasted  the  whole 
summer  in  a  futile  siege  of  Valenza.  Meanwhile  the 


136  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

Spaniards  enjoyed  a  complete  ascendency  at  sea,-  which 
enabled  them  to  maintain  a  constant  intercourse  both 
with  the  Netherlands  and  the  Italian  peninsula.  It 
was  a  bitter  humiliation  for  France  when  a  Spanish 
fleet  occupied  and  garrisoned  the  two  little  islands  of 
Le"rins,  off  the  coast  of  Provence. 

Richelieu's  magnificent  schemes  of  conquest  were  for 
the  time  at  an  end,  and  the  cardinal  himself  is  not 
free  from  some  responsibility  for  his  failure.  His  past 
experience  had  taught  him  to  be  always  suspicious,  and 
he  could  not  trust  his  generals.  He  was  so  long  used 
to  command  himself,  and  so  confident  in  his  own  capacity, 
that  he  thought  his  orders  from  a  distance  must  be 
better  than  those  of  a  mistrusted  subordinate  on  the 
spot.  When  possible,  he  divided  the  command,  so  that 
differences  between  the  two  generals  might  secure  his 
own  supremacy.  But  the  chief  cause  of  failure  is  to  be 
found  in  the  character  of  the  French  soldiery.  In  the 
course  of  three  generations  of  civil  strife  they  had  lost 
every  military  virtue  except  courage.  They  could  fight 
in  face  of  the  enemy,  but  in  camp  they  were  disorderly, 
mutinous,  impatient  alike  of  hardship  and  of  control. 
Against  veterans  trained  in  the  school  of  Gustavus  and 
of  Tilly  such  troops  were  worse  than  useless.  But  for 
the  support  of  Bernhard  of  Saxe -Weimar  and  his  hardy 
mercenaries  the  campaign  of  1635  would  have  been 
still  more  disastrous. 

In  spite  of  the  check  he  had  received,  Eichelieu  de- 
termined to  continue  his  aggressive  policy  in  1636.  In 
Italy  Victor  Amadeus  and  Crequi  advanced  to  the 
Ticino,  where  they  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat  on  the 
Spanish  army.  But  the  duke  of  Savoy  was  on  bad 


vii  REVERSES  AND  TRIUMPHS  137 

terras  with  his  colleague,  and  prevented  any  attempt 
to  join  Rohan,  who  was  waiting  near  Lake  Como  for  a 
combined  advance  upon  Milan.  In  August  the  troops 
returned  to  winter  quarters.  Meanwhile  a  French 
army  had  invaded  Franche  donate"  and  laid  siege  to 
Dole.  But  the  population  was  better  treated,  and 
therefore  more  loyal  than  that  of  any  other  Spanish 
province,  and  Dole  was  still  untaken  when  the  unex- 
pected news  arrived  that  France  itself  was  exposed  to  a 
formidable  invasion.  Frederick  Henry  had  succeeded 
in  retaking  the  fortress  of  Schenk,  which  the  enemy  had 
captured  in  the  previous  year,  and  the  French  troops 
in  the  Netherlands  were  preparing  to  relieve  Liege, 
besieged  by  the  imperial  general  Piccolomini.  But  the 
arrival  of  the  Bavarian  commander,  John  of  Werth,  and 
of  a  considerable  Spanish  force,  under  the  Cardinal 
Infant  Leopold,  encouraged  the  enemy  to  attempt  a 
more  ambitious  enterprise.  Patching  up  terms  with 
the  Liegeois,  the  imperial  troops  marched  southwards, 
and  in  July  crossed  the  frontier  of  Picardy.  No 
preparations  had  been  made  for  resistance.  The 
border  fortresses  of  La  Chapelle  and  Le  Catelet  sur- 
rendered at  the  first  summons,  the  passage  of  the 
Somme  was  forced  with  ease,  and  the  enemy  advanced 
burning  and  ravaging  to  the  banks  of  the  Oise.  So 
great  was  the  terror  inspired  by  his  mounted  Croats 
that  the  name  of  John  of  Werth  served  French  mothers 
for  years  as  a  bogey  to  frighten  children  Avith. 

Paris  was  panic-stricken.  Louis  XIII.,  always 
gloomy,  was  more  reserved  than  ever.  Everybody 
seemed  to  throw  the  responsibility  for  danger  and 
disaster  upon  the  minister  who  had  declared  war. 


138  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

Richelieu  alone  preserved  his  courage  and  presence  of 
mind  in  a  crisis  that  would  have  daunted  a  lesser  man. 
In  spite  of  the  entreaties  and  warnings  of  his  friends, 
he  proceeded  almost  unattended  through  the  streets  to 
the  Hotel  de  Ville  to  call  upon  the  citizens  to  make 
sacrifices  for  the  safety  of  their  country.  The  effect  of 
his  undaunted  resolution  and  confidence  was  magical. 
Paris  hastened  to  respond  to  his  appeal  with  a  devotion 
like  that  which  was  shown  a  century  and  a  half  later 
in  the  revolutionary  wars.  The  municipality,  the  par- 
liament, the  Sorbonne,  and  the  trading  guilds  vied  with 
each  other  in  offering  grants  of  money,  and  volunteers 
hastened  to  enrol  their  names  on  the  list  which  was 
drawn  up  in  the  Hotel  de  Ville.  The  example  of  Paris 
was  followed  by  the  other  large  towns,  and  the 
Huguenots  were  as  eager  to  prove  their  patriotism  as 
the  Catholics.  Bichelieu  had  many  enemies,  but  for 
the  moment  men  thought  only  of  his  services  to  the 
country. 

The  danger  proved  less  than  it  had  at  first 
appeared.  The  invaders  succeeded  in  taking  Corbie, 
but  they  never  advanced  beyond  the  Oise.  The 
Dutch  were  threatening  the  Netherlands,  and  the 
Cardinal  Infant  feared  to  involve  his  troops  too  far  in 
the  interior  of  France.  By  the  time  that  the  new 
levies  were  ready  to  take  the  field,  John  of  Werth  was 
in  full  retreat  towards  the  frontier.  No  attempt  was 
made  to  harass  the  enemy,  and  the  French  army  con- 
tented itself  with  undertaking  the  siege  of  Corbie, 
which  was  forced  to  open  its  gates  in  November.  At 
the  same  time  an  attempted  invasion  of  Burgundy  by 
the  duke  of  Lorraine  was  successfully  repulsed.  France 


vn  REVERSES  AND  TRIUMPHS  139 

had    failed    to    make    conquests,    but    within    its    own 
frontiers  it  was  still  invincible. 

But  though  France  was  saved,  the  minister  was  still 
exposed  to  personal  danger.  The  Spaniards  had  striven 
to  revive  internal  disunion,  and  the  manifesto  of  the 
Cardinal  Infant  had  been  filled  with  denunciations  of 
Richelieu.  The  duke  of  Orleans  and  the  count  of 
Soissons,  instead  of  being  conciliated  by  their  appoint- 
ments to  command  the  army  of  defence,  thought  only 
of  the  opportunity  to  gratify  their  personal  ambition  or 
their  desire  for  vengeance.  Soissons  had  been  irritated 
by  the  refusal  of  the  command  in  Elsass,  entrusted  to 
the  cardinal  de  la  Valette,  and  deemed  himself  insulted 
by  the  proposal  of  a  marriage  with  Richelieu's  niece, 
Madame  de  Combalet.  The  two  princes,  laying  aside 
their  former  animosity,  formed  a  dangerous  conspiracy 
against  the  object  of  their  mutual  hatred.  Their 
schemes  went  so  far  as  to  project  the  assassination  of 
the  cardinal  at  Amiens,  but  Gaston's  courage  failed  him 
at  the  moment  when  he  should  have  given  the  concerted 
signal.  The  failure  of  the  Spanish  invasion  and  the 
recapture  of  Corbie  discouraged  the  conspirators,  and 
an  attempt  to  tamper  with  the  fidelity  of  the  troops 
proved  futile.  Dreading  discovery  and  arrest,  the  two 
princes  fled  from  the  army  in  November,  Gaston  to 
Blois  and  Soissons  to  Sedan.  Negotiations  proving 
futile,  the  king  and  cardinal  led  an  army  against  Blois 
in  January  1637.  Gaston  was  unprepared  for  resist- 
ance, and  was  allowed  to  make  peace  on  easy  terms. 
Soissons,  more  obstinate  or  more  distrustful,  held  out 
till  July,  when  he  also  made  his  submission,  but  refused 
to  return  to  court. 


140  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

Unfortunately  discontent  was  by  no  means  confined 
to  the  princes  and  great  nobles.  The  middle  and  lower 
classes  resented  the  heavy  taxation  which  was  rendered 
necessary  by  the  war.  Brilliant  successes  might  have 
kindled  a  spirit  of  patriotic  self-sacrifice,  but  these 
successes  were  still  to  be  won.  The  parliaments  made 
themselves  the  organs  of  local  dissatisfaction.  In 
Normandy  the  opposition  of  Eouen  to  the  financial 
edicts  of  1637  was  only  overcome  by  a  threatened 
advance  of  king  and  cardinal  at  the  head  of  an  army. 
In  Guienne  citizens  and  peasants  rose  in  armed  revolt 
against  the  tax-collectors.  But  the  monarchy,  as 
usual,  profited  by  class  divisions.  The  duke  of  la 
Valette,  one  of  Kichelieu's  most  active  opponents,  took 
command  of  the  royal  troops  and  put  down  the  rebels. 
To  suppress  local  independence  Richelieu  extended  the 
use  of  intendants  in  1637,  and  thus  forged  the  most 
powerful  link  in  the  chain  which  bound  France  in 
servitude  to  an  absolute  monarchy. 

While  the  cardinal  was  engaged  in  defeating  open 
opposition,  his  power  was  threatened  by  an  extra- 
ordinary court  intrigue,  in  which  religion  and  love 
were  curiously  intermingled.  Louis  XIII. ,  though 
constitutionally  chaste,  had  all  a  Bourbon's  delight  in 
feminine  society.  Alienated  from  his  wife  by  political 
and  personal  antipathy,  he  was  accustomed  to  cherish 
a  platonic  attachment  for  one  of  the  ladies  of  his  court. 
For  some  years  his  virtuous  affection  had  been  fixed 
upon  Mademoiselle  de  Hautefort,  the  recognised  beauty 
of  Parisian  society.  But  the  titular  mistress  was  a 
devoted  admirer  of  the  neglected  Anne  of  Austria,  and 
used  all  her  influence  to  inspire  the  king  with  distrust 


vii  REVERSES  AND  TRIUMPHS  141 

of  the  cardinal,  whom  she  regarded  as  the  chief  barrier 
between  the  royal  husband  and  wife.  Richelieu  and 
his  supporters  were  delighted  when,  in  1635,  Louis 
transferred  his  affections  to  Louise  de  la  Fayette,  a 
beautiful  and  pensive  brunette,  whose  personal  attrac- 
tions were  equalled  by  her  piety.  The  new  favQurite 
was  a  relative  of  Father  Joseph,  and  the  king's  devotion 
seemed  likely  to  strengthen  the  cardinal's  ascendency. 
But  Eichelieu's  energetic  and  almost  ruthless  policy 
had  little  fascination  for  women,  and  the  innocent 
Mademoiselle  de  la  Fayette  became  the  tool  of  a  hostile 
cabal.  Its  leader  was  a  Jesuit,  Pere  Caussin,  the  royal 
confessor,  who  shared  the  general  distrust  of  his  order 
towards  the  cardinal.  But  the  growing  affection  of 
the  king  excited  the  scruples  of  the  maid -of -honour, 
and  she  wished  to  escape  danger  by  entering  the 
cloister.  This  pious  resolution  was  applauded  and 
encouraged  by  Eichelieu  and  his  supporters.  On  the 
other  hand,  her  relatives  and  the  zealous  Caussin  strove 
to  persuade  her  that  she  could  remain  at  court  without 
risk  to  her  virtue.  Few  more  curious  incidents  are 
recorded  in  French  history  than  this  struggle  to  repress 
or  to  aid  the  monastic  inclinations  of  a  young  girl. 
At  last,  whether  frightened  by  royal  tenderness,  or  won 
over  by  the  advice  of  the  Dominican  agents  of  Richelieu, 
Mademoiselle  de  la  Fayette  entered  the  convent  of  the 
Visitation  in  the  rue  St.  Antoine  (May  19,  1637). 
But  the  battle  was  only  half  won.  The  king,  who 
applauded  while  he  deplored  the  resolution  of  his 
mistress,  continued  to  visit  her  at  her  convent,  and  her 
denunciations  of  the  cardinal  were  the  more  vigorous 
now  that  her  virtue  was  protected  by  her  vows  and 


142  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

the  convent  bars  through  which  the  conversation  was 
conducted.  The  influence  of  Pere  Caussin  over  the  king 
seemed  to  be  stronger  than  ever,  and  an  open  contest 
began  between  the  confessor  and  the  minister.  But  the 
ties  which  bound  Louis  XIII.  to  the  cardinal  were  too 
strong  to  be  broken  even  by  the  combined  weight  of 
priestly  and  feminine  influence.  In  December  1637 
Pere  Caussin  was  exiled  to  Rennes,  and  the  king 
ceased  his  visits  to  the  convent  of  the  Visitation. 

Meanwhile  the  war  continued  to  be  waged  in  1637, 
as  before,  with  varying  success.  The  death  of  Ferdinand 
II.  in  February  made  little  difference  to  a  struggle  of 
which  he  had  been  a  principal  author.  Although  the 
new  emperor,  Ferdinand  III.,  was  more  pacifically  dis- 
posed than  his  father,  he  was  forced  to  continue 
hostilities  by  the  refusal  of  France  and  Sweden  to 
recognise  an  election  in  which  the  archbishop  of  Trier, 
still  a  prisoner,  had  taken  no  part.  Eichelieu  made  his 
great  effort  in  this  year  in  the  Netherlands,  whither  he 
sent  his  friend,  the  cardinal  de  la  Valette,  to  co-operate 
with  Frederick  Henry.  But  the  militant  cardinal  did 
little  to  justify  the  confidence  of  his  patron.  His  only 
achievements  were  the  capture  of  two  places  in  Flanders, 
and  the  recovery  of  the  frontier  fortress  of  La  Chapelle, 
while  the  Prince  of  Orange,  more  careful  of  Dutch  than 
of  French  interests,  contented  himself  with  laying  siege 
to  Breda,  which  surrendered  in  October.  These  slight 
successes  were  more  than  counterbalanced  by  losses  in 
Germany  and  in  Italy.  In  Germany  the  Imperialists 
carried  all  before  them.  The  Swedes  were  driven  from 
Pomerania,  John  of  Werth  took  Ehrenbreitstein  and 
Hanau,  while  Bernhard  of  Saxe- Weimar,  who  had  over- 


\ni  REVERSES  AND  TRIUMPHS  143 

run  Tranche  Comte,  failed  in  his  attempt  to  relieve  the 
last  fortress,  so  that  the  French  lost  their  last  hold  on 
the  coveted  province  of  Elsass.  In  Italy  the  successive 
deaths  of  the  dukes  of  Savoy  and  Mantua  broke  up 
the  coalition  which  Richelieu  had  formed  against  the 
Hapsburgs,  and  the  duke  of  Parma  was  forced  by  the 
invasion  of  his  duchy  to  desert  the  French  alliance. 
Still  more  serious  was  the  expulsion  of  Rohan  from  the 
Grisons,  and  the  recovery  of  the  Valtelline  by  Spain. 
For  once,  sacrificing  religious  to  political  considerations, 
the  Spaniards  offered  the  Protestants  greater  conces- 
sions than  even  France  had  been  willing  to  give.  The 
Grisons  accepted  the  bribe,  and  undertook  to  rise  against 
the  French,  whom  they  had  welcomed  as  deliverers. 
Rohan  found  his  position  untenable  without  native 
support,  and  was  forced  to  evacuate  the  territory  of  the 
Leagues.  The  Hapsburgs  thus  recovered  the  interrupted 
communication  between  Tyrol  and  Lombardy.  The  only 
counterpoise  to  these  disasters  was  an  event  which 
must  have  been  peculiarly  gratifying  to  Richelieu.  For 
ten  years  he  had  laboured  to  create  a  French  navy,  and 
in  1636  he  had  been  rewarded  by  the  appearance  in  the 
Mediterranean  of  a  fleet  of  more  than  forty  vessels. 
Nothing  was  achieved  in  that  year,  owing  to  want  of 
agreement  between  the  joint  commanders,  count 
Harcourt  and  the  archbishop  of  Bordeaux.  But  in 
1637  the  fleet  sailed  from  the  harbours  of  Provence,  and 
after  threatening  a  descent  upon  Sardinia,  returned  to 
recover  the  two  islands  of  Lerins,  which  had  been 
occupied  for  two  years  by  the  Spaniards.  It  was  a 
small  triumph  in  itself,  but  it  was  a  relief  to  the 
national  pride,  and  it  presaged  a  great  change  in  the 


144  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

balance  of  maritime  power  in  Southern  Europe.  A 
powerful  French  navy  could  inflict  more  damage  upon 
the  scattered  empire  of  Spain  than  a  succession  of  the 
most  brilliant  victories  by  land. 

The  Thirty  Years'  War  had  developed,  mainly  under 
.Richelieu's  guidance,  into  a  duel  between  the  houses  of 
Hapsburg  and  Bourbon,  and  it  was  evident  that  the 
struggle  would  be  long  and  desperate.  But  Richelieu 
showed  no  signs  of  fli-nching  from  the  task  which  he 
had  undertaken.  He  was  resolute  not  to  make  peace 
until  he  had  obtained  substantial  advantages  for  his 
country,  and  until  he  had  broken  the  power  of  her 
rival.  France,  in  spite  of  financial  mismanagement, 
was  the  least  exhausted  of  the  combatants.  The 
campaign  of  1637,  although  it  had  not  been  dazzlingly 
successful,  had  at  any  rate  opened  the  prospect  of  better 
things.  It  was  with  some  confidence  that  the  cardinal 
set  to  work  to  renew  his  alliance  with  the  Swedes  and 
Beruhard  of  Saxe- Weimar,  while  he  made  strenuous 
preparations  for  simultaneous  hostilities  in  Elsass,  the 
Netherlands,  Italy,  the  Spanish  frontier,  and  on  the  sea. 
Of  so  many  enterprises,  it  was  impossible  that  all 
should  be  equally  successful,  but  it  may  be  safely 
affirmed  that  none  was  without  important  and  lasting 
results. 

With  the  year  1638  begins  the  series  of  triumphs 
which  have  given  to  Richelieu  his  almost  unequalled 
reputation  as  a  statesman.  If  he  had  died  at  the  end 
of  1637  he  would  be  remembered  as  a  great  home 
minister,  who  had  crushed  the  princes,  rendered  the 
Huguenots  powerless,  and  supplied  the  despotic  mon- 
archy with  an  efficient  administrative  machinery.  It 


viz  REVERSES  AND  TRIUMPHS  145 

was  during  the  next  five  years  that  he  earned  un- 
dying fame  as  the  man  who  crushed  the  power  of 
the  house  of  Hapsburg,  secured  the  ascendency  of  the 
house  of  Bourbon,  and  gave  an  impulse  to  the  history 
of  Europe  which  was  felt  for  more  than  a  century  after 
his  death.  And  he  has  the  further  claim  to  admiration 
that  for  all  his  achievements  both  at  home  and  abroad 
he  had  consciously  and  intentionally  laboured.  Hitherto 
we  have  been  tracing  the  period  of  preparation  and  of 
partial  failure.  Space  allows  only  a .  brief  effort  to 
point  out  the  direction  and  extent  of  his  triumphs. 

The  first,  and  perhaps  in  French  eyes  the  greatest  of 
Richelieu's  successes  was  the  conquest  of  Elsass.  The 
hero  of  this  achievement  was  Bernhard  of  Saxe  Weimar, 
a  descendant  of  the  Albertine  line  of  Saxony,  which 
had  championed  the  Protestant  cause  against  Charles  V., 
and  had  paid  for  its  religious  zeal  by  the  confiscation  of 
its  territories.  Bernhard's  great  ambition  was  to  revive 
the  glories  of  his  family  by  the  acquisition  of  a  German 
principality.  It  was  with  this  object  that  he  had  joined 
the  Swedes,  and  after  the  death  of  Gustavus  Adolphus 
he  had  almost  succeeded  in  erecting  a  principality  in 
Franconia.  But  the  battle  of  Nordlingen  had  destroyed 
his  hopes,  and  had  forced  him  to  accept  the  French  alliance 
as  the  only  means  of  making  head  against  the  emperor. 
Richelieu  had  hastened  to  secure  so  valuable  an  ally 
by  promising  him  French  aid  in  acquiring  the  land- 
graviate  of  Elsass,  the  oldest  possession  of  the  Austrian 
Hapsburgs.  For  three  years,  owing  mainly  to  the 
absorption  of  France  in  the  Netherlands,  Bernhard  had 
made  little  advance  towards  the  goal  of  his  endeavours. 
But  in  1638  Richelieu  decided  to  make  Elsass  the 

L 


146  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

principal  scene  of  warfare.  He  paid  up  the  arrears  of 
the  promised  subsidies,  and  promised  to  make  no  treaty 
which  did  not  secure  the  interests  of  Bernhard  and  his 
army.  Thus  encouraged,  Bernhard  hastened  to  take 
the  field  before  the  winter  was  over.  He  had  already 
captured  three  towns  in  the  Breisgau,  and  was  besieging 
Rheinfelden  when  the  Imperialists  attacked  his  camp,  and 
after  an  obstinate  struggle  forced  him  to  retreat.  Nothing 
daunted  by  this  check,  he  reorganised  his  forces,  and 
three  days  later  fell  upon  the  enemy  while  they  were 
still  celebrating  their  victory.  The  surprise  was  com- 
pletely successful.  The  Imperialist  generals,  among 
whom  was  the  famous  John  of  Werth,  fell,  with  the 
standards  and  artillery,  into  Bernhard's  hands.  Rhein- 
felden at  once  surrendered,  and  in  a  few  weeks  the 
whole  of  the  Breisgau  was  reduced  to  submission. 

Bernhard  now  crossed  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine 
and  laid  siege  to  Breisach,  the  famous  fortress  which 
commanded  Elsass,  and  enabled  its  possessor  to  control 
the  line  of  communication  between  Italy  and  the  Nether- 
lands. The  importance  of  Breisach  was  fully  realised 
by  the  Spaniards,  and  numberless  efforts  were  made  to 
relieve  the  garrison.  But  Bernhard  succeeded  in  re- 
pulsing all  attacks,  and  on  December  19  Breisach  was 
forced  to  open  its  gates.  The  conquest  of  Elsass  was 
assured.  But  the  advantage  to  France  was  by  no  means 
so  immediate  or  obvious.  Bernhard  was  fighting  his 
own  battle  and  that  of  Protestantism,  and  had  no  inten- 
tion of  being  used  as  a  catspaw  by  his  ally.  To  the 
demand  that  he  should  recognise  French  suzerainty  over 
Elsass,  he  replied  that  he  would  not  be  the  first  to  par- 
tition the  German  Empire.  But  the  erection  of  an 


vii  REVERSES  AND  TRIUMPHS  147 

independent  and  powerful  principality  on  the  French 
frontier  was  by  no  means  in  accordance  with  Richelieu's 
wishes.  Bernhard  seemed  likely  to  prove  as  inconvenient 
and  unmanageable  as  Gustavus  Adolphus.  But  here 
fortune  came  to  the  assistance  of  France,  as  it  had  done  in 
1632.  Bernhard  was  eager  to  secure  his  new  principality 
by  forcing  the  emperor  to  make  peace.  To  effect  this 
he  determined  in  1639  to  march  westward  in  order  to 
support  the  Swedish  general,  Baner,  who  was  invading 
Bohemia.  But  his  health  was  already  broken  by 
anxieties  and  fatigue,  and  he  had  hardly  crossed  the 
Rhine  when  he  died,  on  July  15,  at  the  age  of  thirty-six. 
By  his  will  he  left  his  army  to  the  joint  command  of 
his  generals,  and  his  territories  to  whichever  of  his 
brothers  would  accept  them.  Bernhard's  death  was 
Richelieu's  opportunity.  French  gold  purchased  the 
allegiance  of  the  German  officers  and  troops,  who  accepted 
a  French  commander  and  admitted  a  French  garrison  into 
Breisach.  France  had  secured  a  hold  upon  Elsass  which 
nothing  but  a  series  of  signal  and  unexpected  reverses 
could  compel  her  to  relax.  At  the  same  time  a  fatal 
blow  was  dealt  at  the  cohesion  of  the  Spanish  Empire. 
In  Italy  the  French  triumphs,  though  rather  later, 
were  hardly  less  decisive,  and  they  were  the  more 
gratifying  because  they  were  directly  due  to  the  courage 
and  generalship  of  Frenchmen.  The  death  of  Victor 
Amadeus  of  Savoy  had  left  the  regency  for  his  infant  son 
in  the  hands  of  his  widow,  Christine.  She  was  a  sister 
of  Louis  XIII. ,  but  she  was  anxious  to  adopt  a  neutral 
attitude  in  order  to  secure  the  interests  of  her  children. 
She  was,  however,  forced  into  a  French  alliance  by 
the  diplomacy  of  Richelieu,  and  by  the  open  hostility  of 


148  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

the  Spaniards,  who  found  allies  in  her  brothers-in-law, 
Thomas  and  Maurice.  Armed  with  an  imperial  edict 
annulling  the  will  of  the  late  duke,  and  supported  by 
Lleganes,  the  Spanish  governor  of  Milan,  the  two  princes 
headed  a  revolt  in  Piedmont  against  Christine.  Eichelieu 
did  not  hesitate  to  take  advantage  of  the  duchess's 
difficulties  to  secure  the  interests  of  France,  and  de- 
manded the  admission  of  French  garrisons  into  the 
capital  and  chief  fortresses  of  Piedmont.  But  Christine, 
whose  public  conduct  was  more  creditable  than  her 
private  life,  refused  to  sacrifice  the  independence  of  her 
son's  territories  even  to  her  own  brother.  She  would 
only  consent  to  the  temporary  occupation  of  three  minor 
fortresses.  For  the  moment  she  suffered  for  her  patriot- 
ism: in  the  autumn  of  1639  both  Turin  and  Nice  fell 
into  the  hands  of  her  opponents,  and  she  was  formally 
deposed  from  the  regency. 

Christine  now  fled  from  Piedmont  to  Savoy,  whither 
she  had  already  sent  the  young  duke  for  safety.  At 
Grenoble  she  had  a  personal  interview  with  Louis  XIII. 
and  the  cardinal,  and  again  discovered  that  disinterested 
assistance  was  the  last  thing  she  could  expect  from  the 
country  of  her  birth.  Eichelieu  demanded  that  the 
young  duke  should  be  sent  to  Paris  to  be  educated,  and 
that  the  whole  of  Savoy,  together  with  the  places  in 
Piedmont  which  still  held  out,  should  be  handed  over 
to  French  occupation.  But  the  duchess,  hard  pressed 
as  she  was,  refused  to  entrust  her  son  to  foreign  custody, 
and  insisted  upon  reserving  the  fortress  of  Montmelian 
as  his  residence.  Eichelieu  did  not  conceal  his  irritation 
at  what  he  called  Christine's  obstinacy,  but  he  could  not 
allow  the  Spaniards  to  retain  their  hold  on  Piedmont. 


vii  REVERSES  AND  TRIUMPHS  149 

The  cardinal  de  la  Valette,  who  had  been  sent  to 
command  in  Italy,  had  died  there  in  September  1639. 
He  was  the  only  son  of  Epernon,  who  was  loyal  to 
Richelieu,  and  he  owed  his  military  employments  more 
to  the  minister's  gratitude  than  to  his  own  capacity. 
His  place  was  taken  by  Count  Harcourt,  the  first  of  the 
distinguished  French  generals  who  obtained  their  train- 
ing in  this  war.  In  1640  Harcourt  commenced  the 
campaign  which  laid  the  foundation  for  the  military 
prestige  of  France.  By  a  bold  march  he  forced  Lleganes, 
though  at  the  head  of  a  vastly  superior  force,  to  raise 
the  siege  of  Casale.  Thence  the  French  returned  to 
undertake  the  siege  of  Turin.  Meanwhile  Lleganes 
collected  all  the  Spanish  troops  and  advanced  to  the  aid 
of  Prince  Thomas,  who  commanded  the  defending  garri- 
son. Harcourt  found  himself  at  once  besieger  and 
besieged,  and  his  army  was  threatened  with  disease  and 
starvation.  Fortunately  the  enemy,  instead  of  harassing 
the  French  and  avoiding  a  direct  conflict,  tried  to  crush 
them  by  a  combined  attack.  After  a  desperate  struggle 
under  the  walls  of  Turin,  Harcourt  succeeded  not  only 
in  forcing  the  garrison  back  to  the  city,  but  also  in 
driving  the  Spaniards  from  their  position.  After  two 
months  of  blockade  the  garrison  could  hold  out  no  longer. 
A  last  effort  on  the  part  of  Lleganes  to  break  through 
the  besiegers  was  repulsed,  and  on  September  22 
Turin  opened  its  gates.  "  I  would  rather  be  Count 
Harcourt  than  emperor ! "  said  the  captive  John  of 
Werth,  when  he  heard  the  news  of  this  achievement. 
In  November  Christine  returned  to  her  capital  amidst  the 
applause  of  the  citizens.  By  the  end  of  another  year  the 
Spaniards  had  been  completely  driven  from  Piedmont. 


150  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

For  the  victories  in  Italy  Richelieu  was  indebted  to 
the  capacity  of  subordinates,  whom  he  had  selected  and 
inspired,  but  whose  actions  he  could  not  direct.  For 
the  naval  triumphs  of  France  he  may  claim  far  more 
personal  glory,  as  he  was  the  virtual  creator  of  the 
French  navy.  Hitherto  the  only  achievement  of  the 
fleet  had  been  the  capture  of  the  Lerins,  and  there  had 
been  no  attempt  to  meet  the  Spaniards  in  open  battle. 
But  the  year  1638  witnessed  the  first  serious  blow  to 
that  maritime  ascendency  without  which  Spain  could 
hardly  defend  its  own  territories,  much  less  prove  for- 
midable to  foreign  states.  On  August  22  Archbishop 
Sourdis  attacked  and  almost  destroyed  a  Spanish  squad- 
ron off  Guetaria  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay.  Only  a  week 
later  fifteen  French  vessels  under  Pont-Courlay,  a 
nephew  of  Eichelieu,  assaulted  an  equal  number  of 
Spanish  ships  near  Genoa.  The  struggle  was  long 
and  exhausting,  but  the  superior  artillery  of  the 
French  gave  them  an  advantage  at  close  quarters, 
and  their  victory  was  crowned  by  the  capture  of  the 
Spanish  admiral.  This  success,  though  smaller,  was 
even  more  significant  than  that  of  Guetaria,  because 
the  Spanish  power  had,  since  Lepanto,  no  rival  on  the 
Mediterranean,  whereas  in  the  northern  seas  it  was  already 
threatened  by  the  growing  navy  of  the  United  Provinces. 
In  1639  events  at  sea  were  still  more  decisive.  A  large 
Spanish  fleet  succeeded  in  evading  the  watchfulness  of 
Sourdis,  and  reached  the  English  Channel.  There  it 
met  the  Dutch  under  Martin  Tromp,  and  after  fighting 
for  two  days  the  Spaniards  sought  the  Downs  and  the 
shelter  of  the  English  coast.  While  Charles  I.  was 
higgling  with  Spain  about  the  price  to  be  paid  for 


vii  REVERSES  AND  TRIUMPHS  151 

his  protection,  Richelieu  succeeded  in  conveying  to 
Tromp  an  intimation  to  disregard  the  threats  of 
England.  Nothing  loth,  the  Dutch  admiral  sailed 
against  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  almost  completely  de- 
stroyed it  (October  11).  Barely  ten  of  the  great 
galleons  succeeded  in  reaching  Dunkirk  in  safety. 
Spain  had  experienced  no  such  crushing  disaster  since 
the  loss  of  the  great  Armada.  With  its  fleet  shattered 
and  Breisach  in  the  hands  of  the  French,  it  was  almost 
impossible  to  send  assistance  to  the  Netherlands. 

Since  the  treaty  of  1629  Richelieu  had  little  to  fear 
from  the  hostility  of  England.  Charles  I.  seemed 
determined  to  maintain  an  inexpensive  if  inglorious 
neutrality,  and  he  was  alienated  from  Spain  by  the 
steady  refusal  to  do  anything  for  the  Palatine  family. 
But  the  growing  naval  power  of  France  excited  mis- 
givings in  England.  Charles  was  indignant  at  the 
insult  to  the  English  flag  in  the  Downs,  and  Henrietta 
Maria  was  not  disinclined  to  espouse  the  cause  of  her 
mother  against  the  minister  who  condemned  her  to 
life-long  exile.  But  Richelieu  had  weapons  ready  to 
hand  against  the  English  king,  and  he  did  not  scruple 
to  use  them.  French  agents  and  French  money  had 
no  small  part  in  stirring  up  that  Scotch  rebellion  which 
dealt  the  first  fatal  blow  to  Stuart  despotism.  And 
when  the  expenses  and  failures  of  the  war  forced  Charles 
at  last  to  summon  the  Long  Parliament,  Richelieu  did 
not  hesitate  to  establish  relations  with  the  opposition 
party,  which  had  less  cause  than  the  king  to  favour 
Spain.  No  doubt  the  Great  Rebellion  would  have 
arisen  if  Richelieu  had  never  lived,  but  he  had  some 
share  in  moulding  the  actual  events  which  led  to  it.  It 


152  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

was  even  reported  and  believed  that  when  Charles 
endeavoured  to  seize  the  five  members,  the  warning 
which  enabled  them  to  escape  came  from  the  French 
ambassador.  The  minister  who  did  more  than  any 
other  man  to  establish  absolutism  in  France  may  claim 
to  have  assisted — from  purely  selfish  motives — in  the 
vindication  of  liberty  in  England. 

The  same  keen  insight  which  enabled  Richelieu  to 
appreciate  and  make  use  of  the  elements  of  discontent 
and  opposition  in  England  and  Scotland  was  equally 
apparent  in  his  relations  with  the  Spanish  peninsula. 
Spain,  unlike  France,  was  never  a  united  state.  The 
Hapsburgs  were  primarily  kings  of  Castile,  and  they 
ruled  the  other  parts  of  the  peninsula  as  dependent 
provinces,  no  better  off  than  Naples  or  Milan.  This 
policy  was  not  likely  to  conciliate  a  population  in  which 
local  prejudices  and  traditions  were  always  stronger 
than  central  interests.  The  two  extremes  of  the 
peninsula,  Portugal  and  Catalonia,  were  especially 
alienated  by  a  government  which  trampled  upon  their 
pride  and  their  aspirations  to  independence.  Olivares, 
the  all-powerful  minister  of  Philip  IV.,  saw  the  weak- 
ness of  Spain,  but  could  not  devise  the  proper  remedy. 
He  attributed  the  superiority  of  France,  quite  rightly, 
to  its  greater  unity  and  centralisation,  and  thought  to 
exalt  his  own  country  by  imitating  the  government  of 
his  rival.  But  it  was  not  easy  to  make  the  bonds  more 
tolerable  merely  by  tightening  them.  The  only  result 
of  his  premature  experiment  was  to  provoke  a  double 
rebellion,  which  France  was  quite  ready  to  ferment  and 
to  use  for  its  own  advantage. 

The  local  militia  of  Catalonia  had  loyally  defended 


vn  REVERSES  AND  TRIUMPHS  153 

the  little  province  of  Koussillon  against  French  invasion 
in  1639.  But  the  people  resented  the  outrages  of  the 
Castilian  troops,  who  were  quartered  upon  them  during 
the  winter.  Early  in  1640  Olivares  issued  an  edict 
ordering  the  enrolment  of  all  men  capable  of  bearing 
arms  to  serve  wherever  they  should  be  sent.  This  was 
contrary  to  the  traditional  privileges  of  the  provinces,  and 
excited  a  general  revolt.  As  the  government  of  Madrid 
would  make  no  concessions,  the  rebels  turned  for  assist- 
ance to  France.  Richelieu  had  no  scruples  about  the 
legitimacy  of  a  revolt  which  served  his  plans,  and 
promised  to  send  officers  and  8000  men  to  aid  the 
Catalans.  Nor  was  a  mere  diversion  of  the  enemy's 
attention  the  only  result  at  which  he  aimed.  In 
January  1641  a  treaty  was  arranged  by  which  the 
Catalans  were  to  become  not  only  the  allies  but  the 
subjects  of  France,  on  condition  that  their  liberties 
should  be  respected.  The  Pyrenees  had  never  been  a 
boundary /and  for  centuries  Spanish  rule  had  extended 
north  of  the  mountain  range.  Now  France  threatened 
to  advance  to  the  Ebro,  once  the  limit  of  the  power  of 
Charles  the  Great. 

The  example  of  Catalonia  was  promptly  followed  by 
Portugal,  which  had  been  annexed  by  Philip  II.  in  1580> 
but  had  never  acquiesced  in  the  rule  of  its  conquerors. 
From  the  first  declaration  of  war  Richelieu  had  reckoned 
upon  Portuguese  assistance,  and  his  agents  had  been 
busy  in  encouraging  and  stirring  up  discontent.  Prob- 
ably the  revolt  would  have  begun  sooner  but  for  the 
moderation  or  timidity  of  the  duke  of  Braganza,  the 
largest  landholder  in  Portugal  and  the  representative  of 
the  old  royal  line.  But  in  1640  circumstances  were 


154  RICHELIEU  CHAI-. 

too  favourable  to  be  neglected.  The  nobles  refused  to 
obey  the  order  of  Olivares  to  march  against  Catalonia, 
and  could  only  avoid  the  penalty  of  disobedience  by 
rebellion.  The  scruples  of  the  duke  of  Braganza  were 
overcome  by  French  representations,  and  in  December 
he  was  proclaimed  king  as  John  IV.  Never  was  a 
revolution  accomplished  with  greater  ease  or  unanimity. 
The  first  act  of  the  new  king  was  to  conclude  a  treaty 
with  France,  which  promised  to  aid  him  against  Spain, 
while  he  pledged  himself  to  conclude  no  treaty  without 
French  approval 

In  the  Netherlands  events  were  not  so  rapid  or 
decisive  as  elsewhere;  but  here  also  the  year  1640 
witnessed  an  important  triumph  for  France.  In  June 
the  French  army  laid  siege  to  Arras,  the  strongly-forti- 
fied capital  of  the  border  province  of  Artois.  Artois 
was  an  ancient  fief  of  France,  but  had  been  freed  from 
vassalage  by  Charles  V.  The  Cardinal  Infant  and  the 
duke  of  Lorraine  tried  to  harass  the  besiegers  by 
occupying  the  adjacent  country  and  cutting  off  sup- 
plies. Richelieu  himself  went  to  Amiens  to  superin- 
tend the  sending  of  reinforcements  and  provisions  to 
Arras.  A  regular  army  was  formed  to  conduct  the 
convoy.  Before  it  could  arrive  the  Spaniards  made  a 
desperate  attack  upon  the  French  camp,  but  were 
repulsed.  This  failure  was  decisive.  On  August  9  the 
town  of  Arras  was  surrendered,  and  the  province  of 
Artois  was  declared  to  be  reunited  to  the  French 
crown.  It  was  a  conquest  which  France  was  not  likely 
to  relinquish. 

The  aspect  of  affairs  had  undergone  a  startling 
change  since  1636.  In  that  year  the  Spaniards  had 


vii  REVERSES  AND  TRIUMPHS  155 

been  victors  on  French  soil,  and  their  advance  had 
excited  a  panic  in  the  French  capital.  In  1640  France 
was  not  only  secure  against  invasion,  but  its  frontier 
had  been  advanced  in  the  east,  in  the  north,  and  in  the 
south,  and  its  great  rival,  Spain,  was  threatened  with 
imminent  dissolution.  The  connection  with  the  Nether- 
lands was  already  destroyed,  and  the  French  fleet  in  the 
Mediterranean  made  communication  with  Italy  difficult 
and  dangerous.  In  the  peninsula  itself  two  provinces 
were  in  open  revolt,  and  one  of  them  seemed  likely  to 
become  a  part  of  France.  The  man  who,  in  five  years, 
had  produced  such  marvellous  results  was  Richelieu. 

While  the  cardinal's  foreign  policy  had  been  at- 
tended with  such  gratifying  success,  an  event  had 
occurred  at  home  which  he  regarded  with  even  greater 
satisfaction.  The  essential  weakness  of  Eichelieu's 
position  was  the  fact  that  Louis  XIII.  was  childless, 
and  that  the  heir  to  the  throne  was  his  inveterate 
opponent,  the  feeble  and  vicious  Gaston  of  Orleans. 
But  on  September  5,  1638,  after  twenty-three  years  of 
married  life,  Anne  of  Austria  rendered  her  first  service 
to  the  minister  whom  she  detested  by  giving  birth  to  a 
dauphin,  afterwards  Louis  XIV.  Richelieu  presented 
a  diamond  rose  to  the  messenger  who  brought  him  the 
welcome  news,  and  all  France  shared  in  his  exultation. 
In  1640  the  succession  was  still  further  secured  by  the 
birth  of  a  second  son,  the  ancestor  of  the  house  of 
Orleans. 

One  misfortune  clouded  the  felicity  of  the  grand 
period  of  Richelieu's  career.  In  December  1638,  just 
after  the  news  of  the  capture  of  Breisach,  he  lost  Father 
Joseph,  "  his  prop  and  consolation,"  as  he  called  him  in 


156  RICHELIEU  CHAP,  vn 

the  first  fervour  of  his  grief.  Richelieu's  detractors 
have  not  hesitated  to  make  the  most  of  the  obscurity 
which  covers  the  relations  between  these  two  men. 
They  have  contended  that  Father  Joseph  was  the  brain 
and  Richelieu  the  arm;  that  the  red  cardinal  was  only 
the  marionette  who  danced  before  the  public,  while  the 
grey  cardinal  pulled  the  strings.  To  such  assertions 
or  innuendoes  no  answer  is  possible  except  that  there 
is  no  evidence  for  it,  and  against  it  we  have  not  only 
antecedent  improbability,  but  the  fact  that  Eichelieu's 
policy  and  character  show  no  signs  of  vacillation  or 
weakness  after  the  death  of  his  friend.  The  only 
reasonable  conclusion  is  that  the  Capuchin  monk  was 
the  most  able  and  perhaps  the  most  trusted  of  the  few 
confidential  agents  whom  Richelieu  collected  round 
him,  but  that  there  is  no  ground  for  believing  that  he 
was  more  than  a  familiar  adviser  whose  counsel  was 
always  valued,  but  not  always  adopted. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

DOMESTIC    GOVERNMENT 

Richelieu's  influence  almost  as  great  in  France  as  abroad — The  aims 
of  his  domestic  policy — Treatment  of  the  Huguenots — Measures 
against  the  nobles  :  the  destruction  of  fortresses  ;  edict  against 
duelling ;  appointment  of  intendants  —  Relations  with  the 
Parliament  of  Paris — Hostility  to  the  provincial  estates  — 
Organisation  of  the  Conseil  du  Roy — The  Conseil  d'&at — 
Centralisation  inevitable — Merits  of  Richelieu's  government : 
military  and  naval  organisation  ;  patronage  of  commerce  and 
colonisation  —  Defects  :  neglect  of  manufactures  and  agri- 
culture ;  financial  maladministration — Attempts  to  conciliate 
public  opinion — Meetings  of  notables — Patronage  of  literature 
and  foundation  of  the  Academy — Origin  of  the  Gazette  de  la 
France. 

THE  foremost  statesmen  of  history  may  be  roughly 
divided  into  two  chief  classes.  Some  are  great  diplom- 
atists, endowed  with  a  natural  gift  for  understanding 
and  influencing  the  relations  between  the  great  states 
of  their  time,  and  they  employ  this  gift  to  such  purpose 
as  to  secure  the  prestige  and  the  material  advancement 
of  their  own  country,  and  thereby  profoundly  influence 
the  general  history  of  the  world.  Others  concentrate 
their  attention  mainly  upon  domestic  problems  :  either 
upon  economic  questions,  such  as  the  development  of 
trade,  or  manufactures,  or  colonisation ;  or  upon  more 


158  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

purely  political  questions,  such  as  the  relations  of  classes 
to  each  other  or  to  the  crown,  the  extension  or  limita- 
tion of  local  independence,  the  widening  or  narrowing 
of  the  basis  of  government.  It  is  one  of  Richelieu's 
claims  to  exceptional  distinction  that  he  belongs  to  both 
these  classes.  For  good  or  for  evil,  he  left  an  inefface- 
able mark  both  upon  the  general  history  of  Europe  and 
upon  the  internal  development  of  France.  It  may  be 
contended  that  he  was  more  successful  as  a  diplomatist 
than  as  a  ruler  of  France,  that  he  was  too  much  absorbed 
in  foreign  politics  to  give  sufficient  attention  to  the 
solution  of  domestic  problems ;  but  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  his  influence  was  equally  great  in  both 
departments  of  government. 

The  aims  of  Richelieu's  domestic  policy  are  extremely 
simple,  and  they  have  been  described  by  himself  with 
equal  point  and  clearness  in  the  "  brief  narration  of  the 
great  actions  of  the  king,"  which  he  drew  up  towards 
the  close  of  his  ministry.  "  When  your  Majesty  resolv.ed 
to  admit  me  to  his  council  and  to  a  share  in  his  confid- 
ence, I  can  say  with  truth  that  the  Huguenots  divided 
the  State  with  the  monarchy,  that  the  nobles  behaved 
as  if  they  were  not  subjects,  and  that  the  chief  governors 
of  provinces  acted  as  if  they  had  been  independent 
sovereigns.  ...  I  then  undertook  to  employ  all  my 
energy  and  all  the  authority  that  you  were  pleased  to 
.  give  me  to  ruin  the  Huguenot  faction,  to  humble  the 
pride  of  the  nobles,  to  reduce  all  your  subjects  to  their 
duty,  and  to  exalt  your  name  to  its  proper  position 
among  foreign  nations."  Hostile  critics  have  contended 
that  the  dangers  from  the  Huguenots  and  the  nobles 
were  less  than  Richelieu  would  have  us  believe,  but  no 


vin  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  159 

one  has  denied  that  he  made  it  his  first  object  to  estab- 
lish the  unity  of  France,  that  he  conceived  a  strong 
monarchy  to  be  the  only  basis  of  that  unity,  and  that 
he  set  himself  resolutely  to  remove  or  destroy  all 
obstacles  to  the  direct  and  efficient  exercise  of  the 
central  power. 

Eichelieu's  treatment  of  the  Huguenots  has  been  al- 
ready sufficiently  described.  He  deprived  them  of  their 
exceptional  privileges  and  securities,  reduced  them  to 
political  impotence,  but  left  them  in  the  enjoyment  of  re- 
ligious liberty.  The  result  was  that  many  of  the  nobles, 
who  had  espoused  the  reformed  doctrines  mainly  as  a 
means  of  recovering  independence,  returned  to  orthodoxy 
in  the  hope  of  gaining  court  favour.  An  orderly  and 
governing  mind  could  hardly  fail  to  appreciate  the  value 
of  uniformity  of  belief  and  worship  as  a  bulwark  of 
national  unity,  and  there  were  not  wanting  advisers  to 
urge  upon  Richelieu  that  a  little  politic  pressure  might 
result  in  the  extinction  of  a  sect  with  which  he  had 
scant  reason  to  sympathise.  But  the  cardinal  steadily 
refused  to  risk  the  undoing  of  the  work  he  had  accom- 
plished and  to  revive  religious  discord  by  persecution. 
His  complaint  against  the  Huguenots  had  been  that 
they  were  Protestants  first  and  Frenchmen  afterwards  ; 
if  they  would  only  consent  to  be  Frenchmen  in  the  first 
place,  and  to  regard  patriotic  devotion  as  their  primary 
duty,  he  had  no  desire  to  alienate  them  once  more  from 
the  state  by  attempting  to  enforce  religious  conformity. 
His  moderation  was  rewarded  with  complete  success. 
The  Huguenots  showed  their  gratitude  by  becoming  in 
the  next  generation  not  only  the  most  industrious  and 
thrifty,  but  also  the  most  loyal  subjects  of  the  crown. 


160  RICHELIEU  CUAP. 

The  list  of  great  commanders  whose  ability  turned  the 
scale  in  the  struggle  between  France  and  Spain  would 
be  sadly  diminished,  both  in  numbers  and  in  brilliance, 
if  it  had  not  included  such  famous  Huguenots  as 
Gassion,  de  la  Force,  de  Rohan,  Duquesne,  and  Turenne. 

The  Vicomte  d'Avenel,  in  his  great  work  on 
Richelieu  et  la  Monarchic  Absolue,  has  endeavoured  to 
defend  the  French  nobles  from  the  charges  of  factious 
disloyalty  which  constitute  the  sole  justification  of 
Richelieu's  harsh  treatment  of  their  order.  But  his 
special  pleading,  learned  and  ingenious  as  it  is,  breaks 
down  before  the  bare  facts  of  history  during  the  religious 
wars,  the  regency  of  Mary  de  Medici,  and  the  Fronde. 
It  is  impossible  for  any  unprejudiced  reader  of  those 
periods  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  as  a  class  the 
nobles  were  the  most  dangerous  and  useless  part  of  the 
population.  Their  pretensions  to  lawless  independence 
were  equally  inconsistent  with  the  efficiency  of  the 
central  government  and  with  the  prosperity  of  the 
people.  They  had  ceased  to  perform  most  of  the 
duties  which  had  devolved  upon  them  in  the  days  of  the 
feudal  system,  yet  they  retained  all  the  privileges  and 
exemptions  which  they  had  gained  in  consideration  of 
their  discharge  of  these  duties.  The  relations  of  the 
chief  nobles  with  Gaston  of  Orleans  and  the  queen- 
mother,  together  with  the  fact  that  the  foreign  enemies 
of  France  openly  encouraged  and  exulted  in  these 
divisions,  would  have  justified  Richelieu's  attitude  on 
the  simple  ground  of  self-defence,  even  if  it  were  im- 
possible to  find  any  higher  motive  for  his  actions. 

The  power  of  the  French  nobles  rested  mainly  upon 
a  triple  basis :  (1)  their  strongly-fortified  castles,  each 


vin  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  161 

of  which  required  a  separate  siege  for  its  reduction ; 
(2)  their  contempt  for  ordinary  jurisdiction,  and  their 
claim  to  settle  their  own  disputes  by  what  had  once 
been  their  recognised  right — private  war ;  (3)  the  power 
which  they  exercised  in  the  provinces  through  their 
position  as  governors.  With  that  insight  which  is 
always  the  highest  proof  of  statesmanship,  Richelieu 
struck  directly  at  the  foundations,  confident  that  if  they 
could  be  overthrown  the  superstructure  would  topple 
down  of  its  own  accord.  In  1626  two  important  edicts 
were  issued.  One  ordered  the  destruction  of  all 
fortresses,  except  such  as  were  needed  for  the  defence  of 
the  frontiers,  and  forbade  in  the  future  the  fortification 
of  private  houses.  The  other  prohibited  duelling  on 
pain  of  death.  The  first  of  these  edicts  was  carried  out 
amidst  the  applause  of  burghers  and  peasants.  It  has 
been  urged  that  the  compulsory  demolition  was  un- 
necessary, and  therefore  of  slight  importance,  that  the 
changed  habits  of  the  nobles  required  comfort  rather 
than  fortifications,  and  that  the  later  style  of  baronial 
residence  would  have  come  in  of  its  own  accord  without 
any  action  on  the  part  of  the  government.  But  this 
argument  carries  with  it  its  own  refutation.  The 
changed  habits  of  the  nobles  were  the  result,  not  the 
cause,  of  their  political  impotence ;  and  that  impotence 
arose  from  the  disappearance  of  the  old  sense  of 
impunity,  to  which  the  loss  of  defensible  walls  un- 
questionably contributed.  The  edict  against  duels,  in 
spite  of  the  severity  dealt  out  to  Bouteville  and  des 
Chapelles,  was  not  enforced  with  anything  like  the 
same  stringency.  Richelieu  himself  had  too  much  of  the 
sentiment  of  his  noble  birth  and  his  military  training 

M 


162  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

not  to  feel  a  real  sympathy  for  the  traditional  method 
of  defending  personal  honour.  No  execution  for  which 
he  was  responsible  cost  him  more  hesitation  and  mis- 
givings than  that  of  Bouteville,  and  he  devotes  several 
pages  of  his  Memoirs  to  a  regretful  estimate  of  his 
merits  and  misfortunes.  It  was  rather  the  general 
character  of  Richelieu's  administration  than  the  letter 
of  any  particular  edict  which  caused  the  gradual  decline 
of  the  practice  of  duelling. 

When  Richelieu  entered  the  ministry  in  1624  he 
found  the  chief  provinces  divided  among  nineteen 
governors,  all  of  them  belonging  to  the  highest  rank  of 
nobility.  These  regarded  their  posts '  as  private  and 
heritable  property  to  be  administered  for  their  personal 
interests.  Whenever  they  had  occasion  to  quarrel  with 
the  court,  it  was  to  their  province  that  they  retreated, 
either  as  a  secure  asylum  or  as  a  source  of  strength  for 
attack.  By  the  time  of  the  cardinal's  death,  only  four 
of  these  nineteen  governors  retained  their  position. 
The  rest  had  been  removed  to  make  room  for  officials 
whom  the  minister  could  trust.  And  a  terrible  lesson 
of  the  duty  and  necessity  of  obedience  had  been  taught 
to  these  local  rulers  by  the  defeat  and  execution  of 
Montmorency  in  his  own  province  of  Languedoc.  But 
by  far  the  greatest  blow  to  the  authority  of  the  nobles 
was  dealt  by  the  appointment  of  intendants.  A  small 
literature  has  arisen  in  recent  years  on  the  subject  of 
the  origin  of  these  famous  officials.  An  edict  of  1635 
which  had  long  been  regarded  as  marking  the  definite 
creation  of  intendants  has  been  conclusively  proved  to 
have  no  reference  to  them.  It  has  been  further  proved 
that  mattres  des  requites  of  the  royal  council  had  been  fre- 


vin  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  163 

quently  sent  out  to  the  provinces  in  the  sixteenth  century 
with  the  title  of  intendant,  and  with  special  instructions 
to  supervise  and  control  local  administration.  But  the 
tradition  which  regards  Richelieu  as  their  real  author 
has  still  a  substantial  foundation.  It  was  he  who  made 
the  intendants  permanent  officials,  who  extended  them 
to  the  whole  kingdom,  and  gave  them  their  complete 
functions  as  intendants  of  justice,  police,  and  finance. 
No  single  edict  determined  their  appointment  or  defined 
their  powers,  but  gradually  they  obtained  the  supreme 
control  of  all  departments  of  administration,  and  became 
the  recognised  channel  of  communication  between  their 
districts  and  the  royal  council.  The  jealousy  which 
they  inspired  among  the  privileged  classes  is  illustrated 
by  the  fact  that  one  of  the  first  demands  of  the  Fronde 
was  for  their  suppression.  But  under  Louis  XIV.  they 
were  restored,  to  become  the  agents  of  that  efficient, 
if  excessive  centralisation,  which  constituted  at  once 
the  strength  and  the  weakness  of  the  later  Bourbon 
monarchy.  The  nobles  retained  their  dignity  and 
their  revenues  as  provincial  governors,  but  all  substan- 
tial authority  passed  to  the  middle-class  officials,  who 
had  neither  the  means  nor  the  temptation  to  resist  the 
crown. 

It  would  take  too  long  to  examine  in  detail  all  the 
measures  taken  by  Richelieu  to  simplify  and  centralise 
the  government  of  France.  He  suppressed  the  ancient 
and  dignified  offices  of  constable  and  admiral  because 
they  gave  their  holders  a  power  too  great  to  be  safely 
entrusted  to  a  subject.  He  never  summoned  the  States- 
General,  and  he  sternly  checked  the  political  pretensions 
of  that  most  interesting  and  unique  of  judicial  courts, 


164  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

the  Parliament  of  Paris.  By  an  edict  of  1641  the 
parliament  was  forbidden  to  take  any  cognisances  of 
affairs  of  state,  unless  its  advice  was  specially  asked  by 
the  king ;  all  edicts  on  matters  of  government  or 
administration  are  to  be  registered  at  once  without 
opposition  or  debate ;  on  financial  matters  the  parlia- 
ment is  forbidden  to  introduce  amendments ;  any  re- 
monstrances it  may  wish  to  make  must  be  presented  at 
once,  and  if  they  are  rejected,  registration  is  to  follow 
as  a  matter  of  course ;  finally,  the  old  formula  of 
refusal,  "we  ought  not  and  cannot,"  is  expressly  pro- 
hibited as  injurious  to  the  authority  of  the  prince.  Nor 
was  Richelieu  content  with  this  suppression  of  political 
powers,  to  which  the  claim  was  of  more  than  doubtful 
validity  ;  he  also  encroached  upon  the  undoubted  rights 
of  jurisdiction  which  the  court  had  always  possessed. 
In  spite  of  the  vigorous  and  well- justified  protests,  both 
of  the  parliament  and  of  the  accused,  the  trial  of 
prominent  political  offenders  was  in  all  cases  withdrawn 
from  the  cognisance  of  the  supreme  law  court,  and 
entrusted  to  extraordinary  commissions  nominated  for 
each  case.  This  exceptional  jurisdiction,  which  enabled 
Eichelieu  to  give  a  dangerous  latitude  and  vagueness  to 
offences  against  the  state,  was  one  of  the  most  arbitrary 
and  least  defensible  features  of  his  administration. 

Of  the  local  liberties  which  had  survived  in  some 
parts  of  France  Eichelieu  showed  himself  the  bitter 
enemy.  Most  of  the  provinces  were  pays  d'dlection,  i.e. 
they  were  divided  into  districts  in  which  the  assessment 
and  collection  of  taxes  were  vested  in  royal  officials 
called  6lus.  But  several  provinces  had  retained  repre- 
sentative institutions,  either  by  custom  or  by  special 


vin  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  165 

agreement  made  at  the  time  of  their  annexation  to  the 
crown.  The  chief  of  these  pays  d'dtats  were  Languedoc, 
Normandy.  Brittany,  Burgundy,  Provence,  and  Dauphine. 
The  composition  and  powers  of  the  provincial  estates 
varied  in  innumerable  details,  but  all  had  one  common 
privilege  :  they  made  their  own  financial  bargains  with 
the  crown,  and  they  appointed  their  own  officials  to 
assess  and  collect  their  contributions  to  the  state.  The 
suppression  in  1629  of  the  Huguenot  revolt  in  Lan- 
guedoc gave  Richelieu  an  opportunity  for  attempting 
the  suppression  of  this  privilege,  and  edicts  were  issued 
to  extend  the  division  into  Elections  to  all  the  provinces 
of  France.  These  edicts  were  finally  enforced  in  Nor- 
mandy and  Dauphin^.  In  the  latter  the  estates  were 
altogether  abolished,  and  in  Normandy,  though  the 
estates  continued  to  meet  till  their  final  suppression  in 
1666,  they  lost  all  practical  power.  In  the  other 
provinces  the  edicts  provoked  strenuous  remonstrances 
and  resistance,  to  which  Richelieu,  warned  by  Mont- 
morency's  rising  in  Languedoc,  found  it  advisable  to 
yield.  In  Languedoc,  Burgundy,  and  Provence  the 
Elections  were  abolished,  but  these  provinces  had  to 
purchase  the  concession  by  heavy  money  payments  and 
by  accepting  conditions  which  deprived  the  provincial 
estates  of  much  of  their  independence.  For  instance, 
in  Languedoc,  by  far  the  most  important  of  the  pays 
d'etats,  the  estates  were  only  allowed  to  meet  every  other 
year ;  their  session  was  limited  to  fifteen  days,  and  they 
were  strictly  forbidden  to  levy  any  tax  or  loan  without 
the  royal  approval.  In  Brittany  alone,  where  the  com- 
position of  the  estates  was  least  democratic,  and- where 
Richelieu  had  special  authority,  both  as  governor  and 


166  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

as  head  of  the  maritime  administration,  no  special 
attempt  was  made  to  harass  the  provincial  assembly, 
which  indeed  had  shown  a  desire  to  aid  rather  than  to 
impede  the  minister's  policy.  But  even  in  Brittany 
some  changes  were  made  to  the  advantage  of  the  crown. 
The  nobles  lost  the  right  of  personal  attendance,  and 
could  only  appear  when  authorised  by  royal  letters- 
patent,  and  the  towns  which  were  to  send  deputies  to 
the  meeting  were  to  be  selected  on  each  occasion  by  the 
governor.  In  this  connection,  too,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  institution  of  intendants  contributed  to 
strengthen  the  control  of  the  central  government  over 
both  pays  d'dtats  and  pays  Selections. 

One  obvious  result  of  Richelieu's  policy  was  to  throw 
a  vast  increase  of  work  upon  the  royal  council,  and 
it  was  necessary  to  improve  its  organisation  so  as  to 
enable  it  to  meet  its  enlarged  duties  and  responsibili- 
ties. Richelieu's  arrangements,  which  lasted,  with  slight 
changes  in  detail,  till  the  fall  of  the  monarchy,  may  be 
instructively  compared  with  the  organisation  of  the 
Privy  Council  undertaken  by  the  Tudor  kings  under 
the  pressure  of  similar  necessities.  To  render  the 
conduct  of  business  regular  and  uniform  the  council 
was  split  into  sections,  which  met  on  special  days  for  the 
consideration  of  particular  departments.  On  Tuesdays 
was  held  the  conseil  des  cUpeches,  which  was  responsible 
for  the  provincial  administration.  To  it  were  sent  all 
reports  from  the  governors  and  other  local  officers, 
and  its  functions  resemble  those  of  our  Home  Office. 
The  conseil  des  finances  sat  twice  a  week — on  Wednes- 
days, to  consider  all  questions  connected  with  assess- 
ment and  expenditure,  and  on  Thursdays,  to  hear  all 


vin  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  167 

appeals  on  financial  matters,  either  from  officials  or  from 
private  individuals.  On  Saturdays  was  held  the  conseil 
des  parties  or  the  conseil  prive".  This  was  a  purely  judicial 
body.  Before  it  were  brought  appeals  from  other  courts 
to  the  crown,  and  a  number  of  cases  of  first  instance, 
especially  those  in  which  officials  were  interested,  which 
were  evoked  from  the  ordinary  courts  to  the  royal 
council.  These  councils  must  not  be  regarded  as 
distinct  bodies,  but  as  parts  of  the  same  body.  The 
great  officers  of  state,  the  chancellor,  the  surintendant 
des  finances,  and  the  four  secretaries  of  state,  were 
members  of  all  the  divisions,  and  so  were  many  of  the 
ordinary  councillors.  The  business  of  each  section  was 
prepared  and  reported  upon  by  a  number  of  maitres  des 
requetes,  who  took  it  in  turns  to  serve  at  the  council  for 
three  months  at  a  time.  At  other  times  they  were 
employed  in  special  commissions  in  the  royal  service. 
These  men  formed  the  nursery  of  French  administrators, 
and  it  was  from  among  them  that  the  intendants  were 
always  selected. 

But  this  elaborate  organisation  was  only  concerned 
with  the  routine  work  of  administration.  The  conseil 
du  roy,  like  the  English  Privy  Council  under  the  later 
Stuarts,  had  become  too  numerous  and  clumsy  a  body 
to  provide  that  secrecy  and  concentration  which  a 
despotism  always  requires,  and  especially  for  foreign 
affairs.  The  same  motives  which  led  in  England  to  the 
growth  of  the  Cabinet,  produced  a  similar  institution  in 
France,  which  is  variously  known  as  the  conseil  d'ttat, 
the  conseil  d'en  haut,  conseil  ttroit  or  conseil  prive. 

It  is  impossible  to  describe  Richelieu  as  the  founder 
of  this  institution,  which  grew  out  of  obvious  necessities  ; 


168  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

but  it  was  he  who  gave  it  the  form  and  the  importance 
which  it  retained  till  the  Revolution.  The  council  of 
state — to  choose  one  out  of  its  numerous  appellations — 
had  the  sole  consideration  of  foreign  affairs,  which  had 
formerly  gone  to  the  conseil  des  ddpfohes,  and  it  possessed 
the  real  initiative  and  decisive  voice  in  all  domestic 
matters.  Its  members,  who  were  always  nominated  by 
the  king,  were  called  ministres  d'dtat.  The  chief  officers 
of  state  were  usually,  but  not  necessarily,  included  in 
the  council,  but  the  king  often  admitted  men  who  held 
no  special  office.  The  king  himself  presided,  and  in  his 
absence  the  first  minister.  The  powers  of  the  council 
were  in  appearance  very  great.  It  quashed  the  decisions 
of  ordinary  courts,  it  evoked  cases  for  its  own  considera- 
tion, and  appointed  extraordinary  judicial  commissions. 
It  issued  the  edicts  which  became  law  on  registration 
by  the  parliament.  It  could  make  peace  or  war, 
determine  the  amount  and  method  of  taxation,  and 
supervise  the  conduct  of  all  other  administrative  bodies. 
But  these  enormous  powers  were  in  reality  not  the 
powers  of  the  council  but  of  the  crown.  The  ministers 
of  state  had  no  other  function  than  to  advise.  There 
was  no  voting,  and  no  decision  by  a  majority.  The 
members  stated  their  opinion,  often  in  the  form  of  a 
written  memoir,  but  the  king  decided  at  his  own 
pleasure. 

Thus  Richelieu  had  erected  an  administrative  system 
which  survived  the  attacks  of  nobles  and  parliament 
in  the  Fronde,  and  justified  the  boast  attributed  to 
Louis  XIV.,  I'Etat  c'est  moi!  It  is  usual,  though  of 
doubtful  fairness,  to  hold  the  cardinal  responsible  for 
the  fact  that  succeeding  kings  abused  the  powers  be- 


viii  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  169 

queathed  to  them,  or  at  any  rate  failed  to  use  them 
for  the  best  advantage  of  their  country.  It  is  the 
inherent  vice  of  despotism  that  no  human  ingenuity 
can  provide  a  succession  of  men  wise  and  virtuous 
enough  to  be  intrusted  with  that  omnipotence  which 
in  the  hands  of  a  perfect  ruler  may  be  for  a  moment 
the  best  form  of  government  in  the  world.  English- 
men have,  except  for  a  short  interval,  preferred  a 
government  in  which  there  is  more  balance  of  forces, 
more  complicated  machinery,  and  less  individual  initi- 
ative and  responsibility.  Such  a  system  has  many 
unquestionable  defects;  it  is  less  simple,  less  logical, 
and  less  easy  to  work  than  a  centralised  despotism  ; 
but  it  has  the  supreme  merit  of  being  safer,  of  leaving 
less  to  chance,  of  resting  upon  the  average  capacity  of 
the  many,  rather  than  upon  the  possibility  of  excep- 
tional capacity  in  one.  Those  critics  who  condemn 
Richelieu  for  the  ultimate  failure  of  French  despotism 
are  of  opinion  that  he  ought  to  have  founded,  or  tried 
to  found,  a  constitutional  government  in  France  like 
that  which  gradually  grew  up  in  England.  Instead  of 
doing  "  everything  for  the  people,  and  nothing  by  the 
people,"  he  should  have  allowed  the  subjects  some 
voice  in  their  own  government.  To  this  criticism 
there  is  one  simple  and  overwhelming  answer  :  it  was 
quite  impossible.  It  would  require  a  long  analysis  of 
French  history  and  French  institutions  to  furnish  conclu- 
sive proof  of  this  assertion,  but  it  can  be  so  established 
beyond  question.  Ever  since  the  thirteenth  century 
there  had  been  an  incurable  twist  against  constitution- 
alism. The  secret  of  the  successful  beginning  of  parlia- 
mentary government  in  England  is  to  be  found  in  the 


170  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

alliance  of  classes  against  the  crown,  which  begins  with 
the  great  struggle  to  extort  the  charter  from  John. 
Such  an  alliance  is  conspicuously  absent  in  France, 
where  from  the  thirteenth  to  the  eighteenth  century 
there  is  no  single  instance  of  a  league  between  the 
nobles  and  the  third  estate  to  secure  an  interest  common 
to  both.  The  jealous  hostility  of  classes  in  France 
enabled  the  crown  to  play  off  one  against  the  other, 
and  thus  to  raise  itself  to  unchallenged  supremacy. 
Geographical  needs  and  the  long  struggles,  first  with 
England  and  afterwards  with  Spain,  all  contributed  to 
the  triumph  of  the  monarchy.  No  statesman,  how- 
ever great,  can  free  himself  from  the  influence  of 
historical  development,  nor  can  he  work  with  other 
instruments  than  those  which  are  supplied  to  him  from 
the  past.  In  France  there  were  two  institutions  which 
at  one  time  or  another  claimed  what  we  should  call 
constitutional  powers.  The  States -General,  after  a 
brief  triumph  in  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  century, 
proved  a  complete  and  hopeless  failure.  The  division 
into  three  orders,  each  more  zealous  for  its  selfish 
interests  than  for  the  general  welfare,  and  the  inability 
of  the  third  estate  to  make  its  influence  felt  against 
the  ascendency  of  nobles  and  clergy,  condemned  this 
assembly  to  sterile  impotence.  Richelieu  himself,  as 
has  been  seen,  was  a  prominent  member  of  the  States- 
General  of  1614,  and  had  seen  enough  to  convince  him 
that  the  success  of  France  was  not  to  be  sought  there. 
No  similar  assembly  met  till  the  eve  of  the  Revolution. 
The  disappearance  of  the  States-General  gave  increased 
prominence  and  importance  to  the  Parliament  of  Paris, 
which  endeavoured  to  fill  the  gap  thus  created.  This 


vin  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  171 

hereditary  corporation  of  judges  aspired  to  emulate 
the  English  legislature,  with  which  it  had  nothing  in 
common  but  the  name.  The  practice  of  registration 
enabled  them  to  claim  a  right  first  of  remonstrance  and 
afterwards  of  veto  on  all  legislation,  and  their  independ- 
ence of  royal  nomination  or  dismissal  gave  this  claim 
an  importance  which  it  would  not  otherwise  have  pos- 
sessed. But  it  would  be  the  grossest  mistake  to  argue 
from  the  spirited  and  often  just  opposition  of  the  Par- 
liament to  despotism  that  its  members  had  any  sym- 
pathy with  popular  wishes,  or  any  understanding  of 
popular  needs.  The  Parliament  of  Paris,  as  was  con- 
clusively shown  on  the  eve  of  the  Revolution,  was 
really  the  last  and  firmest  stronghold  of  official  pre- 
judices and  class  privileges.  If  Eichelieu  ever  seriously 
considered  the  alternatives  he  would  have  been  right 
in  deciding  that  it  was  better  to  trust  the  future  of 
France  to  the  monarchy  than  to  a  narrow  and  bigoted 
bureaucracy.  In  the  one  there  was  a  chance  of  salva- 
tion, in  the  other  there  was  none. 

The  criterion  by  which  Richelieu's  government 
should  be  tested  is  to  be  sought,  not  in  an  estimate  of 
the  successes  or  blunders  of  the  later  Bourbons,  but  in 
an  examination  as  to  whether  Richelieu  himself  made 
the  best  use  of  the  authority  which  he  established. 
That  his  foreign  policy  was  prudent  and  far-sighted, 
and  that  it  was  guided  by  a  single-minded  desire  to 
promote  the  interests  of  his  country,  has  been  generally 
admitted  both  by  Frenchmen  and  by  foreigners.  But 
it  is  not  easy  to  be  equally  positive  about  his  domestic 
administration.  Many  of  his  measures  may  doubtless 
be  praised  without  reserve.  He  revived  the  military 


172  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

organisation,  which  had  fallen  into  chaos  during  the 
disorders  of  the  religious  wars.  The  steps  which  he 
took  to  increase  the  numbers  of  the  army  by  an  im- 
proved system  of  recruiting,  to  develop  and  systematise 
the  commissariat,  and  to  enforce  strict  discipline,  antici- 
pated the  more  thorough  reforms  of  le  Tellier  and 
Louvois,  and  began  the  process  which  made  the  French 
army  for  half  a  century  the  finest  fighting  force  in  the 
world.  Still  more  personal  credit  is  due  to  the  naval 
administration,  to  which  Richelieu  gave  strenuous  and 
unflagging  attention.  When  he  came  into  office  there 
was  practically  no  navy  at  all,  and  in  time  of  war  the 
government  had  to  depend  upon  the  vessels  it  could 
hire  from  individuals.  When  Sully,  under  Henry  IV., 
was  sent  on  an  embassy  to  London,  he  had  to  make 
the  voyage  in  an  English  vessel,  and  we  have  seen  that 
Richelieu,  in  his  first  measures  against  the  Huguenots, 
was  forced  to  employ  borrowed  ships  from  England  and 
Holland.  Thus  the  whole  task  of  naval  construction, 
of  the  forming  and  training  of  efficient  crews,  had  to 
be  begun  from  the  very  beginning.  But  Richelieu's 
energetic  will  was  equal  to  all  difficulties.  By  the  time 
of  his  death  France  possessed  thirty-two  men  of  war  in 
the  Mediterranean,  and  twenty-four  on  the  Atlantic 
coast,  without  counting  the  smaller  vessels.  And  this 
force  had  shown  itself  fully  capable  on  more  than  one 
occasion  of  holding  its  own  against  the  naval  power  of 
Spain,  which  had  hitherto  been  without  a  rival  in 
Southern  Europe.  At  the  same  time  special  attention 
was  paid  to  the  fortification  of  naval  ports.  The  de- 
fences of  Toulon  in  the  south,  and  of  Havre  in  the  north, 
were  immensely  strengthened.  Richelieu's  special  in- 


vin  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  173 

terest  in  Poitou  led  him  to  exaggerate  the  importance 
of  Brouage,  on  which  large  sums  of  money  were  wasted; 
but  he  more  than  redeemed  this  mistake  by  creating 
the  port  of  Brest,  which  was  destined  in  the  future  to 
be  the  great  French  arsenal  on  the  Atlantic.  It  is 
further  to  his  credit  that  he  recognised  the  important 
truth  that  the  only  sound  basis  of  naval  power  is  to  be 
found  in  a  mercantile  marine,  and  that  he  spared  no 
pains  to  extend  French  commerce  and  colonisation.  He 
protected  Mediterranean  traders  against  the  pirates 
of  Algiers,  Tunis,  and  Morocco,  and  he  opened  fresh 
markets  in  the  north  by  commercial  treaties  with 
Russia,  Sweden,  and  Denmark.  His  colonial  policy  was 
marred  by  the  practice,  common  to  all  statesmen  of 
that  day,  of  entrusting  colonial  enterprise  entirely  to 
exclusive  companies.  These  corporations,  by  which 
privileged  individuals  were  protected  at  the  expense  of 
the  general  body  of  consumers,  were  extremely  unsuc- 
cessful in  French  hands,  partly  through  their  excessive 
dependence  upon  state  patronage  and  control,  and  partly 
through  their  total  neglect  of  agriculture,  and  the  con- 
sequent failure  to  form  permanent  and  prosperous 
French  settlements.  Still,  in  spite  of  the  inherent 
defects  of  the  methods  he  employed,  Richelieu's  ministry 
marks  a  notable  era  in  the  history  of  French  colonies. 
His  support  secured  the  restoration  to  Canada  of 
Quebec  and  Nova  Scotia,  which  had  been  seized  by  the 
English,  and  his  encouragement  also  led  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  French  settlements  on  the  coast  of  Guiana 
and  in  the  West  Indian  islands  of  St.  Christopher,  Mar- 
tinique, Guadaloupe,  and  St.  Domingo,  and  in  the  east 
to  the  first  attempt  to  occupy  Madagascar. 


174  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

But  against  these  measures,  which  were  well- 
intentioned  if  not  always  wise,  must  be  set  an  almost 
complete  neglect  of  the  internal  wellbeing  of  France. 
In  the  history  of  the  progress  of  French  agriculture  and 
manufactures  there  is  a  distinct  and  lamentable  gap 
between  the  time  of  Sully  and  that  of  Colbert.  In 
spite  of  the  strongly-worded  protests  of  the  third  estate 
in  1614,  Richelieu  left  production  hampered  by  the 
system  of  guilds  and  privileged  corporations,  and  he 
made  no  attempt  to  remove  or  limit  the  provincial 
customs  duties  which  acted  as  a  barrier  to  internal  trade, 
and  as  a  hindrance  to  the  complete  realisation  of 
national  interests  and  unity.  But  by  far  the  most  serious 
charge  against  Richelieu's  domestic  government  is  based 
on  his  complete  failure  to  reform  the  abuses  of  the 
financial  administration  of  France.  The  direct  taxes, 
from  which  the  privileged  classes  were  wholly  exempt, 
were  extremely  oppressive  in  their  incidence,  especially 
in  those  provinces  where  the  tattle  was  levied  on 
personal  and  not  on  real  property.  The  indirect  taxes, 
assessed  for  the  most  part  on  the  selling  prices  of  com- 
modities, were  likewise  extremely  unequal,  and  con- 
stituted a  direct  discouragement  to  exchange.  The 
gabette  on  salt  was  perhaps  the  most  ludicrously 
iniquitous  tax  recorded  in  the  history  of  any  civilised 
community.  The  sale  of  offices,  a  practice  which  had 
been  going  on  for  more  than  a  century,  had  given  rise  to 
a  disguised  national  debt,  contracted  on  the  most 
extravagant  and  ruinous  terms.  The  practice  of  farm- 
ing the  indirect  taxes,  and  the  constant  insufficiency  of 
the  revenue  to  meet  the  expenditure,  had  placed  the 
government  at  the  mercy  of  the  financiers,  who  were 


vm  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  175 

accustomed  to  make  large  fortunes  at  the  expense  of  the 
tax-payers.  The  secrecy  and  consequent  disorder  of  the 
public  accounts  had  facilitated  fraud  and  peculation,  and 
the  reckless  concessions  to  rebellious  nobles  during  the 
king's  minority  had  more  than  undone  the  reforms 
which  Sully  had  introduced  under  Henry  IV. 

Richelieu  was  not  a  trained  economist,  and  many  of 
the  evils  of  the  financial  system  were  doubtless  less 
obvious  in  the  seventeenth  than  they  are  in  the 
nineteenth  century.  But  that  contemporaries  were 
fully  alive  to  some  of  the  worst  abuses,  and  were 
clamorous  for  their  removal,  is  fully  established 
by  the  cahiers  of  the  third  estate  in  1614.  That 
Richelieu  himself  was  equally  alive  to  the  necessity  of 
reform  is  proved,  not  so  much  by  the  dubious  evidence 
of  the  so-called  Testament  Politique,  as  by  numerous 
passages  in  his  Memoirs,  and  by  the  detailed  proposals 
which  he  submitted  to  the  king  in  1625.  It  is  equally 
certain  that  Richelieu  was  the  only  minister  in  French 
history  who  possessed  sufficient  authority  and  strength 
of  will  to  carry  through  a  sweeping  measure  of  financial 
reform  against  the  interested  opposition  of  the  privi- 
leged classes,  who  in  the  end  succeeded  in  maintaining 
the  old  abuses  till  they  were  swept  away  by  the 
Revolution.  A  few  tentative  measures  were  taken  in 
his  earlier  years,  such  as  the  reduction  of  the  taille  by 
600,000  francs,  and  the  appointment  of  a  chamber  of 
justice  which  mulcted  the  financiers  of  some  of  their 
ill-gotten  gains.  But  these  Acts  led  to  no  permanent 
improvement,  arid  in  the  meantime  the  worst  evils,  the 
sale  of  offices,  the  gabelle,  and  the  system  of  the  ferme, 
were  left  absolutely  untouched.  And  under  the  grow- 


176  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

ing  pressure  of  military  expenditure  all  idea  of  reform 
was  ultimately  abandoned.  Every  method  of  raising 
the  revenue  was  strained  to  the  uttermost.  The 
opposition  of  the  parliaments,  of  the  provincial  estates, 
and  of  armed  rebellion,  as  in  the  case  of  the  famous 
Nus-pieds  in  Normandy,  was  ruthlessly  suppressed.  New 
offices  were  created  for  the  purpose  of  selling  them,  and 
direct  loans  were  raised  at  an  ever-increasing  rate  of 
interest.  The  result  was  that  after  Eichelieu's  death 
the  queen  regent  found  that  the  revenues  of  the  next 
three  years  had  been  already  spent. 

It  has,  of  course,  been  urged  by  Richelieu's  defenders 
that  the  greatest  and  most  industrious  statesman  can- 
not do  everything,  and  that  a  period  of  almost  incessant 
war  does  not  offer  a  favourable  opportunity  for  the 
introduction  of  financial  reforms.  To  the  second  argu- 
ment it  may  be  answered  that  Richelieu  was  in  office 
for  ten  years  before  France  was  involved  in  war  on  a 
large  scale,  and  that  if  he  had  set  himself  in  those 
ten  years  to  remedy  acknowledged  abuses,  and  to  abolish 
or  restrict  harmful  and  obsolete  privileges,  he  would 
have  immensely  increased  the  ability  of  the  country  to 
stand  the  strain  of  the  vastly-increased  expenditure 
after  1635.  And  to  the  first  argument  the  possible 
answer  has  still  more  weight.  Like  many  other  notable 
rulers,  Richelieu  was  extremely  jealous  of  the  display  of 
any  independence  or  initiative  on  the  part  of  his 
colleagues.  In  choosing  them,  he  did  not  look  for 
ability  or  even  honesty  so  much  as  for  absolute  sub- 
mission to  himself.  The  same  autocratic  assumption 
that  impelled  him  to  control  from  Paris  the  operations 
of  generals  in  the  field,  led  him  at  home  to  surround 


vin  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  177 

himself,  as  time  went  on,  with  useful  tools  rather  than 
with  men  of  marked  capacity.  To  this  mtist  be 
attributed  the  rapid  though  temporary  decline  of  France 
after  his  death.  In  no  branch  of  administration,  except 
in  diplomacy,  did  Richelieu  leave  behind  him  a  ready- 
trained  politician  capable  of  filling  his  place.  It  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  the  Fronde  would  never  have 
taken  place  if  Richelieu  had  thought  more  of  securing 
efficiency  in  those  departments  to  which  he  could  not 
give  sufficient  personal  attention,  and  less  of  con- 
centrating all  authority  in  his  own  hands. 

This  concentration  may  have  been  partially  forced 
upon  Richelieu  by  his  isolation,  and  by  the  necessity  of 
defending  his  authority  against  jealous  opponents,  but  it 
had  none  the  less  disastrous  results  to  the  administra- 
tion of  finance.  On  the  fall  of  la  Vieuville,  the  duties 
of  surintendant  were  divided  between  Michel  Marillac 
and  Champigny,  of  whom  the  former  was  undoubtedly 
the  ablest  of  Richelieu's  colleagues,  and  had  also  a 
genuine  desire  for  reform.  In  1626  Marillac  was  ap- 
pointed keeper  of  the  seals,  and  the  finances  were  in- 
trusted to  the  marquis  d'Effiat.  On  his  death  in  1632 
the  system  of  dual  control  was  revived  by  the  appoint- 
ment of  Bullion  and  Bouthillier,  whose  chief  qualifica- 
tion was  that  they  were  the  docile  agents  of  the 
cardinal,  and  after  the  former's  death  Bouthillier 
remained  in  office  alone.  These  ministerial  changes 
are  coincident  with  a  steady  decline  in  the  management 
of  French  finance.  The  short-lived  and  rather  half- 
hearted reforms  belong  to  the  period  of  Marillac's 
tenure  of  office.  Under  d'Effiat  some  measure  of  order 
was  preserved,  and  the  public  credit  was  maintained, 

N 


178  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

and  in  some  respects  improved,  in  spite  of  an  increase 
of  taxation.  The  reckless  multiplication  both  of  exac- 
tions and  of  indebtedness  belongs  to  the  time  of  Bullion 
and  Bouthillier. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Richelieu's  neglect  of 
the  paramount  duty  of  financial  reform,  whether  it  be 
condemned  or  excused,  was  of  decisive  importance  for 
the  future  history  of  France.  No  subsequent  minister 
was  strong  enough  to  cleanse  the  Augean  stable,  and 
the  partial  improvement  effected  by  Colbert  was  soon 
effaced  by  the  lavish  expenditure  of  Louis  XIV.  on 
luxury  and  war.  Throughout  the  eighteenth  century 
the  efforts  of  France  were  crippled  by  the  burden  of  a 
chronic  deficit  which  threatened  to  bring  the  state  to 
bankruptcy.  It  is  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  import- 
ance to  a  state  of  a  wholesome  and  efficient  financial 
system.  France  was  able  to  get  the  better  of  Spain 
because  the  economic  condition  of  Spain  was  even  worse 
than  her  own.  But  the  decline  of  Spain  and  the 
exhaustion  of  Holland  left  France  face  to  face  with 
England,  and  the  two  states  waged  a  long  and  desperate 
struggle  for  commercial  and  colonial  expansion.  The 
financial  system  of  mediaeval  England,  though  not  so 
full  of  abuses  as  that  of  France,  was  almost  equally 
inefficient  and  stationary.  The  greatest  boon  which  the 
Commonwealth  conferred  upon  England  was  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  antiquated  methods  of  taxation,  and  the 
substitution  of  a  system  which,  whatever  its  faults  in 
detail,  had  the  supreme  merit  of  making  the  national 
revenue  proportionate  to  the  nation's  wealth.  Among 
the  many  causes  which  helped  England  to  gain  the  victory 
over  France  on  the  sea,  in  America  and  in  India,  not  the 


vin  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  179 

least  important  was  the  vast  superiority  of  her  financial 
administration,  which  enabled  her  to  defray  with  com- 
parative ease  an  expenditure  which  reduced  her  rival  to 
exhaustion  and  despair.  This  superiority  might  never 
have  existed  if  Bichelieu  or  his  colleagues  had  been 
far-sighted  enough  to  grapple  with  problems  from  which 
they  deliberately  turned  their  attention. 

Although  Richelieu  deliberately  set  himself  to 
establish  absolutism  and  to  free  the  monarchy  from  all 
effective  restraints  upon  its  action,  it  would  be  a  great 
error  to  suppose  that  he  recklessly  disregarded  public 
opinion,  or  that  he  failed  to  appreciate  the  strength 
which  any  government  obtains  by  conciliating  its 
support.  It  is  true  that  he  would  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  States-General,  but  he  summoned  two  im- 
portant meetings  of  Notables,  one  in  1626  to  parade  the 
national  sanction  of  his  anti-papal  action  in  the  matter 
of  the  Valtelline,  and  the  other  in  1627  to  strengthen 
his  domestic  position  after  the  first  conspiracy  against 
him  had  ended  in  the  execution  of  Chalais.  Of  course 
these  meetings  were  carefully  packed,  and  they  were 
allowed  no  legislative  powers.  His  motives  for  their 
convention  were  much  the  same  as  those  which  induced 
Simon  de  Montfort  to  summon  the  parliament  of  1265, 
or  Philip  the  Fair  to  hold  the  first  sessions  of  the  States- 
General.  At  the  same  time  the  Notables  were  allowed, 
especially  in  1627,  considerable  latitude  and  liberty  of 
discussion,  and  their  debates  gave  to  the  measures  and 
schemes  of  the  government  a  publicity  which  a  less 
enlightened  despotism  might  have  considered  both 
dangerous  and  degrading. 

The  same  desire  to  satisfy  and  gain  over  opinion  is 


180  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

apparent  in  his  patronage  of  literature,  though  here 
personal  tastes  and  interests  combined  to  influence  his 
action.  He  surrounded  himself  with  a  small  regiment 
of  learned  scribes,  whom  he  employed  to  produce 
treatises  in  support  of  his  views  on  such  subjects  as  the 
claims  of  the  crown  to  foreign  territories,  or  the  proper 
relations  of  church  and  state.  The  Memoirs  and  the 
Succincte  Narration,  which  constitute  his  own  chief  con- 
tributions to  literature,  were  probably  drafted  in  the 
first  instance  by  these  subordinates,  though  he  reserved 
the  task  of  revision  for  himself.  But  his  interest  was 
by  no  means  confined  to  the  serious  and  practical  uses 
of  literary  composition.  He  was  himself  an  indefatigable 
writer  of  versified  dramas,  though  his  industry  could 
not  command  success  nor  his  authority  applause.  His 
personal  failure,  however,  did  not  make  him  meanly 
jealous  of  more  fortunate  followers  of  the  Muses. 
Nearly  all  the  most  prominent  writers  of  the  day  were 
in  personal  intercourse  with  him,  and  were  in  receipt  of 
pensions  or  gratuities  from  his  purse.  The  two  greatest 
prose  writers,  Voiture  and  Balzac,  repaid  his  liberality 
by  eulogising  his  administration  in  terms  of  equal 
warmth  and  sincerity.  It  is  true  that  the  patronage  of 
an  absolute  ruler,  whether  king  or  minister,  is  not 
always  an  unmixed  benefit  to  literature,  and  that 
none  of  Eichelieu's  proUgfa,  except  Corneille,  can  be 
placed  in  the  highest  rank.  But  on  the  other  hand 
court  patronage  in  France  did  effect  a  very  notable 
literary  revival,  and  it  is  impossible  to  deny  to  Richelieu 
some  credit  for  the  rise  of  the  next  generation  of 
authors,  whose  works  have  reflected  such  glory  upon 
the  France  of  Louis  XIV. 


vni  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  181 

In  connection  with  literature  Kichelieu  will  always 
be  best  remembered  as  the  founder  of  the  French 
Academy.  This  had  its  origin  in  the  private  meetings 
of  a  number  of  literary  friends,  who  in  1629  formed 
the  habit  of  assembling  once  a  week  for  the  discussion 
of  literary  topics  and  the  consideration  of  each  other's 
productions.  These  meetings  had  already  been  going 
on  for  four  years  when  Richelieu  was  informed  of 
them  by  one  of  the  numerous  busybodies  whose 
function  it  was  to  tell  him  of  everything  that  was 
going  on  in  Paris.  With  characteristic  keenness, 
though  foreign  affairs  seemed  sufficiently  critical  to 
absorb  all  his  energies,  he  grasped  the  possible  uses 
of  such  an  organisation,  and  offered  the  members  a 
constitution  under  government  patronage.  There  was 
some  natural  hesitation,  as  party  spirit  ran  high  in 
France,  and  men  of  letters  were  by  no  means  un- 
animously cardinalist.  But  the  offer  could  not  be 
safely  or  courteously  refused,  and  letters -patent  were 
drawn  up  in '1635,  though  the  bigoted  opposition  of 
the  parliament,  ever  jealous  of  new  corporations, 
delayed  their  formal  promulgation  till  July  10,  1637. 
The  primary  function  of  the  Academy  was  to  regulate 
and  purify  the  French  language,  to  make  it  the  most 
perfect  of  modern  tongues,  and  to  "  render  it  not 
only  elegant,  but  also  capable  of  treating  all  the  arts 
and  all  the  sciences."  But  from  the  first  both  the 
founder's  intentions  and  the  habits  of  the  members 
combined  to  give  it  a  second  function  as  a  tribunal 
of  literary  criticism.  Richelieu  himself  pointed  clearly 
to  this  duty  by  demanding  in  1637  a  corporate 
opinion  on  Corneille's  Cid,  which  had  been  attacked 


182  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

in  the  Observations  of  Scud6ry.  From  this  time  it 
became  a  regular  part  of  the  Academy's  business  to 
criticise,  and,  if  it  thought  fit,  to  express  formal 
approbation  of  the  works  both  of  members  and  others ; 
and  it  needs  only  a  superficial  knowledge  of  French 
literature  to  appreciate  what  an  immense  influence  it 
has  thus  exerted  both  upon  language  and  style. 

From  the  political  point  of  view  the  origin  of 
French  journalism  is  even  more  important  than  the 
foundation  of  the  Academy,  and  to  this  also  Richelieu 
gave  the  deciding  impulse.  Hitherto  the  only  news- 
paper in  France  had  been  an  annual  publication,  the 
Mercwe  fran$ois,  which  was  a  continuation  of  the 
Chronologie  sepUnaire  of  Palma  Cayet.  This  was 
obviously  insufficient  to  satisfy  the  growing  interest 
in  political  events,  and  it  was  supplemented  by  a 
number  of  unauthorised  fly-sheets,  called  nouvelles  a 
la  main,  which  were  circulated  either  in  print  or 
manuscript,  and  eagerly  read.  The  most  industrious 
compiler  of  news  was  a  prominent  physician, 
Th^ophraste  Eenaudot,  who  supplied  nouvelles  for  the 
distraction  as  well  as  medicines  for  the  cure  of  his 
wealthy  patients.  Renaudot  succeeded  in  gaining  the 
confidence  of  Richelieu,  and  in  1631  received  a  formal 
license  to  transform  his  fugitive  fly-sheets  into  a 
regular  newspaper  under  government  sanction.  Thus 
was  founded  the  Gazette,  or,  as  it  was  called  later,  the 
Gazette  de  la  France.  It  appeared  weekly  in  a  small 
quarto  sheet  of  four  pages,  each  containing  a  single 
column.  From  the  first  the  extent  and  accuracy  of 
its  intelligence  gave  it  a  secure  pre-eminence  over  any 
rival  publication,  and  its  circulation  and  importance 


vin  DOMESTIC  GOVERNMENT  183 

rapidly  increased.  Both  king  and  minister  were 
among  the  contributors  to  its  pages,  and  Louis  XIII. 
took  a  special  pleasure  in  the  labour  of  composition 
and  revision.  Secure  of  this  novel  method  of  in- 
fluencing opinion,  Richelieu  was  able  to  dispense 
for  the  rest  of  his  ministry  with  the  more  cumbrous 
system  of  assembling  Notables  which  he  had  adopted 
at  starting.  In  the  words  of  Henri  Martin,  he  had 
"given  birth  to  the  two  great  enemies,  whose  struggle 
was  to  fill  the  modern  world — absolutism  and  the 
press." 


CHAPTEK  IX 

RICHELIEU   AND    THE   CHURCH 

Condition  of  the  French  Church  during  the  religious  wars — 
Religious  revival  in  the  seventeenth  century — Charitable 
orders — Advance  of  clerical  and  secular  education — Monastic 
reform — Richelieu's  relations  with  the  papacy — Relations  of 
Church  and  State — Clerical  taxation — Richelieu  and  St. 
Cyran — Richelieu's  opportunism  in  ecclesiastical  matters — 
His  superstition — Case  of  Urbain  Grandier. 

EICHELIEU,  although  a  bishop  and  a  cardinal,  was  not 
a  great  theologian,  nor  was  he  in  the  narrowest  sense 
a  great  churchman.  Many  of  his  contemporaries, 
endowed  with  far  less  dignity  and  authority,  yet 
exercised  an  incomparably  more  distinct  and  vital 
influence  on  the  religious  life  of  his  time  than  he 
can  claim  to  have  done.  Still  his  career  is  coincident 
with  a  very  important  epoch  in  the  history  of  the 
French  Church,  and  both  in  his  actions  and  in  his 
Memoirs  he  shows  a  very  keen  interest  in  ecclesiastical 
matters,  and  a  very  vivid  sense  of  their  importance 
to  the  order  and  wellbeing  of  the  state.  Possibly 
his  interest  was  rather  that  of  the  politician  than  of 
the  ecclesiastic,  but  it  was  none  the  less  real,  nor 
was  the  influence  which  he  could  not  fail  to  possess 
diminished  because  he  himself  was  lacking  in  spiritual 


CHAP,  ix          RICHELIEU  AND  THE  CHURCH  185 

insight  or  because  his  motives  were  rather  secular 
than  religious.  These  considerations  make  it  im- 
possible, even  in  a  brief  sketch  like  the  present,  to 
dismiss  his  relations  with  the  Church  in  a  brief  and 
perfunctory  paragraph. 

The  sixteenth  century  had  witnessed  two  of  the 
greatest  religious  movements  in  history.  The  first 
was  the  Reformation,  by  which  a  number  of  states, 
mostly  in  Northern  Europe,  threw  off  all  dependence 
upon  Rome,  and  adopted  religious  doctrines  and 
organisation  more  or  less  at  variance  with  those 
which  had  hitherto  prevailed  throughout  Western 
Christendom.  By  the  second  or  Counter  Reformation, 
the  Roman  Catholic  Church  profited  by  the  lessons 
it  had  received,  reformed  the  abuses  which  had 
provoked  discontent  and  rebellion,  and  strengthened 
its  internal  organisation  in  order  not  only  to  prevent 
further  defections,  but  also  to  recover  some  of  the 
ground  that  had  been  lost.  This  reforming  move- 
ment, which  was  immensely  stimulated  by  the  efforts 
of  the  Jesuit  order,  found  its  final  expression  in  the 
decrees  of  the  Council  of  Trent.  But  although  France 
was  represented  at  Trent,  and  although  the  doctrinal 
definitions  of  the  council  were  welcomed,  yet  those 
decrees  which  touched  the  constitution  of  the  Church 
and  restored  discipline  were  never  accepted  or  pro- 
mulgated in  France.  There  were  two  primary 
motives  for  this  repudiation  of  the  chief  measures  of 
reform.  The  crown  contended  that  the  conciliar 
decrees  diminished  the  authority  and  patronage 
conferred  upon  the  kings  by  the  Concordat  of  1516. 
The  Parliament  of  Paris  complained  that  they  would 


186  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

destroy  the  liberties  of  the  Gallican  Church,  which 
had  always  been  dear  to  the  official  classes  since  their 
first  definition  in  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  of  Bourges 
in  1438. 

Thus  the  Church  of  France  remained  unreformed, 
and  during  the  religious  wars  the  abuses  of  the  old 
system  become  still  more  numerous  and  conspicuous. 
Many  archbishoprics  and  bishoprics  were  allowed  to  re- 
main vacant,  while  others  were  held  by  men  who  had 
obtained  them  by  uncanonical  or  simoniacal  means.  Most 
of  the  bishops  were  non-resident  and  neglected  their 
dioceses.  Du  Vair,  who  lived  at  Aix  as  first  president 
of  the  Parliament  of  Provence,  was  bishop  of  Lisieux, 
in  Normandy,  which  he  never  visited.  It  is  recorded 
that  on  one  occasion  the  bishop  of  St.  Malo  confirmed 
two  thousand  persons  in  a  single  village,  which  proves 
that  his  visits  cannot  have  been  very  frequent.  There 
were  no  schools  for  the  education  of  the  clergy,  most 
of  whom  were  extremely  ignorant  and  incompetent. 
While  the  revenues  of  the  church  were  very  large,  the 
village  curds  were  lamentably  ill-paid,  and  their  mode 
of  life  was  practically  that  of  the  peasants  from  whom 
they  were  sprung,  and  whom  they  were  vainly  expected 
to  elevate  and  instruct.  The  fabric  of  the  churches 
was  in  a  lamentable  state.  Many  had  been  used  as 
fortresses  in  the  war,  with  very  natural  results ;  others 
had  been  profaned  or  destroyed  by  the  Huguenots.  In 
many  parishes  divine  service  had  come  to  an  end 
altogether,  and  the  people  were  left  without  any  religious 
ministrations.  And  if  the  condition  of  the  secular 
clergy  was  bad,  that  of  the  regulars  was  still  worse. 
The  headships  of  religious  houses  were  frequently  given 


ix  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  CHURCH  187 

to  children  or  to  persons  of  scandalous  character.  In 
many  cases  the  abbot  was  a  layman,  who  drew  the 
revenues  of  the  monastery,  while  his  duties  were  dis- 
charged by  an  ill-paid  substitute.  The  count  of 
Soissons  was  said  to  receive  an  ecclesiastical  revenue  of 
100,000  livres  a  year,  while  his  place  was  filled  by  a 
prior  with  an  annual  income  of  1000.  Elsewhere  the 
revenues,  both  of  monasteries  and  of  bishoprics,  were 
saddled  with  pensions  and  reserves  which  had  been 
granted  to  courtiers  of  both  sexes.  Discipline  was 
completely  neglected,  and  both  monks  and  nuns  lived 
worldly,  self-indulgent,  and  often  vicious  lives. 

The  termination  of  the  religious  wars  by  the  acces- 
sion of  Henry  IV.  and  his  acceptance  of  the  Eoman 
Catholic  faith  was  followed  by  a  notable  religious  revival 
in  France,  which  reached  its  zenith  during  Kichelieu's 
ministry.  But  this  revival  was  not  the  work  of  the  state, 
nor  even  of  the  Church  acting  in  its  corporate  capacity. 
The  whole  credit  belongs  to  a  few  devoted  and  highly- 
gifted  individuals,  whose  lives  will  always  attract 
attention  and  admiration  as  long  as  the  record  of 
religious  enthusiasm  and  heroic  self-sacrifice  awakens 
any  responsive  chord  in  the  hearts  of  mankind.  The 
dominant  impulse  was  given  by  a  native  of  Savoy,  St. 
Francois  de  Sales,  but  the  most  active  and  influential 
worker  was  a  Frenchman,  the  famous  St.  Vincent  de 
Paul.  As  was  natural,  the  revival  was  a  composite  and 
many-sided  movement.  One  of  its  manifestations  was 
a  general  desire  among  the  clergy  to  strengthen  the 
bonds  which  connected  France  with  the  Universal 
Church,  of  which  she  professed  to  be  the  eldest  daughter. 
This  Ultramontane  tendency  was  specially  encouraged 


188  RICHELIEU  CIIAP. 

by  the  Jesuits,  who  had  been  restored  to  France  in 
1604  after  a  brief  period  of  exile,  and  at  once  gained 
great  influence  at  court  by  supplying  a  series  of  royal 
confessors.  Another  sign  of  the  revival  was  the  en- 
deavour of  the  Church  to  free  itself  from  the  trammels 
of  state  control,  to  recover  as  much  as  possible  the  free 
election  of  its  own  dignitaries,  and,  above  all,  to  restore 
the  independence  of  clerical  judicature,  which  had  been 
much  restricted  by  the  encroachments  of  the  secular  courts, 
and  especially  by  the  practice  of  appealing  on  purely 
clerical  matters  from  the  Church  courts  to  the  Parlia- 
ment of  Paris  (the  famous  appel  comme  d'abus).  But  by 
far  the  most  conspicuous  and  creditable  aspect  of  the 
movement  was  its  practical  side,  the  immense  energy 
and  enthusiasm  that  was  thrown  into  the  work  of 
active  charity,  of  education,  and  of  monastic  reform. 

The  Roman  Catholic  Church  has  always  shown  itself 
honourably  conscious  of  its  duties  towards  the  poor  and 
afflicted,  but  at  no  time  and  place  has  it  undertaken  the 
task  of  charitable  relief  with  more  devotion  than  in  the 
early  part  of  the  seventeenth  century.  It  was  upon 
pious  women  that  the  task  was  mainly  thrown,  and 
among  the  numerous  orders  that  were  founded  to 
systematise  and  encourage  their  labours  two  are 
specially  conspicuous  for  the  piety  of  their  founders 
and  for  their  subsequent  development.  The  Visitandines, 
or  Congregation  of  the  Visitation,  were  founded  at 
Annecy  by  Francois  de  Sales,  and  a  branch  was 
established  in  Paris  in  1621  by  Madame  de  Chantal. 
In  the  eighteenth  century  the  order  possessed  more  than 
a  hundred  houses  in  France.  Still  more  famous  and 
useful  have  been  the  Sceurs  de  la  ChariU,  or  Gray 


ix  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  CHURCH  189 

Sisters,  founded  and  organised  by  Vincent  de  Paul  in 
1633,  and  rapidly  extended  under  the  headship  of 
Madame  Legras.  This  organisation — for  it  can  hardly 
be  called  an  order — was  mainly  composed  of  women 
of  humble  origin,  whose  habits  and  training  fitted 
them  for  the  toilsome  and  often  repulsive  labours  which 
they  undertook.  At  the  same  time  Vincent  de  Paul 
succeeded  in  enlisting  in  the  good  work  many  ladies 
of  the  highest  rank,  who,  with  the  title  of  Dames  de  la 
Charit^  undertook  the  task  of  organising  relief,  and 
acting  as  visitors  and  overseers  of  the  humbler  Sisters. 
So  great  was  their  success,  according  to  an  admiring 
biographer  of  the  founder,  that  in  the  first  year  of  their 
activity  no  less  than  760  heretics  were  converted  to 
the  orthodox  faith.  Prominent  among  these  ladies 
was  Eichelieu's  favourite  niece,  Madame  de  Combalet, 
afterwards  duchess  d'Aiguillon,  and  it  was  she  who 
succeeded  in  enlisting  her  uncle's  sympathy  and  support 
in  a  work  which  he  probably  thought  outside  the  duties 
of  the  state,  and  which  he  had  little  time  or  inclination 
to  direct  in  person. 

Almost  equally  numerous  were  the  associations 
formed  for  the  education  and  training  of  the  clergy. 
Here  the  lead  was  taken  by  de  Beguile,  who  founded 
the  Oratoire  de  Jesus  in  1611,  and  obtained  its  approval 
from  Paul  V.  in  1613.  Within  a  brief  period  the 
Oratorians  possessed  no  less  than  fifty  houses,  and 
among  their  pupils  were  such  men  as  Malebranche, 
Mascaron,  and  Massillon.  De  B^rulle  found  numerous 
imitators,  of  whom  the  chief  were  Adrien  Bourdoise, 
the  founder  of  the  seminary  of  St.  Nicolas  du 
Chardonnet,  and  Jean  Jacques  Olier,  who  organised  iu 


190  RICHELIEU  CHAI-. 

1641  the  celebrated  seminary  of  St.  Sulpice.  But  in  the 
work  of  clerical  education,  as  in  that  of  charity,  by  far 
the  most  successful  and  practical  organiser  was  Vincent 
de  Paul.  The  Congregation  of  the  Mission  was  founded 
by  him  in  1625  in  the  College  des  Bons  Enf ants,  and  in 
1632,  when  it  received  formal  confirmation  from 
Urban  VIII. ,  was  moved  into  more  spacious  quarters 
in  the  Priory  of  St.  Lazare,  whence  its  members 
obtained  the  name  of  Lazaristes.  The  success  of  this 
institution  in  raising  the  standard  of  piety  and  priestly 
activity  throughout  the  country  districts  was  marvellous, 
and  attracted. the  interested  attention  of  Richelieu.  In 
an  interview  with  Vincent  de  Paul  he  asked  for  full 
information  as  to  the  aims  and  constitution  of  the 
order,  and  gave  it  solid  encouragement  by  recommend- 
ing its  more  prominent  members  for  ecclesiastical 
promotion. 

Nor  was  the  work  of  secular  education  neglected  in 
the  general  revival  of  clerical  enthusiasm.  The  Con- 
gregation of  the  Ursulines,  founded  in  Italy  in  the 
previous  century,  was  now  introduced  into  France  by 
Madeleine  Lhuillier,  and  devoted  itself  with  marked 
success  to  the  teaching  of  girls.  But  by  far  the  greatest 
educating  force  was  supplied  by  the  Jesuits.  The  edict 
for  their  restoration  in  1604  allowed  them  to  possess 
thirteen  colleges  in  the  provinces,  but  they  were  at  first 
excluded  from  the  capital.  This  obstacle  was  overcome 
by  the  influence  of  the  king's  confessor,  Father  Cotton,  and 
in  1609  they  were  permitted  to  give  public  instruction  in 
the  College  de  Clermont.  This  gave  rise  to  a  long  and 
bitter  struggle  between  the  Jesuits  and  the  University 
of  Paris,  in  which  the  former  only  held  their  own 


ix  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  CHURCH  191 

through  the  unwavering  support  of  Richelieu.  He  had 
little  sympathy  with  the  Jesuits,  who  were  opposed 
both  to  his  foreign  policy  and  to  much  of  his  home 
government,  but  he  realised  that  in  education,  if  not 
in  commerce,  a  monopoly  is  a  dangerous  gift  to  a 
corporation.  Thanks  to  his  support,  the  pupils  of  the 
Order  in  1627  numbered  no  fewer  than  13,195.  This 
strenuous  competition  was  wholesome  to  the  University 
itself,  which  at  last  abandoned  the  effort  to  suppress  its 
rivals,  and  set  to  work  to  recover  its  declining  influence 
by  improving  its  own  methods  of  instruction. 

If  Richelieu's  attitude  towards  the  work  of  charity 
and  education  was  passive  rather  than  active,  he  took  a 
more  direct  interest  in  the  furtherance  of  monastic 
reform.  This  holds  a  prominent  place  among  the 
proposals  which  he  submitted  to  the  king  in  1625,  and 
throughout  his  ministry  he  endeavoured  by  frequent 
visitations  to  enforce  the  observance  of  the  stricter 
rules  of  monastic  life.  To  increase  his  authority  for 
this  purpose  he  obtained  his  own  nomination  as  general 
of  the  great  orders  of  Cluny,  Citeaux,  and  the  Premon- 
stratensians,  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  pope,  who 
refused  to  confirm  him  in  the  two  latter  offices.  But 
the  magistrates  and  other  secular  agents  whom  Richelieu 
employed  provoked  ecclesiastical  jealousy  and  opposition, 
and  in  the  end  a  great  deal  more  was  effected  by 
individual  initiative  than  by  government  intervention. 
By  far  the  greatest  achievements  of  the  period  were 
the  foundation  of  the  reformed  Benedictine  Congre- 
gation of  St.  Maur,  whence  proceeded  in  the  next 
generation  the  monumental  works  of  French  erudition, 
and  the  restoration  of  discipline  in  the  nunneries  of 


192  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

Port  Royal  and  Maubuisson  by  the  famous  Angelique 
Arnauld.  From  Port  Royal  nuns  were  despatched  on 
missions  to  extend  the  work  of  reform  to  all  the 
convents  of  France.  But  if  Richelieu's  share  in  the 
movement  was  less  predominant  than  he  probably 
anticipated,  yet  his  example  and  patronage  contributed 
to  the  success  of  the  efforts  of  others,  and  he  may 
further  claim  the  credit  of  having  terminated  the  long 
warfare  between  regulars  and  seculars.  By  the  decision 
of  a  conference  which  he  initiated,  and  whose  labours  he 
personally  superintended,  the  jealousy  with  which  the 
parish  priests  had  always  regarded  the  intervention  of 
their  rivals  was  at  last  allayed.  The  monks  were 
subjected  to  episcopal  authority,  and  they  were  only 
allowed  to  preach  and  receive  confession  with  the 
express  permission  of  the  ordinary. 

So  far  the  ecclesiastical  revival  had  proceeded  with 
Richelieu's  approval,  and  to  some  extent  with  his  active 
encouragement  and  support.  But  with  the  Ultramontane 
tendencies  of  the  movement  he  came  into  direct  and 
hostile  collision.  During  the  minority  of  Louis  XIII. 
the  support  of  Mary  de  Medici  had  enabled  cardinal 
du  Perron  and  the  Ultramontane  party  in  France  to 
gain  a  considerable  increase  of  strength.  This  was 
conclusively  proved  by  the  removal  of  Richer,  the  chief 
champion  of  Gallican  liberties,  from  his  office  of  Syndic 
in  the  Sorbonne,  by  the  frustration  of  the  Parliament's 
attack  on  the  Jesuits,  and  by  the  attitude  assumed  by 
the  clerical  estate  in  the  States -General.  But  this 
progress  was  checked  by  the  accession  of  Richelieu  to 
power.  With  his  strong  sense  of  the  overpowering 
importance  of  national  interests,  he  was  not  likely  to  be 


ix  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  CHURCH  193 

submissive  to  a  foreign  authority,  whose  action  could 
not  possibly  be  dictated  by  a  single-minded  regard  for 
France.  Among  his  early  measures  the  expulsion  of 
papal  troops  from  the  Valtelline  and  the  conclusion 
of  the  treaty  of  1626  with  the  Huguenots  excited 
the  horrified  animosity  of  the  Eoman  Catholic  world. 
Bitter  attacks  were  published  against  the  "  cardinal  of 
the  Huguenots,"  the  betrayer  of  his  Church  to  the 
infidels,  and  Eichelieu  thought  it  necessary  to  procure  a 
condemnation  of  these  libels  from  a  clerical  synod.  It 
was  at  this  juncture  that  a  book  reached  Paris  from 
Rome,  written  by  a  Jesuit,  Sanctarellus,  and  approved 
both  by  the  pope  and  the  General  of  the  Order.  In 
this  book,  "  the  most  evil  of  its  kind,"  as  Eichelieu  calls 
it,  were  maintained  in  their  most  extreme  form  the 
doctrines  of  papal  absolutism :  "  the  pope  may  punish 
and  depose  kings,  not  only  for  heresy  and  schism,  but 
for  any  intolerable  offence,  for  incapacity  or  for  negli- 
gence ;  he  has  power  to  admonish  kings  and  to  punish 
them  with  death ;  all  princes  who  govern  states  do  so 
by  commission  from  His  Holiness,  who  may  claim  to 
govern  them  himself,  etc."  These  maxims,  says  Eichelieu, 
are  capable  of  ruining  the  whole  Church,  and  they  are 
the  more  preposterous  with  regard  to  the  pope,  as  he 
"is  a  temporal  prince,  and  has  made  no  such  renuncia- 
tion of  earthly  greatness  as  to  be  indifferent  to  it."  He 
hastened  to  stimulate  the  Gallican  sentiment  in  opposi- 
tion to  such  teaching.  The  Sorbonne,  or  theological 
faculty  of  the  University,  censured  the  book  as  "con- 
taining novel,  false,  and  erroneous  doctrines,  contrary  to 
the  word  of  God,  and  rendering  odious  the  dignity  of 
the  sovereign  Pontiff."  The  parliament  ordered  the 

0 


194  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

book  to  be  publicly  burned,  and  eagerly  seized  the 
opportunity  to  renew  their  attack  upon  the  Jesuits, 
whom  they  proposed  to  expel  from  their  colleges,  and 
even  from  France.  Eichelieu,  however,  interfered  to 
check  their  ardour,  in  the  belief  that  "it  was  neces- 
sary to  reduce  the  Jesuits  to  such  a  state  that  they 
had  no  power  to  be  harmful,  but  not  to  drive  them  to 
attempt  any  mischief  from  despair."  The  Order  escaped 
further  persecution  by  accepting  a  solemn  declaration 
that  they  repudiated  the  doctrines  of  Sanctarellus  about 
the  power  of  kings,  that  they  acknowledged  that  kings 
hold  immediately  of  God,  and  that  they  would  never 
teach  any  doctrines  on  this  matter  other  than  those  held 
by  the  clergy,  the  Universities  of  the  kingdom,  and  the 
Sorbonne. 

This  alliance  of  Eichelieu  with  the  Gallican  party 
could  not  but  be  distasteful  to  the  papal  court,  and  it 
was  by  no  means  obliterated  by  subsequent  services, 
such  as  the  taking  of  La  Rochelle,  and  the  strengthening' 
of  the  temporal  power  of  the  papacy  by  the  anti-Spanish 
policy  pursued  in  the  Mantuan  succession.  On  the 
strength  of  these  services  Eichelieu  ventured  to  demand 
a  boon  for  which  he  was  extremely  eager — that  he  should 
be  appointed  papal  legate  in  Fr.ance,  as  cardinal  Amboise 
had  been  in  the  reign  of  Louis  XII.  But  Urban  VIII. 
had  no  mind  to  give  increased  power  to  a  prelate  who 
was  already  sufficiently  independent,  and  it  is  possible 
that  Eichelieu's  leniency  to  the  Huguenots  was  in  some 
measure  a  retaliation  for  this  refusal.  Nor  were  his 
other  requests  more  favourably  received.  Urban  refused 
to  make  him  legate  in  Avignon,  to  allow  his  nomination 
as  coadjutor  of  the  archbishop  of  Trier,  and  to  confirm 


ix  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  CHURCH  195 

him  as  general  of  the  three  great  monastic  orders.  The 
cardinal's  hat  was  never  granted  to  Father  Joseph,  in 
spite  of  the  persistent  efforts  of  the  French  govern- 
ment; and  the  pope  steadfastly  declined  to  recognise 
the  validity  of  the  decision  which  pronounced  the 
marriage  of  Gaston  with  Margaret  of  Lorraine  to  be 
null  and  void. 

These  continued  rebuffs,  and  especially  the  last, 
inspired  Richelieu  with  the  wish  to  teach  the  pope  a 
lesson.  Pierre  Dupuy,  one  of  the  ablest  of  the  authors 
whose  learning  was  always  at  the  cardinal's  command, 
drew  up  an  exhaustive  treatise  on  the  LiberUs  de  I'Eglise 
Gallicane,  which  stated  fully  the  arguments  not  only 
against  papal  despotism,  but  also  for  the  subjection  of 
the  church  to  the  state.  This  book,  which  was  published 
anonymously  in  1638,  caused  the  greatest  sensation 
both  in  France  and  at  Rome,  and  the  council  found  it 
advisable  to  decree  its  suppression,  though  only  on  the 
technical  ground  that  it  had  been  published  without 
license.  But  the  book  continued  to  be  sold,  and  in  the 
next  year  the  execution  of  an  attendant  of  the  French 
envoy  at  Rome  gave  rise  to  an  open  quarrel.  The 
envoy,  d'Estrees,  ceased  all  communications  with  the 
Vatican.  Louis  XIII.  closed  his  doors  to  the  papal 
nuncio  in  Paris,  and  forbade  the  bishops  to  hold  any 
intercourse  with  him.  It  was  currently  reported  that 
Richelieu  was  prepared  to  break  off  all  connection  with 
Rome  and  to  obtain  from  a  national  synod  his  own 
election  as  patriarch  of  France.  A  priest  named  Hersent 
hastened  to  denounce  the  projected  schism  in  a  treatise 
which  he  published  under  the  title  of  Optatus  Gallus. 
The  bishops  did  not  venture  to  defend  the  book,  and 


196  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

the  parliament  hastened  to  proscribe  it,  and  indirectly  to 
express  approval  of  the  doctrines  of  Dupuy.  But  the 
pope  could  not  afford  to  carry  any  further  his  quarrel 
with  France.  Satisfaction  was  given  to  d'Estrees,  and 
the  grant  of  a  cardinal's  hat  to  Mazarin,  who  acted  as 
papal  envoy  on  the  occasion,  was  taken  as  the  pledge  of 
reconciliation.  But  Urban  VIII.  never  forgave  the 
prelate  who  had  humbled  him.  On  Richelieu's  death  he 
refused  to  allow  the  usual  commemorative  service  for  a 
cardinal  to  be  celebrated  at  Rome,  and  he  is  said  to 
have  expressed  his  opinion  of  the  dead  statesman's 
character  in  terms  which  sound  oddly  in  the  mouth 
of  a  pope :  "If  there  is  a  God,  he  will  pay  dearly  for 
his  conduct ;  but  if  there  is  no  God,  then  he  was  truly 
an  admirable  man." 

Although  Eichelieu  was  the  champion  of  Gallican 
liberties  against  papal  pretensions,  he  was  equally 
resolute  to  enforce  the  duties  of  the  clergy  to  the  state. 
In  this  respect  his  conduct  as  a  minister  stands  in 
instructive  contrast  to  the  more  purely  clerical  attitude 
which  he  had  assumed  at  the  meeting  of  the  States- 
General.  In  his  speech  as  orator  of  the  clergy  he  had 
made  the  following  claims  for  his  order :  (1)  the  more 
frequent  admission  of  ecclesiastics  to  office  and  to  the 
royal  council ;  (2)  the  prohibition  of  future  grants  of 
church  revenues  to  laymen,  either  directly  or  by  way  of 
pensions  and  reserves;  (3)  the  release  of  the  clergy  from 
direct  taxes,  on  the  ground  that  the  only  tribute  which 
they  owed  was  their  prayers ;  (4)  the  restoration  of 
clerical  jurisdiction  to  its  former  limits  and  independence; 
(5)  the  recognition  of  the  decrees  of  the  Council  of  Trent. 
Of  these  demands  the  only  one  which  he  gratified  when 


ix  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  CHURCH  197 

the  opportunity  came  was  the  first.  His  partiality  for 
ecclesiastical  agents,  not  only  in  diplomacy,  but  in 
military  and  naval  commands,  was  a  subject  of  derision 
in  Europe,  and  gave  a  handle  against  him  to  the  pope, 
who  openly  expressed  his  disapproval  of  the  employment 
of  churchmen,  like  the  cardinal  de  la  Valette,  in  leading 
armies  to  the  field.  The  other  proposals  proved  nothing 
more  than  pious  wishes.  The  Council  of  Trent  re- 
mained unacknowledged.  The  diversion  of  ecclesias- 
tical revenues  to  laymen  continued,  and  Richelieu  himself 
is  said  to  have  rewarded  a  favourite  fiddler  with  the  gift 
of  an  abbey.  No  limit  was  placed  on  the  encroachment 
of  the  secular  courts  on  church  jurisdiction,  nor  on 
the  employment  of  the  appel  com/me  d'abus.  And  the 
question  of  clerical  taxation  gave  rise  to  an  open  and 
envenomed  quarrel  between  Richelieu  and  his  fellow- 
clergy. 

The  revenues  of  the  French  clergy,  whether  from 
land  or  from  other  sources,  were  wholly  exempt  from 
direct  taxation.  The  clerical  assemblies  were  in  the 
habit  of  making  an  annual  grant  of  2,000,000  livres, 
but  they  always  protested  that  this  was  a  don  gratuit 
and  not  a  compulsory  payment,  and,  moreover,  such  a 
sum  was  ludicrously  out  of  proportion  to  the  wealth  of 
the  Church.  Among  the  financial  expedients  forced 
upon  Richelieu  by  military  expenses  were  increased 
demands  on  the  liberality  of  the  Church  synods,  and 
these  were  usually  granted,  though  always  with 
murmuring  and  reluctance.  But  in  1640  he  came 
forward  with  a  wholly  novel  and  unforeseen  demand. 
His  supporter  and  confidant,  the  bishop  of  Chartres, 
had  collected  documents  from  the  royal  archives  to 


198  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

prove  that  land  could  only  be  held  in  mortmain  by 
letters -patent,  to  be  obtained  on  payment  of  a  droit 
d'amortissement.  This  form  the  clergy  had  systematically 
failed  to  observe,  and  therefore  it  was  held  that  their 
lands  were  legally  forfeited  to  the  crown.  Instead  of 
enforcing  this  claim,  it  was  determined  to  collect  all 
arrears  of  payment  due  since  the  year  1520,  when 
Francis  I.  had  levied  a  similar  exaction.  The  sum  thus 
due  was  estimated  at  nearly  80,000,000  livres,  but  the 
government  announced  that  it  would  be  content  with 
3,600,000.  The  clergy  were  furious  at  the  attempt  to 
collect  such  a  payment  without  consulting  their  assembly. 
It  was  at  this  time  that  the  quarrel  with  Rome  was  at 
its  height,  and  that  Hersent  published  his  Optatus  Gallus, 
which  attacked  Richelieu's  conduct  at  home  as  well  as 
his  attitude  towards  the  papacy.  Regardless  of  this 
opposition,  the  council  issued  an  edict  in  October  1640, 
demanding  the  additional  payment  of  one-sixth  of  church 
revenues  for  two  years.  But  the  clergy,  encouraged  by 
the  prospect  of  papal  aid,  prepared  for  strenuous 
resistance  to  the  "tyrant"  and  "apostate"  who  so  shame- 
lessly violated  the  privileges  of  his  own  order.  Richelieu, 
unwilling  to  face  this  domestic  storm  at  a  time  when 
foreign  affairs  demanded  all  his  attention,  found  it 
advisable  to  give  way  to  some  extent,  and  agreed  to 
summon  an  assembly  of  the  clergy.  The  assembly  met 
at  Mantes  early  in  1641,  and  it  was  announced  that  all 
the  claims  of  the  government  would  be  commuted  for  a 
lump  sum  of  6,600,000  livres.  Even  this  diminished 
demand  provoked  a  storm  of  indignation.  The  arch- 
bishop of  Sens  recalled  the  ancient  maxim  that  "the 
people  contribute  their  goods,  the  nobles  their  blood, 


ix  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  CHURCH  199 

and  the  clergy  their  prayers,"  and  declared  that  the 
liberty  of  the  Church  would  be  destroyed  if  "  they  were 
compelled  to  open  their  hands  instead  of  their  lips." 
Montchal,  archbishop  of  Toulouse,  whose  Memoirs  give 
the  most  vivid  picture  of  the  passions  that  were  excited 
on  the  subject,  termed  the  royal  exactions  "  a  horrible 
sacrilege  committed  on  the  property  of  the  cross," 
and  declared  "  our  kings  have  always  believed  that  the 
gold  of  the  sanctuary  would  be  fatal  to  them  unless 
they  received  it  as  a  gift."  Richelieu  found  it  necessary 
to  take  violent  measures,  and  the  two  archbishops,  with 
four  other  bishops,  were  ordered  to  quit  Mantes  and 
retire  to  their  respective  dioceses,  without  venturing 
to  pass  through  Paris  on  the  way.  Their  withdrawal 
enabled  the  dispute  to  be  compromised.  The  majority 
agreed  to  pay  a  sum  of  five  millions  and  a  half,  with 
which  the  government  professed  itself  satisfied,  and  this 
settlement  Avas  followed  by  the  reconciliation  with  the 
papacy. 

The  same  determination  to  prevent  Gallicanism  from 
developing  into  a  claim  for  clerical  independence,  and 
to  enforce  at  all  hazards  the  solidarity  and  authority 
of  the  state,  is  visible  in  Richelieu's  relations  with  one 
of  his  most  famous  contemporaries,  the  Abb6  de  St. 
Cyran.  St.  Cyran  had  not  yet  become  the  founder  of 
a  sect,  but  he  was  already  famous  as  the  reputed  author 
of  Petrus  Aurelius,  and  as  a  formidable  free-lance  on  the 
side  of  Gallican  liberties.  His  piety  and  learning  gave 
him  an  influence  quite  out  of  proportion  to  his  ecclesi- 
astical rank  :  he  was  the  spiritual  director  of  Port 
Royal,  which  had  been  transferred  by  Angelique  Arnauld 
to  Paris,  and  he  was  the  confidential  adviser  of  many 


200  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

distinguished  persons  of  both  sexes.  St.  Cyran's  concep- 
tion of  the  Church  as  an  oligarchy  of  bishops  rather 
than  a  monarchy  brought  him  into  collision  with  Rome, 
and  both  he  and  his  friend  Jansen  had  been  from  the 
first  hostile  critics  of  the  principles  and  morality  of 
Jesuit  teaching.  Both  these  positions  commended 
themselves  to  Richelieu,  who  was  engaged  in  a  quarrel 
with  the  papacy,  and  had  good  reason  to  dislike  the 
Ultramontane  and  Spanish  predilections  of  the  Jesuits. 
In  his  early  days  he  had  been  brought  into  intimate 
relations  with  St.  Cyran,  through  their  common  friend 
the  bishop  of  Poitiers,  and  he  now  made  strenuous 
efforts  to  gain  the  allegiance  of  the  man  whom  he 
openly  declared  to  be  the  most  learned  theologian  in 
Europe.  No  less  than  five  bishoprics — some  say  eight 
— were  successively  offered  to  the  friend  of  his  youth. 
But  St.  Cyran  resolutely  refused  to  sacrifice  his  inde- 
pendence by  accepting  preferment  from  a  "  government 
which  only  wished  for  slaves."  The  autocracy,  which 
he  suspected  Richelieu  of  a  desire  to  establish,  was 
quite  as  repugnant  to  his  principles  as  the  absolutism  of 
the  pope.  His  obstinate  self-confidence  and  isolation 
were  the  first  cause  of  Richelieu's  enmity.  The  higher 
his  appreciation  of  St.  Cyran's  ability,  the  more  he 
mistrusted  the  growth  of  an  influence  which  was  outside 
his  control.  And  to  this  first  ground  of  alienation  others 
were  speedily  added.  We  have  seen  what  importance 
Richelieu  attached  to  the  dissolution  of  Gaston's  marriage 
with  Margaret  of  Lorraine.  On  this  subject  St.  Cyran 
did  not  hesitate  to  take  the  same  line  as  Urban  VIII., 
and  to  declare  that  it  was  impious  to  annul  a  sacrament 
of  the  Church  for  purely  political  reasons.  But  probably 


ix  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  CHURCH  201 

the  greatest  displeasure  was  caused  by  the  action  of 
Jansen,  of  whose  teaching  St.  Cyran  was  already  the 
avowed  champion.  Jansen,  a  native  of  the  Spanish 
Netherlands,  had  published  the  Mars  Gallicus,  in  which 
he  bitterly  denounced  the  conduct  of  France  in  betray- 
ing the  cause  of  Roman  Catholicism  by  an  open  alliance 
with  Lutherans  and  Calvinists.  This  pamphlet,  which 
earned  from  the  Spanish  government  the  elevation  of 
its  author  to  the  bishopric  of  Ypres,  appeared  in  a 
French  translation  in  1638.  Richelieu  was  always 
keenly  sensitive  to  such  attacks  on  his  policy,  and  as  he 
could  not  touch  the  chief  culprit,  he  determined  to  take 
vengeance  on  the  disciple.  In  May  1638  St.  Cyran 
was  arrested  and  imprisoned  in  Vincennes,  where  he 
remained  till  the  cardinal's  death.  His  papers  were 
seized,  and  a  judicial  inquiry  instituted,  in  the  hope  of 
obtaining  evidence  for  a  charge  of  heresy,  but  the  scheme 
resulted  in  failure,  and  the  prisoner  was  never  brought 
to  trial.  That  Richelieu  foresaw  the  formation  of  a 
Jansenist  sect  as  the  inevitable  result  of  St.  Cyran's 
combination  of  personal  independence  with  deep  spiritual 
influence  over  others  is  proved  by  his  comparing  him 
with  the  great  reformers  of  the  previous  century.  "  If 
Luther  and  Calvin,"  he  said,  "had  been  imprisoned 
when  they  began  to  dogmatise,  the  states  of  Europe 
would  have  been  spared  many  troubles."  Later,  when 
the  prince  of  Conde  tried  to  obtain  the  prisoner's 
release,  he  replied,  "  Do  you  know  the  man  you  are 
speaking  of?  he  is  more  dangerous  than  six  armies." 
But  the  cardinal's  harshness  towards  an  innocent  op- 
ponent was  subtly  avenged  by  the  famous  John  of 
Werth.  He  had  been  a  captive  since  the  battle  of 


202  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

Eheinfelden,  and  had  made  St.  Cyran's  acquaintance  in 
their  common  prison  of  Vincennes.  The  general  was 
brought  from  his  confinement  to  witness  the  sumptuous 
representation  of  Bichelieu's  comedy  of  Miriame  before 
the  king  and  court.  When  asked  for  his  opinion  of 
the  spectacle,  he  replied  that  it  was  magnificent,  but 
that  what  astounded  him  most  was  to  find  "  in  the 
Most  Christian  kingdom,  the  bishops  at  the  comedy  and 
the  saints  in  prison."  Richelieu  pretended  not  to  hear, 
but  the  blow  must  have  struck  shrewdly  home. 

It  is  impossible  to  discover  in  Richelieu's  relations  with 
the  Church  any  signs  that  he  was  actuated  by  profound 
convictions  or  overmastering  principles.  Though  he 
made  use  of  parties,  he  belonged  to  none.  In  ecclesi- 
astical matters,  as  contrasted  with  politics,  he  was  an 
opportunist  pure  and  simple.  If  the  pope  had  not 
refused  his  demands,  and  tried  to  thwart  his  schemes, 
he  would  never  have  identified  himself  with  the  advocates 
of  Gallicanism.  So  long  as  Gallican  liberties  existed  in 
practice  he  had  no  desire  that  they  should  be  defined 
or  formally  recognised.  When  an  open  quarrel  with 
Rome  broke  out,  his  haughty  and  stubborn  temper 
doubtless  prompted  him  to  carry  it  through  after  the 
fashion  of  Henry  VII  I. ,  and  to  establish  the  patriarch- 
ate which  his  enemies  accused  him  of  coveting.  But 
his  temper  rarely  got  the  better  of  his  discretion.  He 
was  keen-sighted  enough  to  apprehend  the  differences, 
both  of  history  and  opinion,  which  rendered  the  action 
of  England  no  safe  guide  for  France,  and  he  foresaw 
that  a  final  rupture  with  the  papacy  would  produce 
such  a  ferment  that  the  political  influence  of  his  country 
would  be  annihilated  for  at  least  half  a  century.  Again, 


ix  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  CHURCH  203 

he  was  far  too  thoroughly  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  his 
order  to  be  a  consistent  and  thoroughgoing  Erastian. 
If  the  clergy  had  not  been  always  suspicious  of  his 
Protestant  alliances,  and  often  sympathetic  with  the 
enemies  of  France,  he  would  never  have  stirred  a  step 
from  his  way  to  attack  their  corporate  privileges  and 
independence. 

It  was  this  detachment  from  religious  partisan- 
ship which  enabled  him  to  subordinate  ecclesiastical  to 
political  considerations,  and  to  be  the  first  European 
statesman  who  ventured  to  translate  the  principles  of 
toleration  into  practice.  His  attitude  in  this  respect 
is  the  more  remarkable  when  we  remember  that  he 
was  no  eighteenth  century  sceptic,  confident  in  human 
powers  and  doubtful  of  divine  intervention.  If  Richelieu 
profoundly  influenced  his  age,  it  was  not  because  he  was 
before  it,  but  because  he  so  thoroughly  identified  himself 
with  it.  It  would  be  misleading  to  call  him  a  religious 
man,  but  he  was  certainly  superstitious.  His  private 
letters  furnish  plentiful  evidence  of  his  belief  in  astrology, 
in  magic,  and  in  the  small  popular  prejudices  against 
unlucky  days  and  actions.  This  vein  of  superstition — 
not  uncommon  in  great  men  of  action — merits  the  more 
attention,  because  without  it  it  would  be  impossible 
to  plead  any  defence  for  Richelieu  in  an  episode  which 
looms  very  largely  in  the  pages  of  his  detractors — the 
case  of  Urbain  Grandier.  The  story  itself  is  suffi- 
ciently remarkable,  and  though  the  evidence  has  now 
been  fully  published,  there  are  several  questions  con- 
nected with  the  case  which  it  is  difficult  to  answer 
with  absolute  certainty. 

Urbain  Grandier  was  a  priest  of  Loudun  in  Poitou, 


204  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

of  a  handsome  and  imposing  exterior,  and  possessed  of 
great  influence  over  women,  which  he  almost  certainly 
abused.  In  one  way  and  another  he  had  excited  the 
enmity  of  several  prominent  inhabitants  of  the  town, 
who  brought  against  him  a  charge  of  immorality  and 
impiety.  In  the  court  of  the  bishop  of  Poitiers  he  was 
condemned,  but  on  appeal  the  sentence  was  reversed 
both  by  the  prdsidial  of  Poitiers  and  by  the  archbishop 
of  Bordeaux  Grandier's  too  obvious  exultation  in  his 
triumph  redoubled  the  fury  of  his  opponents,  who  were 
eager  to  find  some  new  means  of  procuring  his  ruin. 
One  of  them,  Mignon,  was  director  of  the  Ursuline 
convent  in  Loudun.  Rumours  began  to  spread  that 
some  of  the  nuns  were  possessed  with  devils,  that  they 
were  afflicted  with  extraordinary  bodily  contortions,  and 
that  in  their  ravings  they  brought  grave  charges  against 
Grandier.  The  director  and  other  priests  were  called  in 
to  exorcise  the  demons,  and  they  reported  that  they 
obtained  from  the  mouths  of  the  latter  a  reluctant  con- 
fession as  to  the  master  who  had  sent  them.  Still  no 
formal  charge  was  brought,  and  opinion  in  Loudun  was 
divided  between  Grandier's  accusers  and  defenders.  As 
before,  the  bishop  of  Poitiers  was  on  one  side,  professed 
his  belief  in  the  evidence,  while  the  archbishop  of  Bor- 
deaux was  incredulous.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  a 
commissioner  of  the  government,  Laubardemont,  came 
to  Loudun  to  superintend  the  destruction  of  the  castle. 
He  was  a  confidential  agent  of  Richelieu,  and  was  sub- 
sequently employed  to  collect  evidence  against  St.  Cyran. 
The  popularity  of  a  professed  spy  and  informer  was  not 
likely  to  be  great,  and  his  reputation  has  consequently 
suffered.  Laubardemont  was  completely  gained  over  by 


ix  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  CHURCH  205 

the  stories  of  Grandier's  accusers.  He  undertook  to 
bring  the  whole  matter  before  the  cardinal,  and  he  is 
said  to  have  prejudiced  him  against  the  accused  by 
asserting  that  Grandier  was  the  author  of  a  scurrilous 
libel,  Le  Cordonnier  de  Loudun,  that  had  been  circulated 
when  Richelieu  was  a  resident  in  Poitou  as  bishop  of 
Lu9on.  The  result  was  that  a  special  commission  of 
fourteen  persons,  with  Laubardemont  at  its  head,  was 
appointed  to  try  the  case.  The  trial  itself  was,  from  a 
modern  point  of  view,  farcical,  the  bias  of  the  court  was 
unmistakable,  and  the  evidence  was  mainly  that  which 
the  exorcists  professed  to  have  extracted  from  the  so- 
called  devils.  Grandier  was  sentenced  to  death,  tortured 
to  make  him  confess  his  accomplices,  and  finally  burned 
under  circumstances  of  exceptional  and  wanton  bar- 
barity. 

That  Grandier's  death  was  a  judicial  murder  of  the 
worst  kind,  and  that  fraud  as  well  as  credulity  entered 
into  the  conduct  of  the  case  against  him,  is  incontestable. 
But  it  is  by  no  means  easy  to  distribute  equally  the 
exact  measures  of  guilt.  That  the  whole  affair  was  a 
gigantic  conspiracy,  in  which  nuns,  priests,  the  bishop 
of  Poitiers,  and  many  others  played  preconcerted  parts 
to  destroy  a  common  enemy,  is  preposterous.  The  very 
length  of  time — two  years — during  which  the  professed 
marvels  were  prolonged  is  conclusive  against  such  ex- 
tensive and  well -organised  complicity.  The  further 
assertion  of  Gui  Patin  that  Richelieu  was  at  the  bottom 
of  the  plot,  and  that  he  resorted  to  such  an  elaborate 
imposture  to  ruin  a  humble  but  detested  libeller,  is  not 
only  absurd  in  itself,  but  runs  counter  to  all  that  we 
know  of  the  cardinal's  open,  if  often  excessive,  malevo- 


206  RICHELIEU  CHAP,  ix 

lence.  The  probability  is  that  the  nuns  suffered  from 
religious  hysteria,  of  which  there  are  many  recorded 
instances  in  the  same  period  of  revival,  and  that  the 
suggestions  of  their  spiritual  director  led  them  to  make 
their  incoherent  charges  against  the  priest  whom  he  was 
known  to  detest,  and  of  whom  they  had  doubtless  heard 
much  that  was  evil.  Some,  at  any  rate,  of  the  exorcists 
were  men  whose  character  raises  them  above  the  charge 
of  deliberate  ill-faith.  All  that  can  be  urged  against 
Richelieu  is  that  he  saw  no  a  priori  difficulties  as  to  the 
credibility  of  the  accusations,  and  that  he  allowed  the 
machinery  of  a  special  commission,  always  more  likely 
to  look  for  guilt  than  for  innocence,  to  be  employed 
in  a  case  where  there  was  no  possible  justification  for 
its  use. 


CHAPTEE   X 

RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS 

1641-1642 

Military  events  of  1641  and  1642 — Rising  of  Soissons — His  death — 
Conspiracy  of  Cinq-Mars — Richelieu's  illness  at  Narbonne — His 
will — Detection  of  the  plot — Execution  of  Cinq -Mars  and 
De  Thou — Completeness  of  Richelieu's  success — His  death — 
Continuance  of  his  policy — Gradual  relaxation  of  severity — 
Death  of  Louis  XIII. — Permanence  of  Richelieu's  influence — 
Richelieu's  character — His  ill-health — His  isolation — The  in- 
security of  his  position — His  relations  with  Louis  XIII. — His 
vindictiveness — His  unpopularity. 

RICHELIEU  did  not  live  to  witness  the  conclusion  of  the 
great  war  in  which  France  had  engaged  under  his  auspices. 
The  treaties  of  Westphalia  and  the  Pyrenees,  especially 
the  latter,  might  have  been  concluded  earlier  if  his  life  had 
been  prolonged,  but  in  spite  of  the  delay  he  is  as  much 
their  author  as  if  he  had  signed  the  actual  documents.  In 
fact,  all  the  substantial  advantages  which  France  gained 
by  these  treaties  had  been  practically  secured  by  1640. 
The  military  events  of  the  next  two  years  did  little  but 
render  more  certain  the  ultimate  triumph  of  France. 
In  1641  the  flowing  tide  of  French  successes  seemed  for 
a  moment  to  be  arrested.  In  Italy  and  in  Artois  the 
French  troops  had  enough  to  do  to  hold  their  own. 


208  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

Charles  of  Lorraine  was  restored,  only  to  prove  once 
more  a  traitor  to  his  promises,  and  his  duchy  had  to  be 
re-occupied  before  the  year  was  over.  In  Germany 
Guebriant  defeated  the  Imperialists  at  Wolfenbiittel,  but 
the  death  of  Baner  and  other  causes  prevented  the  allies 
from  gaining  any  important  results  by  their  success.  In 
1642,  however,  the  French  cause  made  rapid  and 
decisive  strides.  In  Italy  the  princes  Thomas  and 
Maurice  deserted  the  Spaniards  to  join  their  sister-in-law, 
and  their  adhesion  turned  the  balance  decisively  in 
favour  of  the  French.  A  great  effort  was  planned  by 
Richelieu  on  the  side  of  the  Pyrenees,  and  the  capture  of 
Perpignan  and  Salces  completed  the  second  and  final 
union  of  Roussillon  to  France.  In  Germany  Guebriant 
opened  the  year  with  a  decisive  victory  at  Kempten,  and 
this  was  followed  by  a  campaign  in  which  Torstenson, 
Baner's  successor,  emulated  the  most  brilliant  achieve- 
ments of  Gustavus  Adolphus.  By  a  series  of  rapid  and 
masterly  movements  this  general,  though  imprisoned  in 
his  litter  by  gout,  overran  Silesia  and  Moravia,  and 
caused  a  panic  in  Vienna.  Compelled  to  retreat  by 
superior  forces,  he  threw  himself  into  Saxony  and  laid 
siege  to  Leipzig.  When  the  Imperialists  advanced  to 
relieve  the  city,  he  crushed  them  on  the  plain  of  Breiten- 
feld  (Nov.  2,  1642),  where  Gustavus  Adolphus,  eleven 
years  before,  had  won  the  first  great  victory  which  estab- 
lished his  own  reputation  and  marked  a  decisive  turning- 
point  in  the  history  of  the  war.  The  surrender  of 
Leipzig  was  the  reward  of  Torstenson's  success,  and 
the  news  of  this  brilliant  triumph  must  have  brought 
some  consolation  to  Richelieu  as  he  lay  on  his  death- 
bed. 


x  RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS  209 

The  enemies  of  France  did  not  require  the  lessons  of 
1642  to  teach  them  that  little  hope  remained  for  them 
in  arms.  They  had  already  realised  that  their  only 
chance  of  recovering  from  their  reverses  lay  in  the 
overthrow  by  domestic  treason  of  the  minister  whom 
they  regarded  as  the  author  of  all  their  misfortunes. 
In  spite  of  the  glory  which  his  administration  had 
brought  to  France,  Eichelieu  had  still  many  enemies  who 
longed  for  his  overthrow,  and  few  adherents  who  would 
make  strenuous  efforts  for  his  defence.  Probably  his 
best  friend  —  though  few  suspected  it,  and  perhaps 
the  cardinal  himself  as  little  as  the  general  public — was 
the  king.  The  private  letters  of  Louis  XIII.,  in  these 
two  years,  prove  that  he  was  not  devoid  of  gratitude 
and  even  affection  towards  the  man  who  had  made  his 
reign  illustrious,  though  the  coldness  of  his  manner  and 
a  certain  peevish  resentment  of  anything  like  dictation 
misled  even  those  in  his  most  immediate  confidence  into 
a  belief  that  it  was  no  impossible  task  to  alienate  the 
king  from  the  minister.  Richelieu  had  ever  to  be  on 
his  guard  against  secret  foes  at  court,  who  were  far 
more  dangerous  than  his  avowed  opponents.  Among 
the  latter  the  most  prominent  was  the  count  of  Soissons, 
who  had  never  forgiven  his  defeat  of  1636.  He  had 
been  living  ever  since  in  the  border  fortress  of  Sedan, 
whence  he  carried  on  incessant  intrigues  with  foreign 
states,  with  malcontents  at  home,  and  with  the  nobles 
who  had  followed  the  queen -mother  into  exile.  In 
1641  the  young  duke  of  Guise  arrived  in  Sedan,  and 
discussed  with  Soissons  and  Bouillon,  the  governor  of 
the  fortress,  the  organisation  of  an  armed  rebellion  for 
Richelieu's  overthrow.  The  cardinal,  informed  of  their 

F 


210  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

projects,  sent  orders  to  Bouillon  to  withdraw  bis  hospi- 
tality from  Soissons,  and  to  the  latter  to  depart  for 
Venice.  This  message  was  the  signal  for  civil  war. 
The  conspirators  threw  off  all  disguise  and  applied  for 
aid  to  Spain  and  Austria,  who  were  only  too  glad  to 
encourage  a  movement  which  could  not  fail  to  serve 
their  ends.  The  king  on  his  side  declared  Soissons, 
Guise,  and  Bouillon  enemies  of  the  state,  and  despatched 
the  marshal  de  Chatillon  to  combine  with  the  restored 
duke  of  Lorraine  in  an  attack  on  Sedan.  But  Charles 
of  Lorraine  had  already  decided  to  break  his  recent 
treaty  with  France,  and  Chatillon  was  forced  to  stand 
on  the  defensive  against  the  rebels,  who  received  the 
aid  of  an  Imperialist  detachment  under  Lamboy.  Their 
forces  had  already  quitted  Sedan  and  crossed  the 
Meuse  when  they  were  attacked  by  the  royal  troops  at 
La  Marf6e.  It  was  generally  anticipated  that  the  first 
conflict  would  have  decisive  results,  and  that  a  victory 
of  the  insurgents  would  be  followed  by  a  movement  on 
the  part  of  Richelieu's  opponents  at  the  court  and  in 
Paris.  But  good  fortune  was  on  the  cardinal's  side, 
and  the  forecast,  shrewd  as  it  was,  proved  fallacious. 
No  victory  could  have  been  more  decisive.  The  royalist 
cavalry  had  been  tampered  with,  and  the  infantry,  left 
to  itself,  fled  in  panic-stricken  confusion.  But  in  the 
turmoil  Soissons  was  killed  by  a  chance  bullet,  and  the 
death  of  the  rebel  leader,  whose  rank  as  a  prince  of  the 
blood  made  him  indispensable,  deprived  his  confederates 
of  all  the  fruits  of  their  success.  The  whole  scheme  of 
rebellion  was  at  an  end.  Guise  fled  to  Brussels,  Bouillon 
submitted  and  was  pardoned,  and  their  secret  sym- 
pathisers at  court  had  to  wait  for  a  more  favourable 


x  RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS  211 

opportunity,  only  too  pleased  that  they  had  not  betrayed 
themselves  by  a  premature  movement. 

Gratitude,  as  Richelieu  had  good  reason  to  know,  is 
rarely  a  permanent  force  in  politics,  and  the  most  active 
and  resolute  of  his  opponents  at  court  was  a  young  man 
who  owed  his  advancement  entirely  to  the  cardinal. 
Henri  d'Effiat,  marquis  de  Cinq-Mars,  was  the  son  of  the 
marquis  d'Effiat,  who  had  been  for  four  years  super- 
intendent of  finance,  but  had  won  more  renown  as  a 
military  leader.  Richelieu  had  brought  Cinq- Mars  to 
the  notice  of  Louis  XIII.  at  a  moment  when  he  wished 
to  divert  the  king's  interest  from  the  society  of  Made- 
moiselle d'Hautefort,  to  whom  Louis's  platonic  affections 
had  returned  after  the  retirement  of  Louise  de  la  Fayette. 
The  move  was  successful  in  gaining  its  immediate  end. 
Good  looks  and  an  attractive  manner  gained  for  Cinq- 
Mars  the  favour  of  the  king,  and  he  was  speedily 
advanced  to  the  office  of  grand  equerry.  But  this 
rapid  promotion  turned  his  head.  The  pleasures  and 
magnificence  of  the  court  failed  to  satisfy  him,  and  he 
aspired  to  the  rank  of  duke  and  peer,  to  military 
distinction,  and  to  political  ascendency.  Richelieu  saw 
clearly  that  he  must  resign  all  hope  of  using  Cinq-Mars 
as  a  submissive  tool,  and  he  consoled  himself  for  his 
disappointment  by  ruthlessly  snubbing  his  youthful 
ambitions.  His  pretensions  to  the  hand  of  Marie  de 
Gonzaga,  afterwards  queen  of  Poland,  were  treated  as  a 
piece  of  ridiculous  presumption.  His  endeavour  to 
remain  in  attendance  on  Louis  at  meetings  of  the 
council,  and  even  at  personal  conferences  between  the 
king  and  minister,  was  resented  as  a  gross  impertinence. 
Like  most  young  men,  Cinq -Mars  could  endure  any 


212  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

thing  better  than  contempt,  and  he  became  the  bitter 
enemy  of  his  former  patron.  Confident  in  his  secure 
hold  of  the  king's  affection,  he  resolved  to  play  the  part 
of  a  Luynes,  vainly  hoping  that  Eichelieu  would  be  as 
easily  got  rid  of  as  Concini  had  been. 

Cinq-Mars  had  been  an  accomplice  in  the  conspiracy 
of  Soissons,  and  had  been  terribly  frightened  by  its 
sudden  collapse.  But  his  courage  returned  when  he 
found  that  his  complicity  was  undiscovered,  and  he 
resumed  the  schemes  which  had  been  for  a  moment 
interrupted.  His  chief  confidant  was  Francois  de  Thou, 
a  son  of  the  famous  historian,  who  had  enjoyed  and 
then  forfeited  the  favour  of  Eichelieu.  He  seems  to 
have  been  genuinely  convinced  that  his  inconstant 
employer  was  the  oppressor  of  France  and  the  wanton 
disturber  of  the  peace  of  Europe.  Cinq-Mars  had  for 
a  time  entertained  the  idea  of  assassination  as  the  best 
method  of  removing  his  enemy,  but  de  Thou,  more 
upright  if  less  thoroughgoing,  persuaded  him  to  abstain 
from  crime  and  to  adhere  to  the  well-worn  methods  of 
conspiracy.  In  order  to  gain  a  refuge  and  a  rallying 
point,  in  case  armed  rebellion  became  imperative,  de 
Thou  was  sent  to  gain  over  the  veteran  intriguer, 
Bouillon,  who  was  still  in  possession  of  the  invaluable 
stronghold  of  Sedan.  As  a.  prince  of  the  blood  was 
deemed  indispensable  to  serve  as  a  figure-head  for  the 
rebels,  overtures  were  made  to  Gaston  of  Orleans,  who 
had  been  living  in  tranquil  obscurity  since  the  birth  of 
a  dauphin  had  reduced  him  to  comparative  insigni- 
ficance. Bouillon,  distrusting  the  strength  of  purely 
native  effort,  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  foreign  assist- 
ance. In  spite  of  the  opposition  of  de  Thou,  who  had 


i  RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS  213 

unusual  scruples  about  embarking  in  obvious  treason, 
Fontrailles,  another  friend  of  Cinq-Mars,  was  despatched 
to  procure  the  support  of  Spain,  on  condition  that  when 
peace  should  be  made  after  the  accomplishment  of  the 
coup  d'tiat  all  French  conquests  in  the  war  should  be 
surrendered.  In  the  meantime  no  efforts  were  to  be 
spared  by  the  favourite  to  detach  Louis  from  Richelieu's 
influence,  and  to  convince  the  king  that  his  own  com- 
fort, the  prosperity  of  France,  and  the  peace  of  Europe 
required  the  cardinal's  dismissal  as  an  indispensable 
condition. 

On  his  side  Eichelieu,  of  all  statesmen  the  best 
served  by  his  spies,  was  by  no  means  blind  to  the 
dangers  which  threatened  him.  He  had  made  a  last 
effort  to  disarm  Cinq-Mars  and  to  remove  him  from  the 
court  by  offering  him  the  government  of  Touraine. 
The  offer  was  refused,  and  from  that  moment  there 
was  open  war  between  the  two  men.  But  there  was 
as  yet  no  evidence  sufficient  to  convince  Louis  XIII. 
of  the  treasonable  designs  of  his  favourite,  and  until 
that  could  be  obtained  the  struggle  resolved  itself  into 
a  duel  for  the  dominant  influence  over  the  king;  and 
for  this  the  two  rivals  seemed  to  outside  observers  not 
unequally  matched. 

But  if  they  appeared  equally  matched  in  one  respect, 
in  others  the  contrast  was  complete  and  striking.  Cinq- 
Mars  was  in  the  prime  of  youthful  strength  and  beauty, 
confident  in  his  magnetic  charm  of  manner,  eager  to 
prove  his  yet  untried  and  possibly  overestimated  abilities, 
and  proudly  anticipating  the  brilliant  future  that  seemed 
to  await  him.  Eichelieu,  on  the  other  hand,  had  little 
to  hope  from  the  future.  He  had  never  enjoyed  real 


214  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

health  since  his  boyhood,  and  he  was  now  a  prematurely 
old  man,  broken  down  by  sixteen  years  of  incessant 
anxiety  and  uninterrupted  labours.  Louis  XIII.,  though 
a  much  younger  man,  was  also  in  feeble  heath.  During 
the  winter  his  death  had  seemed  more  than  possible,  and 
the  conspirators  had  busied  themselves  with  schemes 
for  the  exclusion  of  the  cardinal  from  all  share  in  the 
government  during  the  anticipated  minority.  The  king 
had  recovered,  but  he  was  never  more  than  an  invalid 
again,  and  he  was  not  destined  to  survive  the  cardinal 
by  many  months.  In  spite  of  their  weakness,  both  king 
and  minister  set  out  early  in  1642  to  superintend  in 
person  the  military  operations  in  Roussillon.  Travelling 
separately  and  by  easy  stages,  they  both  reached  Nar- 
bonne  in  March.  There  Richelieu,  prostrated  with 
fever  and  tortured  by  an  abscess  in  his  right  arm,  found 
that  farther  progress  was  impossible.  The  doctors 
advised  him  to  seek  a  more  healthy  air  in  Provence,  and 
Louis  XIII.,  after  a  delay  of  more  than  a  month,  set  out 
without  him  to  Perpignan  (April  21).  Richelieu's 
physical  sufferings  were  thus  reinforced  by  the  moral 
agony  which  it  caused  him  to  part  from  the  king  at 
this  critical  moment,  and  thus  to  leave  the  field  clear 
for  the  intrigues  of  his  youthful  rival.  For  another 
month  he  remained  at  Narbonne,  detained  partly  by 
anxiety  and  partly  by  weakness.  On  May  3,  conscious 
that  death  was  not  far  distant,  he  dictated  his  will  to  a 
notary  of  the  town.  The  bulk  of  his  property  he  left 
to  his  relatives,  with  the  exception  of  his  library,  which 
he  bequeathed  to  the  nation,  and  his  residence  in  Paris, 
the  Palais-Cardinal,  which  he  left  to  the  king,  together 
with  the  sum  of  1,500,000  livres  belonging  to  the 


x  RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS  215 

public  funds,  but  which  he  kept  in  his  own  hands  for 
use  as  occasion  might  arise.  Four  days  later  he  set  out 
on  his  painful  journey  to  Provence. 

Richelieu  had  reached  Aries  when  the  long-expected 
weapon  was  placed  in  his  hands,  in  the  shape  of  a  copy 
of  the  treaty  concluded  by  the  conspirators  with  Spain. 
How  the  secret  was  originally  betrayed  has  never  been 
known.  This  proof  of  treason  he  at  once  despatched  to 
Louis,  who  could  no  longer  hesitate  to  take  action. 
Probably  the  danger  on  this  side  had  never  been  as 
great  as  the  cardinal,  in  his  weakness  and  mistrust,  had 
dreaded.  Louis  had  not  for  a  moment  dreamed  of 
seriously  balancing  the  claims  of  the  favourite  and  the 
minister  to  his  confidence.  He  had  listened  to  the 
suggestions  and  accusations  of  Cinq-Mars  because  he 
had  always  found  it  easier  to  endure  than  to  check  the 
outbursts  of  those  around  him,  but  on  more  than  one 
occasion  he  had  been  sufficiently  outspoken  to  betray 
his  real  intention  to  any  one  whose  perceptions  were  not 
blinded  by  conceit  and  self-confidence.  The  arrival  of 
Richelieu's  communication  only  hastened  a  decision  that 
had  been  already  formed.  On  June  10  he  left  Perpignan 
and  returned  to  Narbonne.  Cinq-Mars  might  still  have 
escaped  by  a  prompt  flight  to  Sedan,  but  he  recklessly 
rushed  on  his  fate,  and  determined  to  follow  the  king. 
On  June  12  the  order  was  issued  for  the  imprisonment 
of  Cinq-Mars  and  de  Thou,  and  messengers  were  sent  to 
arrest  Bouillon  in  the  midst  of  the  army  in  Italy,  of 
which  he  had  lately  received  the  command.  The  king 
now  set  out  to  join  Richelieu  at  Tarascon,  and  on  June 
28  the  interview  took  place  in  the  cardinal's  chamber. 
There  the  king  and  minister,  both  in  bed,  agreed  upon 


216  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

the  steps  to  be  taken  for  the  maintenance  of  order  and 
the  punishment  of  the  guilty.  Two  days  later  Louis 
appointed  Richelieu  lieutenant-governor  of  the  kingdom 
with  the  full  powers  of  royalty,  and  set  out  on  his  return 
to  Paris,  having  neither  the  strength  nor  the  inclination 
to  revisit  Roussillon. 

The  collection  of  evidence  against  the  three  prisoners 
was  not  a  matter  of  difficulty.  Gaston  of  Orleans  was 
ready,  as  usual,  to  purchase  his  own  safety  by  betray- 
ing his  associates.  He  made  a  full  confession  of  his 
relations  with  Cinq-Mars  and  of  the  treaty  with  Spain, 
pleading  only  that  he  was  innocent  of  any  plot  for  the 
cardinal's  assassination.  To  inflict  an  adequate  punish- 
ment on  the  king's  brother  was  impossible,  but  Richelieu 
seized  the  opportunity  to  humiliate  his  ancient  adversary. 
Gaston  was  compelled  to  sign  a  full  deposition  for  use 
against  his  accomplices,  and  to  renounce  for  the  future 
all  claims  to  "  any  office,  employment,  or  administration 
in  the  kingdom."  On  these  terms  he  was  allowed  to 
reside  at  Blois  as  a  private  individual.  Nor  did 
Richelieu  spare  the  king  for  the  encouragement  which, 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  he  had  given  to  the  mal- 
contents. Louis  XIII.  was  compelled  to  turn  informer 
against  his  quondam  favourite,  and  to  confess  in  a  formal 
document  that  he  had  encouraged  Cinq -Mars  in  his 
freedom  of  speech  and  action  in  order  the  better  to 
ascertain  his  real  designs,  and  he  asserted  that  the  result 
of  this  policy,  more  worthy  of  a  spy  than  of  a  king,  was 
to  convince  him  that  his  grand  equerry  was  an  enemy  of 
the  state. 

Armed  with  these  depositions,  Richelieu  set  out  on 
August  1 7  for  Lyons  by  the  Rhone,  towing  his  prisoners 


X  RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS  217 

in  another  boat  behind  him.  Bouillon  had  already  been 
sent  to  Lyons,  and  there  the  trial  was  held  before  twelve 
commissioners,  including  the  notorious  and  indispensable 
Laubardemont.  The  guilt  of  Cinq -Mars  was  flagrant, 
and  he  made  no  attempt  to  deny  it ;  but  the  extent  of 
de  Thou's  complicity  was  by  no  means  equally  patent. 
But  any  hesitation  on  the  part  of  the  judges  was  re- 
moved by  the  discovery  of  an  ordinance  of  Louis  XL, 
which  declared  that  the  concealment  of  a  plot  against 
the  state  was  an  equal  offence  with  actual  partnership. 
The  two  friends  were  both  condemned  to  death  on 
September  12,  and  the  sentence  was  carried  out  on  the 
same  day.  Their  youth,  their  rigorous  treatment,  and 
the  heroism  with  which  they  met  their  fate,  have  earned 
for  Cinq-Mars  and  de  Thou  the  sympathy  both  of  con- 
temporaries and  posterity.  This  feeling  was  intensified 
by  the  escape  of  Bouillon,  who  was  at  least  equally 
guilty  ;  but  he  was  the  nephew  of  the  prince  of  Orange, 
an  ally  whom  France  had  every  reason  to  conciliate,  and 
he  had  a  valuable  hostage  for  his  own  life  in  the  fortress 
of  Sedan.,  On  condition  that  Sedan  should  be  sur- 
rendered to  the  crown,  Bouillon  obtained  a  full  pardon 
for  his  numerous  past  offences. 

The  conspiracy  of  Cinq-Mars  was  the  last  episode  of 
importance  in  the  life  of  Richelieu.  The  excitement  of 
the  struggle  had  revived  for  a  moment  his  failing  powers, 
but  with  its  subsidence  the  process  of  decline  became 
more  rapid  than  ever.  Unable  to  leave  his  litter,  he 
was  carried  slowly  from  Lyons  to  Paris,  travelling  where- 
over  possible  by  water.  Everywhere  he  was  received 
with  the  respectful  pomp  usually  displayed  only  for 
royalty.  In  some  towns  the  gates  were  too  narrow  to 


218  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

admit  the  spacious  litter,  and  the  wall  was  promptly 
demolished  to  make  room  for  its  entry.  At  Fontainebleau 
the  king  came  to  meet  him,  and  tried  to  atone  for  any 
past  coldness  by  the  unusual  warmth  of  his  greeting. 
From  Paris  Eichelieu  retired  to  his  favourite  residence 
at  Eueil,  where  he  received  a  visit  from  the  queen,  Anne 
of  Austria,  who  seems  to  have  at  last  been  reconciled 
with  her  dying  enemy.  On  November  4  he  returned 
from  Rueil  to  the  Palais-Cardinal,  which  he  was  never 
to  quit  alive. 

A  sense  of  exultation  may  well  have  buoyed  up  the 
spirits  of  the  dying  statesman.  He  was  master  of  France 
as  he  had  never  been  before.  His  domestic  enemies 
were  utterly  crushed.  One  of  the  most  inveterate  of  his 
opponents,  Mary  de  Medici,  had  died  in  this  summer  at 
Cologne,  endeavouring  to  the  last,  by  an  intentional  and 
exaggerated  parade  of  poverty,  to  excite  odium  against 
the  servant  of  old  days  whose  ingratitude  had  reduced  to 
such  misery  and  degradation  the  mother  of  a  French 
king  and  of  the  queens  of  Spain  and  England.  From 
all  quarters  of  Europe,  from  the  Pyrenees,  from  Italy, 
from  Franche  Cerate",  from  Germany,  the  news  came  of 
victories  which  convinced  Richelieu  that  the  work  of  his 
life  was  well  done,  and  that  the  star  of  the  Hapsburgs 
had  paled  before  that  of  the  Bourbons. 

But  this  feeling  of  exultation,  legitimate  as  it  was, 
could  not  quicken  his  failing  pulse,  nor  expel  the  fever 
from  his  weakened  and  emaciated  frame.  On  November 
2  9  the  mischief  spread  to  his  lungs ;  he  began  to  cough 
blood,  and  to  experience  great  difficulty  in  breathing. 
Though  he  lingered  for  nearly  a  week,  recovery  was 
henceforth  impossible.  The  doctors  tried  to  relieve  the 


x  RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS  219 

fever  by  frequent  bleedings,  but  the  remedy  only  in- 
creased the  general  weakness.  The  king  paid  him  two 
visits,  and  the  cardinal  took  the  opportunity  to  commend 
his  relatives  to  the  royal  protection  and  favour,  and  to 
advise  the  choice  of  Mazarin  as  his  own  successor.  The 
courage  and  composure  with  which  he  awaited  an  end 
which  he  knew  to  be  inevitable  excited  the  wonder  and 
admiration  of  all  his  attendants.  His  intellect  and  his 
iron  resolution  were  alike  unaffected  by  the  approach  of 
death.  Asked  whether  he  pardoned  his  enemies,  he 
replied :  "  Absolutely,  and  I  pray  God  to  condemn  me, 
if  I  have  had  any  other  aim  than  the  welfare  of  God 
and  of  the  state."1  On  November  3,  the  regular 
physicians  gave  up  all  hope,  and  abandoned  their  patient 
to  an  empiric,  whose  prescriptions  produced  such  a 
galvanic  effect  that  the  rumour  of  the  cardinal's  recovery 
spread  through  Paris.  But  the  revival  was  only  moment- 
ary; in  the  evening  he  relapsed  into  unconsciousness, 
which  was  only  broken  by  occasional  intervals  till  the 
following  mid-day,  when  a  groan  and  a  last  convulsion 
of  the  limbs  announced  that  all  was  over,  and  that  the 
man  who  had  been  for  so  many  years  the  great  motive- 
power  in  France  had  ceased  to  live. 

Louis  XIII.'s  studied  and  habitual  coldness  of  manner 
enabled  him  to  avoid  any  display  of  feeling  when  the 
news  arrived.  "  A  great  politician  has  departed  ! "  was 
the  only  ejaculation  that  escaped  him  on  hearing  of  the 
death  of  the  minister  whose  greatness  so  completely 

1  This  sentence,  like  the  deathbed  utterances  of  many  other 
eminent  men,  has  been  corrupted  by  tradition  into  a  more  epigram- 
matic form.  According  to  Madame  de  Motteville,  Richelieu  replied  : 
"  I  have  had  no  enemies  except  those  of  the  state." 


220  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

overshadowed  and  obscured  his  own  character.  But 
death  did  not  free  him  immediately  from  the  influence 
to  which  he  had  so  long  been  accustomed  to  yield.  The 
wishes  of  the  deceased  cardinal  were  carried  out  with 
scrupulous  and  almost  ostentatious  fidelity.  Mazarin, 
who  for  the  last  year  had  shared  all  Eichelieu's  secrets, 
was  .admitted  to  the  council  of  state  the  very  day  after 
his  employer's  death,  and  the  other  ministers  were  con- 
firmed in  their  offices.  The  lesser  posts  which  were 
vacated  by  Eichelieu's  death  were  divided  among  his 
relatives :  the  government  of  Brittany  was  conferred 
upon  la  Meilleraie  ;  the  offices  of  intendant  of  navigation 
and  governor  of  Brouage  were  given  to  the  marquis  de 
Breze ;  and  the  young  Armand  Jean  de  PontrCourlay, 
who  assumed  his  great-uncle's  title  of  due  de  Eichelieu, 
received  also  the  governorship  of  Havre.  A  royal  cir- 
cular to  the  provincial  governors  and  parliaments,  dated 
December  5,  announced  the  king's  determination  "to 
maintain  all  the  arrangements  made  during  the  ministry 
of  the  late  cardinal,  and  to  carry  out  all  the  plans  con- 
certed with  him  for  the  conduct  of  affairs  both  at  home 
and  abroad."  A  decree  for  the  formal  exclusion  of  the 
duke  of  Orleans  from  the  regency,  which  had  been 
drawn  up  in  deference  to  Eichelieu's  wishes,  was  regis- 
tered on  December  9,  in  spite  of  the  urgent  entreaties 
of  Gaston's  daughter,  the  famous  Mademoiselle.  The 
numerous  prisoners  and  exiles,  who  had  hailed  the  news 
of  the  cardinal's  death  as  the  signal  for  their  own  release 
and  triumph,  discovered,  to  their  disgust  and  disappoint- 
ment, that  no  leniency  was  to  be  expected  from  the 
government. 

But  no  man  can   continue   long  to  rule  from   the 


x  RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS  221 

tomb,  and  the  strenuous  and  resolute  policy  of  Richelieu 
was  unsuited  to  the  more  subtle  and  agile  mind  of  his 
successor.  Mazarin  had  all  an  Italian's  love  for  the 
refinements  of  intrigue,  and  was  confident  that  it  was 
both  safer  and  easier  to  bend  his  opponents  than  to  try 
to  break  them.  Gradually  a  new  policy  of  leniency 
and  concession  was  introduced  instead  of  the  older 
methods  of  stern  repression.  The  prison  doors  were 
opened,  and  the  eager  exiles  were  allowed  to  return  to 
France.  The  decree  against  Gaston  was  revoked,  and 
he  was  even  nominated  to  the  office  of  lieutenant-governor 
of  the  kingdom  during  the  approaching  minority.  The 
change  of  attitude  involved  dangers  and  difficulties, 
which  Mazarin  may  have  foreseen,  and  which  he  cer- 
tainly succeeded  in  the  end  in  overcoming.  But  Louis 
XIII.,  whose  growing  ill-health  made  him  the  passive 
instrument  of  his  new  adviser,  did  not  live  to  witness 
the  results  of  the  change.  His  death  (May  14,  1643) 
left  his  widow  and  infant  son  to  face  the  problems  of 
domestic  disorder  and  rebellion,  and  the  consequent 
prolongation  of  the  war  with  Spain.  That  the  Fronde 
proved  in  the  end  a  harmless  and  almost  a  ridiculous 
movement  was  due  to  Richelieu,  who  had  deprived  the 
nobles  and  parliaments  of  all  substantial  power;  that 
the  Fronde  occurred  at  all  was  due  to  Mazarin's  inability 
to  rule  with  the  same  iron  hand  as  his  more  illustrious 
predecessor. 

It  is  needless  to  dilate  further  upon  the  greatness  of 
Richelieu's  achievements,  or  upon  the  magnitude  of  the 
influence  which  he  exercised  upon  both  France  and 
Europe.  That  influence  was  so  great  and  so  lasting 


222  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

that  it  continued  to  be  felt  until  a  new  France  and  a 
new  Europe  were  evolved  from  the  ruins  caused  by  the 
Revolution  and  by  the  insensate  ambition  of  Napoleon, 
and  even  then  it  was  not  wholly  extinct.  In  the  case 
of  France,  indeed,  it  may  be  held  that  the  traditions  of 
Richelieu's  administration  were  regarded  with  excessive 
and  almost  fatal  veneration.  In  the  next  century,  when 
domestic  conditions  had  become  almost  intolerable,  and 
when  wholly  new  problems  had  arisen  in  foreign  politics, 
one  generation  of  ministers  after  another  adhered  with 
blind  tenacity  and  fidelity  to  the  old  lines  of  French 
policy.  By  these  methods,  and  under  these  conditions, 
France  had  been  raised  to  greatness,  and  it  was  un- 
consciously argued  that  to  depart  from  them  must  result 
in  bringing  the  country  to  ruin.  Two  instances  out  of 
many  may  suffice  to  illustrate  the  excessive  importance 
attached  to  Richelieu's  example.  In  order  to  check  the 
power  of  Austria  in  the  east,  Richelieu  had  organised  a 
policy  of  alliance  with  three  client  states — Sweden, 
Poland,  and  Turkey.  In  the  eighteenth  century  these 
three  states  had  so  declined  in  power  that  they  could 
no  longer  serve  the  purpose  for  which  France  had 
supported  them,  and  in  the  meantime  a  wholly  new 
factor  had  been  introduced  into  eastern  politics  by  the 
rise  of  Russia.  A  great  statesman  would  have  seen  the 
necessity  of  modifying  the  policy  of  France  to  suit  these 
altered  conditions,  but  the  French  Government  persisted 
in  regarding  the  maintenance  of  the  client  states  as  its 
primary  duty.  The  result  was  to  alienate  Russia  and 
to  force  her  into  an  unnatural  alliance  with  Austria,  and 
France  had  in  consequence  to  suffer  the  profound  humilia- 
tion of  witnessing  the  partition  of  Poland  without  being 


x  RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS  223 

able  to  move  a  finger  for  its  prevention.  Again,  the 
dominant  aim  of  Richelieu's  foreign  policy  was  to  abase 
the  house  of  Hapsburg,  and  this  end  was  achieved  partly 
by  himself  and  partly  by  his  successors  following  in  his 
footsteps.  So  thoroughly  was  the  work  done  that  in  the 
next  century  the  Hapsburgs  had  wholly  ceased  to  be 
formidable  to  France,  and  French  interests  imperatively 
demanded  the  maintenance  of  Austria  to  secure  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe.  But  the  permanence  of 
the  Richelieu  tradition  prevented  France  from  grasping 
this  patent  fact  until  1756,  and  till  then  the  government 
continued  to  act  as  if  its  primary  duty  was  to  erase 
Austria  from  the  list  of  great  states.  This  led  directly 
to  the  elevation  of  Prussia,  destined  to  deal  a  terrible 
blow  to  French  ascendency  and  prestige,  and  to  the 
forfeiture  to  England  of  the  leading  part  in  maritime 
and  colonial  enterprise. 

It  only  remains  to  say  something  of  the  character  of 
the  great  statesman  whose  career  has  been  sketched  in 
the  foregoing  pages.  It  is  impossible  to  contend  that 
Richelieu  was  wholly  admirable  as  a  man,  however 
much  admiration  may  be  extorted  by  his  political 
achievements.  His  portrait  in  the  Louvre,  the  master- 
piece of  Philip  of  Champagne,  impresses  the  observer 
with  the  conviction  that  he  was  no  vulgar,  domineering 
bully.  His  clear-cut  and  delicate  features — the  white 
hair  contrasting  >  sharply  with  the  dark  moustache  and 
pointed  beard — suggest  rather  the  man  of  letters  or  the 
ascetic  priest  than  the  masterful  politician  who  for  so 
many  years  dominated  both  France  and  her  enemies. 
But  there  is  the  suggestion  at  once  of  power  and  of 
irritability  in  the  thin  and  compressed  lips.  One  realises 


224  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

that  it  is  the  face  of  a  man  who  has  suffered  much, 
even  if  he  has  achieved  much ;  of  a  man  who  has  not 
gained  his  end  without  pain  and  labour.  The  fact  that 
Richelieu's  health  was  never  strong,  and  that  he  was 
constantly  subject  to  physical  pain,  must  be  always 
borne  in  mind  if  we  wish  really  to  understand  his 
character  and  to  appreciate  the  marvel  of  the  work 
which  he  accomplished.  From  his  early  manhood  he 
suffered  from  excruciating  headaches — the  result  of  a 
fever  contracted  in  the  marshes  of  Poitou, — and  these 
often  lasted  for  several  days  at  a  time.  In  one  of  his 
letters  he  says  :  "  I  think  I  have  one  of  the  worst  heads 
in  the  world,"  and  adds  with  a  touch  of  humour  not 
usual  with  him,  "  There  are  many  who  will  agree  with 
this,  but  in  another  sense." 

In  spite  of  this  physical  weakness  his  industry  was 
incessant  and  exhausting.  He  was  not  one  of  those 
statesmen  who  are  content  to  frame  the  broad  lines  of 
policy  and  to  leave  the  details  to  be  worked  out  by 
subordinates.  Nothing  was  too  small  or  unimportant 
for  his  attention,  though  he  never  lost  sight  of  the 
general  aim  amid  the  multiplicity  of  minute  details. 
His  system  of  spies  was  the  most  extensive  and  alert 
that  was  ever  organised  by  any  statesman.  And  the 
activity  of  his  informants  was  by  no  means  limited  to 
affairs  of  state  ;  they  had  to  bring  the  latest  gossip 
from  the  salons,  the  news  of  literary  productions  and 
quarrels,  the  current  talk  of  the  streets  and  the  theatres. 
The  cardinal's  information  was  always  so  full  and  accurate 
that  it  was  believed  that  priests  betrayed  to  him  the 
secrets  of  the  confessional.  On  one  occasion  the  papal 
nuncio  brought  him,  as  a  great  piece  of  intelligence, 


x  RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS  225 

the  overtures  made  by  Gaston  to  the  vice-legate  of 
Avignon.  Bichelieu  acknowledged  the  communication 
by  stating  the  terms  of  the  answer  returned  by  the 
vice-legate.  But  he  had  to  pay  the  penalty  for  his 
multifarious  knowledge  in  the  enormous  amount  of 
labour  which  it  entailed.  Night  and  day  secretaries 
were  in  attendance  to  copy  from  his  dictation  or  his 
rough  drafts.  Many  of  his  personal  letters  are  dated 
in  the  night.  It  was  his  habit  to  go  to  bed  about 
eleven,  and  after  sleeping  for  four  or  five  hours  to  rise 
and  work  till  six,  when  he  would  return  to  bed  to 
snatch  another  brief  interval  of  oblivion  till  he  rose  for 
the  day  between  half-past  seven  and  eight. 

The  whole  weight  of  affairs  rested  upon  Eichelieu. 
He  was  not  only  a  first  minister,  but  practically  a  sole 
minister.  The  mistrust  inspired  by  his  numerous  and 
watchful  enemies  impelled  him  to  keep  all  the  strings 
of  home  and  foreign  politics,  of  military  and  naval 
administration,  in  his  own  hands ;  and  the  responsi- 
bility must  have  been  at  times  almost  overwhelming  to 
a  man  who  lived  a  life  so  essentially  solitary.  Nothing 
in  Richelieu's  career  is  more  striking  than  his  isolation. 
He  had  dependents,  flatterers,  and  tools  in  plenty ; 
but  with  the  exception  of  the  mysterious  Father  Joseph 
he  had  no  confidential  friend,  no  one  with  whom  he 
could  freely  discuss  personal  and  public  affairs,  no  one 
who  could  relieve  him  of  some  part  of  his  burden  by 
sharing  his  secrets  and  anxieties.  He  was  extremely  in- 
accessible ;  even  foreign  envoys  could  only  gain  admission 
to  his  presence  when  the  business  to  be  discussed  was  of 
special  importance.  He  never  quitted  his  residence  with- 
out the  attendance  of  his  personal  bodyguard,  paid  from 

Q 


226  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

his  own  purse  and  officered  by  his  own  nominees.  Even 
in  the  royal  palace  he  insisted  upon  retaining  their 
services.  It  was  this  habit  of  jealous  suspicion,  rather 
than  the  prompting  of  family  affection,  that  led  him  to 
promote  to  high  office  his  own  relatives,  as  his  brother- 
in-law,  de  Br^ze",  his  cousin,  la  Meilleraie,  and  his 
nephew,  de  Pont-Courlay.  His  own  colleagues  in  the 
ministry  were  little  more  than  clerks  who  carried  out 
instructions  received  from  the  cardinal. 

The  burden  of  labour  and  responsibility  which  de- 
volved upon  Eichelieu,  partly  by  his  own  choice  and 
partly  by  compulsion,  must  have  been  rendered  all  the 
heavier  by  the  extraordinary  uncertainty  of  his  own 
position.  The  king's  health  was  never  strong,  and  on 
several  occasions  his  life  was  in  serious  danger  from 
disease.  If  he  had  died  at  any  time  before  the  birth 
of  the  dauphin — born,  it  must  be  remembered,  after 
twenty-two  years  of  barren  wedlock — the  royal  power, 
which  Richelieu  himself  had  so  immensely  strengthened, 
would  have  passed  at  once  to  the  cardinal's  arch-enemy, 
Gaston  of  Orleans.  Nor  was  Richelieu's  hold  over 
Louis  XIII.  by  any  means  secure,  at  any  rate  in  the 
earlier  years  of  his  ministry.  Louis  was  no  mere  puppet, 
as  has  been  often  represented.  His  understanding  was 
retentive  though  slow ;  he  took  a  keen  interest  in 
public  business,  especially  in  its  details,  and  he  had  a 
large  share  of  the  obstinacy  and  self-confidence  of  his 
mother.  In  order  to  obtain  and  keep  the  king's 
confidence,  in  spite  of  the  domestic  and  other  influences 
always  at  work  against  him,  Richelieu  had  to  act  with 
great  tact  and  caution.  He  never  ventured  to  take 
any  step  without  the  king's  consent,  and  it  is  certain 


x  RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS  227 

that  Louis  would  never  have  tolerated  such  an  assertion 
of  independent  authority.  Hence  the  necessity  of 
constant  conferences  or  correspondence,  which  the 
courtiers  hoped  and  believed  would  so  bore  the  king 
that  he  would  ultimately  seek  to  escape  from  such 
enthralling  conditions.  On  every  minute  point  of  policy 
and  administration  Richelieu  found  it  necessary  not 
only  to  convince  Louis — in  itself  a  toilsome  task — but 
also  to  create  in  his  mind  the  impression  that  the 
ultimate  decision  was  not  the  overmastering  will  of  the 
minister  but  the  independent  product  of  the  royal 
intellect.  While  Richelieu  was  so  stern  and  awe-inspir- 
ing towards  the  outside  world,  he  had  to  play  the  supple 
and  pliant  courtier  in  the  presence  of  the  master  on 
whose  favour  and  confidence  all  his  own  authority  was 
based. 

The  charge  most  frequently  brought  against  Richelieu 
is  that  of  cruelty  and  vindictiveness,  and  it  is  a  charge 
that  cannot  possibly  be  denied.  Among  the  victims 
who  perished  on  the  scaffold  for  opposition  to  his  rule 
were  "five  dukes,  four  counts,  a  marshal  of  France, 
and  the  king's  favourite  equerry,  Cinq-Mars."  To  these 
must  be  added  a  number  of  lesser  offenders  who  were  put 
to  death,  and  the  many  opponents,  of  all  ranks,  who  were 
condemned  to  imprisonment  in  the  Bastille  or  driven 
into  exile  in  foreign  lands  by  the  minister  whose 
enmity  they  had  incurred.  But  if  Richelieu  was  pitiless, 
he  was  not,  like  most  revengeful  despots,  either 
capricious  or  unjust.  He  did  not  strike  the  tool  if  he 
could  reach  the  employer ;  nor  did  he  strike  till  guilt 
was  obvious  and  incontestable ;  his  was  no  reckless 
reign  of  terror.  His  methods,  though  often  arbitrary 


228  RICHELIEU  CHAP. 

and  contrary  to  legal  custom  and  tradition,  were  always 
fearless  and  above-board.  Political  considerations 
sometimes  made  it  impossible  to  inflict  a  fitting  penalty 
upon  men  who  richly  deserved  it,  such  as  de  Bouillon 
and  the  traitorous  Gaston,  but  the  motive  that  allowed 
them  to  escape  was  never  terror  nor  a  wish  to  curry 
favour.  And  the  experience  of  Mazarin's  administration 
supplies  a  retrospective  justification  for  Richelieu's 
severity.  He  was  undoubtedly  right  from  his  own 
point  of  view  in  acting  upon  the  maxim  of  Machiavelli 
that  "  it  is  safer  to  be  feared  than  to  be  loved."  It  was 
the  sense  of  impunity  that  had  made  the  nobles 
independent  and  rebellious ;  this  feeling  had  been 
strengthened  by  the  concessions  and  pardons  of  the 
regency,  and  the  only  way  to  remove  it  and  to  compel 
obedience  was  by  making  their  punishments  prompt, 
severe,  and  impartial.  The  element  of  personal  resent- 
ment, which  seems  to  disfigure  and  condemn  Richelieu's 
pitiless  treatment  of  his  foes,  is  accounted  for  by  the 
sublime  confidence  with  which  he  identified  his  own 
ascendency  with  the  welfare  of  the  state,  a  confidence 
without  which  few  rulers  have  been  able  to  achieve  really 
great  work.  Finally,  whatever  we  may  think  of  the 
morality  of  Richelieu's  actions,  it  is  impossible  not  to 
be  impressed  by  the  magnificent  courage  with  which, 
almost  single-handed,  he  faced  the  most  powerful  nobles 
of  the  land,  allied  as  they  were  with  members  of  the 
royal  family,  and  backed  up  from  outside  by  great 
foreign  powers.  And  this  courage  becomes  the  more 
memorable  when  we  remember  that  Richelieu  was  no 
demagogue,  supported  by  the  enthusiastic  and  encourag- 
ing applause  of  the  masses  of  the  people.  On  the 


x  RICHELIEU'S  LAST  YEARS  •  229 

contrary,  the  successes  which  attended  France  were 
obscured  to  contemporaries  by  the  material  sufferings 
which  were  caused  by  military  expenditure  and 
defective  financial  wisdom.  In  his  later  years 
Richelieu  was  detested  by  the  populace,  and  it  is  said 
that  bonfires  were  kindled  in  many  provinces  of  the 
kingdom  to  celebrate  the  death  of  the  statesman  who  has 
been  hailed  by  the  almost  unanimous  opinion  of  later 
generations  as  the  grandest  figure  among  those  who 
have  contributed  most  to  the  greatness  of  France. 


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APPENDIX   B 

THE  CHIEF  BOOKS  ON  THE  PERIOD 

I  HAVE  not  attempted  to  compile  a  complete  bibliography 
of  writings  on  the  age  of  Richelieu,  nor  even  to  draw  up  a 
list  of  all  the  authorities  which  I  have  consulted.  My  only 
object  is  to  call  the  attention  of  the  reader,  who  may  wish 
to  make  a  more  detailed  study  of  the  period,  to  those  books 
which  he  is  likely  to  find  most  helpful  and  accessible. 

Richelieu,  Memoires,    1610-1638    (Petitot's   collection,   2nd 

series,    xxi.-xxx.  ;    Michaud   et  Poujoulat,   2nd    series, 

vii.-ix.). 
Richelieu,    Succincte   narration   des   grandes   actions   du   Roi 

(Petitot,   2nd   series,   xi.  ;  Michaud  et   Poujoulat,    2nd 

series,  ix.). 
Richelieu,  Lettres,  Instructions  Diplomatiques  et  Papiers  d'JZtat, 

edited  by  M.  d'Avenel.     Paris,  8  volumes,  1853-1877. 
Harangue    pour    la   presentation   des  cahiers,    ou   cWture    de 

Vassemblee,  aux  Etats,  prononce'  par   I'e've'que  de  Lucon, 

orateur  du  clerge*  (Petitot,  2nd  series  xi.,  p.  201). 
Fontenay-Mareuil,     Memoires    (Petitot,    1st    series,    1.,    li ; 

Michaud  et  Poujoulat,  2nd  series,  v.). 

Bassompierre,  Memoires  (Michaud  et  Poujoulat,  2nd  series,  vi.). 
De  Brienne,  Memoires  (Michaud  et  Poujoulat,  3rd  series,  iii.  ; 

Petitot,  2nd  series,  xxxv.,  xxxvi.). 

D'Efitrdes,  Memoires  (Michaud  et  Poujoulat,  2nd  series,  vi). 
De  Pontis,  Memoires  (Michaud  et  Poujoulat,  2nd  series,  vi.). 
Mathieu  MoM,  Memoires  (Socidte  de  THistoire  de  France, 

Paris,  1855-1857). 


APPENDIX  B  233 

Omer-Talon,  Memoires  (Michaud  et  Poujotilat,  3rd  series,  vi.). 
Arnauld  d'Andilly,   Memoires  (Michaud    et    Poujoulat,    2nd 

series,  ix.). 
Madame  de  Motteville,  Memoires  (Michaud  et  Poujoulat,  2nd 

series,  x.). 
De    Eohan,    Memoires    (1610-1629)    and    Mdmoires   sur    la 

Guerre   de  la    Valtelline   (Michaud    et    Poujoulat,    2nd 

series,  v.). 

Montchal,  Memoires  (Rotterdam,  1718). 
Aubery,    L'Histoire    du    Cardinal- Due    de    Richelieu    (Paris, 

1660  ;  Cologne,  2  volumes,  1666). 
Aubery,     Memoires     pour    I'histoire     du    Cardinal -Due    de 

Richelieu  (Paris,  1660  ;  Cologne,  5  volumes,  1667). 
Martineau,  Le  Cardinal  de  Richelieu,  tome  i.  (Paris,  1870). 
Hanotaux,  Histoire   du  Cardinal  de   Richelieu,   tome    i.,  La 

jeunesse  de  Richelieu,  1585-1614  (Paris,  1893). 
Griffet,  Histoire  du  Regne  de  Louis  XIII.  (Paris,  1758). 
Bazin,  Histoire  de  France  sous  Louis  XIII.  et  sous  le  ministbre 

du  Cardinal   Mazarin    (4    volumes,   Paris,    1846,    2nd 

edition). 
Henri    Martin,  Histoire  de    France,  tome  xi.    (4th    edition, 

Paris,  1859). 
Ranke,  Franzosische    Geschichte,   vornehmlich   im   sechszehnten 

und  siebzehnten    Jahrhundert,  Band  ii.  (Leipzig,    1876, 

Vierte  Auflage). 
D'Avenel,    Richelieu  et    la   Monarchic    Absolue    (4  volumes, 

Paris,  1884-1892). 
Topin,  Louis  XIII.  et  Richelieu,  Etude  Historique,  accompagnee 

des  lettres  ineUites  du  Roi  au  Cardinal  de  Richelieu  (2nd 

edition,  Paris,  1876). 
Caillet,    L' 'Administration    en    France    sous   le   ministere    du 

Cardinal  de  Richelieu  (Paris,  1857). 


APPENDIX  C 

THE  TESTAMENT  POLITIQUE 

ONE  of  the  most  keenly-debated  points  in  connection  with 
Richelieu  is  that  of  the  authenticity  of  the  Testament  Politique, 
which  was  originally  published  at  Amsterdam  in  1688,  and 
of  which  I  have  consulted  the  Paris  edition  of  1764.  The 
first  chapter,  which  has  been  printed  in  the  collections  of  M. 
Petitot  and  of  MM.  Michaud  and  Poujoulat,  under  the  title 
of  Succinde  narration  des  grandes  actions  du  Roi,  has  been 
generally  admitted  to  be  a  genuine  work  of  the  cardinal's, 
and  to  be  equally  authentic  with  the  Memoirs.  With  this 
view  I  entirely  agree.  But  the  second  chapter,  the  Testa- 
ment proper,  to  which  the  Succincte  narration  serves  as  a 
sort  of  introduction,  has  been  the  subject  of  much  discussion 
from  the  time  of  Voltaire  downwards.  In  the  present 
century  there  has  been  a  growing  tendency  to  treat  it  as  an 
authoritative  statement  of  Richelieu's  political  opinions  in 
his  later  years.  M.  Henri  Martin  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that 
"  the  genius  of  the  cardinal,  whatever  may  be  said  to  the 
contrary,  is  as  obvious  in  the  complete  Testament  as  in  the 
first  chapter  :  the  lion's  mark  is  to  be  traced  in  a  thousand 
passages,  and  the  powerful  personality  of  Richelieu  is  re- 
vealed by  a  crowd  of  traits  which  the  abbe  de  Bourzeis 
could  never  have  invented."  This  very  positive  opinion 
seems  to  me  to  be  wholly  untenable.  The  external  evi- 
dence is  quite  indecisive  one  way  or  the  other,  but  the 
internal  evidence,  both  of  style  and  matter,  seems  to  be 
conclusive  against  the  authenticity  of  the  work.  It  is 
possible  that  the  general  plan  may  have  been  sketched  out 


APPENDIX  C  235 

by  Richelieu  and  filled  in  by  a  subordinate,  but  in  that  case 
it  can  hardly  have  undergone  the  cardinal's  revision,  and  its 
value  as  evidence  of  his  opinions  is  almost  as  slight  as  if  it 
were  an  intentional  forgery  ;  and  the  latter  seems  to  me  to 
be,  on  the  whole,  much  the  more  probable  solution.  In 
accordance  with  this  conviction  I  have  carefully  abstained 
— in  spite  of  obvious  temptations  to  the  contrary — from 
making  any  use  of  the  Testament  as  a  guide  to  the  real  aims 
of  Richelieu's  policy.  And  I  am  further  of  opinion  that,  if 
its  authenticity  could  be  conclusively  proved,  the  current 
estimates  of  Richelieu  would  have  to  be  not  merely  added 
to,  but  profoundly  modified.  Especially  the  striking  saying 
of  Mignet,  that  "  he  intended  everything  which  he  achieved," 
would  have  to  be  abandoned,  and  many  results  of  his  rule, 
which  are  now  attributed  to  intelligent  purpose,  would  have 
to  be  regarded  as  the  product  of  chance. 


THE    END 


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